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This dissertation addresses the following research question. 
Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits of 
entering into interagency agreements vary by city? 
Employing data obtained from 183 human service agencies in six 
western cities, organizational emphases on two classes of goals as 
they relate to the decision to interact with other agencies are 
assessed as functions of six organizational variables and city. The 
organizational variables include organizational goal, reliance on 
federal sources for funding, and a range of environmental uncertainty 
measures. The two classes of organizational goals studied are: first, 
those which directly accrue to the agency itself, and second, those 
which accrue directly to entities outside the organization. 
Findings suggest that while emphases on intraorganizational 
goals are invariant between cities, those pertaining to extra-
organizational entities may well vary between locales. These findings 
bear theoretical implications for the future study of organizations, 
and practical implications for entities seeking to develop programs or 
regulations for application across broadly defined jurisdictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Daniel Bell (1973) and numerous others have noted that in many 
important ways, the United states is entering into an age of organiza-
tions. The escalation of governments' roles in citizens' lives, the 
expansion of large firms' roles in the economy, the steady expansion 
of influence among politically-oriented organizations, and a host of 
other developments all support Bell's position. 
Perhaps nowhere is this point more poignantly apparent than in 
the human service industry. By anyone's standards, the role of this 
industry has expanded considerably during recent years. Federal ex-
penditures on aging services, for example, increased by over 930% in 
the 13 years culminating in 1978 (Estes, 1979, p. 50). Organizations--
non-profit organizations, primarily--have constituted the primary means 
by which these resources have been transformed into programs at the 
local level. 
The nature of the human services industry is in many ways unique 
in the American economy. A number of characteristics contribute to 
this singularity. 
Perhaps most readily apparent is the limited geographic scope 
within which most human services agencies operate. While funding 
sources tend to be concentrated at the federal and state echelons of 
government, the actual delivery of services is typically undertaken by 
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organizations serving a single locale. Frequently, though not always, 
limited by charter to given jurisdictions, service delivery is most 
often limited in practice by the distance which can reasonably be 
traveled by q~ients or service delivery personnel. The ultimate 
result of this limitation of geographic scope in service provision is 
the independent existence of similar service delivery systems in 
different locales. In short, virtually all cities and towns exceeding 
certain critical population thresholds have service delivery systems 
which are quite similar in many respects to those of other cities and 
towns of similar size. 
A second key characteristic of the human services industry is 
the non-profit nature of many of its organizations. While profit-
oriented organizations are not unknown (particularly in health-related 
fields), the modal organization in the delivery of social services 
cannot, by charter, orient toward the accumulation of profit in its 
operations. 
A third characteristic of agencies in the human services industry 
lies in the independent origination of organizations. While notable 
exceptions to the more general case exist, most service agencies are 
founded by local individuals or groups reacting to local problems. 
Once formed, outside funding is generally attained to allow actual 
service delivery, but the creation of the organizations is typically 
local. 
A fourth and more recent development in the human services 
industry is the creation by federal agencies of local coordinating 
organizations with the mandated function of integrating local services 
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into service networks designed to meet the needs of a targeted class 
of clients (O'Brien et al., 1975). In this horizontal integration of 
service agencies, the emphasis rests on the ordering of agencies and 
of their services. This allows identification of potential duplica-
tion and also of "gaps" in service, with potentially beneficial impacts 
on system-wide costs and effectiveness. 
Horizontal integration also allows for another, more client-
oriented benefit. For the most part, service agencies are founded on 
a problem orientation. As examples, Legal Aid provides legal assis-
tance, health agencies treat their clients' medical maladies, and 
family counseling addresses problems of a familial type. While excep-
tions exist to the general condition, in the end result lie two 
potential problems. First, multi-problem clients may encounter 
difficulties in having all their various maladies treated. Second, 
and not entirely unrelated to the first, specific classes within an 
overall client population may not find their particular needs met at 
all. 
One way to remedy these problems lies in the coordination of 
problem-oriented service agencies so as to create an identifiable 
pattern of services capable of meeting the needs characteristic of an 
identifiable client group. This can be accomplished through the 
addition to the local service industry of organizations oriented to 
the focal classes of client, and which have as their mandate the 
creation of such service networks. 
In essence this strategy promotes the development of a human 
service "supermarket" with a "complete stock" of services. The range 
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of services is geared to the focal client group, and clients use those 
elements of the system which are consistent with their needs. Each 
service is available to other classes of clients as well as that under 
consideration, so that eacr. agency may participate in as many networks 
as there are defined client groups. While not performing services in 
the normal sense of the word, the coordinating agency can serve a 
viable function on a relatively small budget in three ways: (1) by 
coordinating a system out of a less organized group of service 
providers; (2) by making known the needs and interests of its particu-
lar class of clients; and (3) by advocating with other, more function-
oriented Community Decision Organizations (Warren, 1967). 
Area Agencies on Aging represent this type of organization 
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1975). Operating under the provisions of the 1973 
amendments to the 1965 Older Americans' Act, Area Agencies on Aging 
(AAAs) operate in jurisdictions serving virtually the entirety of 
America's population. While predominantly operational at the city or 
county level, a number of states have also implemented these offices 
at the state echelon. Their job, in short, lies in the development 
and coordination of services available to the elderly: stated dif-
ferently, AAAs' function lies in systematizing local service provision 
and thereby in improving system-wide service delivery to the locale's 
aged clientele. 
The efficient application of integrating strategies among 
previously existing organizations demands that coordinating agencies 
be able to identify coordinative strategies which "fit" the organiza-
tions to be integrated. Stated alternatively, the strategies employed 
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by AAAs must alter the behavior of needed service agencies in such a 
way as to induce their cooperation in serving aging clients in concert 
with the activities of other agencies. To do so demands an under-
standing of organizational behavior. 
To date, however, much of the foundation upon which organiza-
tional theory is based simply does not apply well to the field of 
human services provision. 
The standard microeconomic model of rational behavior by firms 
has been under attack for a considerable period of time. In a succes-
sion of considerable duration, critics have joined one another in 
pointing out that various weaknesses in the model itself and in the 
assumptions which accompany the model make it unsuitable for analyzing 
the activities and decisions of individual organizations. While the 
rationales for critiquing the microeconomic approach vary, the conclu-
sion reached by most authors is a decision making model in which 
profit is a factor, but not the sole factor in determining organiza-
tional behavior. Firms under these models act to maximize utility to 
the greatest extent possible, and they accomplish this end by pursuing 
multiple l often competing goals. 
Most microeconomic analyses are confined to organizations within 
the private sector. In this context, where profit is ultimately a 
prerequisite to continued operation, the utility function employed by 
firms invariably contains a profit-related goal, although it is often 
couched in terms which at best serve to proxy the actual measure. 
Few attempts have been made to incorporate these utility func-
tions with the findings of a burgeoning literature on organizational 
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theory, which has its roots in psychology and sociology. While based 
in the parallel orientation of social exchange theory, the specifica-
tion of commodities of exchange and of organizational goals presented 
by this approach have the potential not only for enriching the narrower 
products of economic inquiry, but additionally offer the promise of 
extending the basic concepts of utility theory to areas where profits 
per se are inappropriate--non-profit organizations. It further 
provides explicit mechanisms through which to relate organizational 
behavior to characteristics of the organization's environment. 
In the context of human service organizations, the role of the 
environment in the determination of organizational behavior is likely 
to be great. As noted earlier, organizations in this industry are 
typically linked directly to their environments through a range of 
operational processes and historical associations. In conjunction 
with the limited geographic scale of most such organizations' opera-
tional territories, these linkages can combine to promote high degrees 
of responsiveness to local inputs among organizations in this industry. 
Subject to differences borne of scale and other differentiating 
characteristics, this responsiveness can reasonably be expected to 
influence organizationn in other industries as well. 
This dissertation has as its goal the assessment of inter-local 
differences in the operational goals of human service organizations. 
Analysis will be heavily based on the Primitive Economy Model of 
organizational operation (O'Brien, 1976b), which relates organizational 
activity both to intraorganizational goals and to goals identified 
primarily with beneficiaries outside the organization. Operationalized 
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through a modified utility function, this model permits the comparison 
of goal orientations between agencies in different cities. 
The dissertation's analyses are based on a sample of 183 human 
service agencies located in six western cities. Assessments of inter-
city differences in goal orientation are based on analysis of variance 
and analysis of co-variance models. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter is devoted to illustrating the theoretical founda-
tions upon which the Primitive Economy Model is based. Accordingly, 
the theoretical bases for the PEM will be explored and interrelated 
in order to create a conceptual backdrop against which the PEM's 
contributions may be presented. 
The model's development will begin with a brief explication of 
the microeconomic theory of the firm. This description will concen-
trate on the behavioral characteristics ascribed to the firm by 
microeconomists, and will pursue these observations to the point of 
developing a simple model of organizational decision making behavior. 
Next, the chapter will catalog a number of the objections to the 
"Classical Theory of the Firm"l (Simon, 1959) which have been regis-
tered by organizational analysts. Suggestions for alternative models 
of organizational behavior will be developed into a general formulation 
based upon that which was cited in the microeconomic context. 
The chapter's third section will explore the contributions of 
lFollowing the lead of Dr. Simon (1959), the term "Classical 
Theory of the Firm" will be employed in this dissertation to denote 
the microeconomic model of the firm, and not to provide specific 
reference to a "classical" period or body of thought within economics. 
Based on the work of Smith (1909) and Marshall (1948) r the classical 
theory of the firm posits organizational behavior in sole pursuit of 
profit, perfect competition, atomistic competitors, and market trans-
actions. Throughout this dissertation, classical theory of the firm 
and "the microeconomic model" will be employed interchangeably, and 
will be synonymous. 
exchange theorists to the field of organizational analysis, again 
ultimately including these observations in a general formulation of 
organizational behavior based upon that which was developed earlier. 
9 
The Primitive Economy Model of organizational behavior will be 
introduced in Chapter III. Itsties to the work of earlier theorists 
will be illustrated, and its further contributions discussed. As with 
the other approaches addressed earlier, the PEM will be re-stated in 
a general formulation based upon the earlier sections of the chapter. 
This model will constitute the foundation upon which the dissertation's 
analytical endeavors will be based. 
THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM 
The 1776 publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations 
(Smith, 1909) constituted not only an initial description of compet-
itive commerce, but also a prescription for England's commercial 
policies. Still in process of turning its back on the unsuccessful 
mercantile policies which had dominated the country's commerce for 
many years, England's legal fabric produced an intricate network of 
barriers to free trade and, inextricably, personal freedom. Smith's 
book provided an economic rationale to accompany the political and 
social forces which stood in opposition to continued mercantilism. 
At the heart of Smith's system was the much-cited "invisible 
hand." The general statement addressed by this metaphor was the 
inclination of rational men to apply themselves singularly to the 
pursuit of singular goals when unfettered by restraints; if acting 
only to achieve profits, the rational person was posited to engage in 
affairs in such a way as to maximize profits. While probably not 
aware of the inter-relations which exist between the myriad of deci-
sions and activities undertaken, rationality would dictate that the 
individual maintain certain patterns of resource acquisition which 
would tend to reflect in the activities of the firm. Because all 
commercial concerns react to these influences through the common 
motivation of all owners/managers, basic relationships between 
different types of resources and outputs were posited to remain 
relatively constant between businesses which themselves might be 
quite different. 
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Smith's model was elaborated most advantageously in the late 
19th century by Alfred Marshall (1948) in his Principles of Economics. 
A lengthy volume comprised primarily of verbal exposition, this work 
systematically expanded on the ideas first enunciated by Smith, and 
additionally specified a number of basic functions and relationships 
in the Mathematical Appendix which borrowed heavily from Marshall's 
contemporaries. 
The contributions of both authors have been widely discussed and 
extended by a host of later authors. Nonetheless, the discipline of 
microeconomics exists now much as a product of these two germinal, 
early works. Accordingly, the Classical Theory of the Firm, alterna-
tively termed the microeconomic theory of the firm, can be traced 
directly back to their works. 
It is important to recognize that both authors saw their models 
as "ideal typical" (Weber, 1947). While the absolute incarnation of 
their work would rarely if ever be found in reality, the associations 
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they described would nonetheless portray general inclinations and 
directions of association as encountered in reality. Marshall makes 
this point in the Preface to the First Edition as follows: "Economic 
laws and reasonings in fact are merely part of the material which 
Conscience and Common-sense have to turn to account in solving 
practical problems, and in laying down rules which may be a guide in 
life" (Marshall, 1948, p. iv). 
Microeconomics, generally, is a discipline oriented to studying 
how resources are employed in the conduct of individual and organiza-
tional affairs. At the heart of the discipline are certain assump-
tions about what compels the various entities to behave as they do. 
It is assumed in this regard that economic beings will engage in 
activities so as to maximize their well-being; given two courses of 
action, the economic entity will engage in that alternative which 
provides the greatest return to the costs incurred in support of 
activity undertaken in its pursuit. 
Exactly how the entity perceives its interest best served rests 
on how the entity itself is defined. Two alternatives are recognized; 
the consumer and the firm. 
Consumers: Utility Maximization 
Consumers are envisioned as multifaceted individuals who in the 
process of pursuing their affairs seek to enhance their personal 
welfare to the greatest extent possible, subject to budgetary con-
straints. Among decisions faced by individuals in this pursuit are 
those which relate to work and countless others which relate to their 
consumption of goods and services, each of which provides unique 
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satisfactions. 
The very variety of the returns by which consumers derive satis-
faction creates a situation within which the modeling of decision 
making behavior must be very general. Thus, when referring to the 
benefits accruing from consumer activity, economists employ a generic 
term for satisfaction, "utility." people seek to achieve the highest 
level of welfare available to them, a goal orientation referred to as 
utility-maximizing behavior. Koplin summarizes the concept as follows. 
Utility or satisfaction is the capacity of a good to satisfy 
a human want. The rational individual will choose among the 
alternatives open to him those that maximize his utility. 
Economic theory assumes that each individual attempts to 
maximize his utility (Koplin, 1971, p. 29). 
The general relation between the individual's well-being and the 
commodities actually consumed can be stated in terms of the "utility 
function." Utility functions describe the contributions of each good 
or service consumed to the overall satisfaction of the consumer. A 
typical representation of a utility function is presented in (1), 
below (Jevons, as cited in Samuelson, 1976; Marshall, 1948). 
(1) • + V. (X.) + ••. + V (X ) 
1 1 n n 
Here, U denotes utility, while Vi represents the satisfaction 
associated by the consumer with the ith good or service, Xi 2 
utility in this formulation is equal to the sum of the utilities 
derived separately from each of the consumed goods and services. 
Total 
The rational consumer, then, tailors consumption of the various 
2 h' h 1 f . 1 d h . In t 1S context, t e va ue 0 V 1S re ate to t e quant1ty of 
the commodity consumed, such that V. (X.)' > 0, and V. (X.)" < o. 
1 1 1 1 
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commodities so that overall utility is maximized. Since the indivi-
dual's budget is fixed, the enhancement of total utility can be 
achieved only through tailoring the consumption of all items so that 
balance is achieved between the benefit received from each and its 
price3• In this context, the consumer faces a problem of optimiza-
tion. Because greater consumption of one good necessarily entails 
the reduction of other goods' consumptions (owing to the fixed budget), 
and since each good contributes independently to total utility, the 
rational consumer tailors expenditures on each so that overall 
utility is the highest possible. 
Firms: Profit Maximization 
o 
The firm constitutes an economic entity which is definitionally 
distinct from the consumer. Koplin addresses the firm as follows. 
The business firm is an organizational device, an economic 
and legal institution. It incurs costs in acquiring inputs, 
which are factors of production such as labor, land, and 
capital, or intermediate goods purchased from other firms. 
The inputs are converted into output through a production 
process. The firm receives revenues by selling its outputs 
to individuals, other firms, or government and nonprofit 
agencies (Koplin, 1971, p. 81). 
Principal among the differences between firms and consumers are 
the goals they pursue. As an instrumentality formed by individuals, 
the firm's role lies in the unique contribution it makes to the utility 
function of its owner or operator--income in the form of profit. 
3This balance is achieved when the ratios relating the marginal 
utilities of each good pr service are equal to the ratios of their 
prices. The interested reader is referred to any microeconomic text, 
of which Samuelson (1964) and Koplin (197l) are representative. 
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The firm as such is not human. It has no utility function 
and no preference maps. The firm is a tool designed to 
further the interests of individuals. It is difficult but 
essential to distinguish between the interests and objectives 
of individuals, who are assumed to be utility maximizers, and 
the objectives of the firm.... The standard assumption of 
microeconornic theory is that a firm attempts to maximize its 
profits (Koplin, 1971, p. 81).4 
In the classical microeconomic theory of the firm, then, the 
goal of the firm is singular--profit maximization. As such, the 
problem facing the firm differs fundamentally from that of the 
individual: where the consumer optimizes, the firm maximizes. 
Profit constitutes the difference between the costs of engaging 
in business, and the revenues derived, as below (Samuelson, 1976). 
(2) P = R - C 
where P denotes profit, R represents revenue, and C signifies costs. 
The firm maximizing profits, then, faces the following problem. 
(3) Max P = R - C. S 
4It should be noted that the firm may also contribute to the 
owner's well-being in other, non-monetary ways. For example, the 
personal preference for being "one's own boss" may compel a firm's 
owner to accept a lower income than would be realized in a salaried 
role for another employer. Where this is the case, this personal 
freedom represents a form of return to the owner which can be valued 
monetarily, and equated conceptually with profit. The interested 
reader is referred to Koplin (1971, pp. 82-83). 
S 
Samuelson's formulation (1976), like others, goes on to note 
that the firm will realize the point of profit maximization when the 
profit realized from the production of the last unit of output is zero, 
or P = R - C = O. This point is achieved through the alteration of 
output quantities, which directly affects revenues (which are constant 
or decreasing with increases in output) and costs (which are increasing 
with increases in output) associated with the last unit of output. The 
interested reader is referred to any microeconomic text, including 
Samuelson (1964) or Koplin (1971). Samuelson (1976) provides a more 
sophisticated presentation. 
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Profit, in the context in which it is employed here, constitutes 
a univariate counterpart to the multivariate concept of consumer 
utility. It is within the definitions of both concepts to envision a 
firm's profit as a synonymous term for its utility, as follows. 
(4) P = U 
Envisioned in this light, the firm's welfare is maximized when the 
firm maximizes its total net revenue, as signified by the reformula-
tion of (5), as follows. 
(5) Max U = R - C 
In sum, the principal distinction separating firm and consumer 
in microeconomic theory lies not in different behavioral orientations, 
for each is oriented to the maximization of its own position. Rather, 
firm and consumer are distinguished in terms of the criteria by which 
their success is measured. Consumers relate to a multi-dimensional 
concept of welfare, reflecting the benefits associated with a range of 
goods, services, and activities. Firms, being instrumentalities 
created to serve owners through the generation of net revenues, are 
oriented to a uni-dimensional goal--profit--and therefore behave so as 
to maximize. 
There are those, however, who would suggest that the distinctions 
between consumers and corporate welfare are less distinct than those 
proposed by microeconomic theory. As explained in the pages which 
follow f these authors challenge the Classical Theory of the Firm as 
excessively over-simplified and, accordingly, offer modifications to 
the Classical Theory which posit organizational utility functions 
similar to those described above as pertaining to consumers alone. 
CHALLENGES TO THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM 
Dissatisfaction with the prosaic neoclassical profit 
maximization rationale has led many economists to search for 
a more viable alternative (Kania and McKean, 1979). 
The profit maximization assumption has long been under 
attack, chiefly on the grounds that it lacks realism 
(Koplin, 1963). 
For a long time, there has been dissatisfaction with the 
traditional theory of the firm and its basic axiom that firms 
maximize profits (Monsen and Downs, 1965). 
Since dissatisfaction with the classical theory began 
vigorously being registered in the 1920's and 1930's, 
theories of the firm have been increased abundantly 
(Schramm and Sherman, 1974). 
The theory of the firm as it exists in present economic 
literature is a deductive system based on assumptions of 
human motivation that appear doubtful in light of present day 
psychology, and on assumptions of organizational behavior that 
are implausible (C. Bernard, 1950). 
These introductions to relatively recent works in the analysis 
of organizational behavior constitute a representative sampling of 
introductions employed in a new branch of the economic literature. 
Having noted that the microeconomic model fails to satisfactorily 
account for organizational behavior as empirically observed, authors 
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typically challenge the profit maximization assumptions which underlie 
the classical model of the firm. In its stead, authors suggest 
alternative goals which, in conjunction with or instead of profit 
attainment, could better explain the observed behavior of commercial 
enterprises. 
If profit maximization is the sole motivation in the operation 
of firms, behaviors which are oriented to the achievement of other, 
incompatible goals are by definition irrational. Yet it is empirically 
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apparent that considerable reason is frequently applied to the applica-
ton of organizational resources to other ends, and this general 
departure from the assumptions of microeconomic theory is cited as 
undermining the model's credibility. 
Chester Bernard (1950) launched what was perhaps the most 
influential, modern attack on the Classical Theory of the Firm. In 
his discussion of executive functions within the organization, he noted 
two Ubiquitous processes which accompany processes of organizational 
development: (1) a tendency to growth, and (2) an orientation to 
survival. Neither is consistent in and of itself with the maximization 
of profit, and so Bernard's remarks suggest an element to organiza-
tional behavior which reflects ends and processes other than profit. 
Cyert and March (1955) take Bernard's work a step further by suggesting 
a consciousness in the multiplicity of goals established by organiza-
tions: this, too, is inconsistent with the microeconomic model of 
organizational behavior. As will be further substantiated later, the 
list of authors contributing to these and other sources of challenge 
has become legion. 
Herbert A. Simon (l959) has addressed the apparent failure of the 
Classical Theory of the Firm. His remarks draw attention to the 
different ends to which such a model can be applied, and to the 
different requirements which must be met in each of the applications 
if a behavioral model is to vindicate itself. 
Simon points out that microeconomists have typically been 
interested in the impacts of policy and other exogenous variables on 
the economy as a whole. At this level of aggregation, a decision 
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making model based solely on profit maximization has allowed findings 
of sufficient accuracy to vindicate the analytical framework employed 
in their derivation; individual differences in the decision making 
criteria of firms tend to be lost at this level of generality. Where 
the unit of analysis is the individual firm, however, variations from 
the profit maximizing principle are likely to be both dramatic and 
important: at this level of specificity, a model of greater precision 
may well be necessary for a number of analytical purposes. In support 
of this observation, he presents the following metaphor. 
Supposing we were pouring some viscous liquid--molasses--
into a bowl of very irregular shape. What would we need in 
order to make a theory of the form the molasses would take 
in the bowl? How much would we have to know about the 
properties of molasses to predict its behavior under the 
circumstances? If the bowl were held motionless, and if we 
wanted only to predict behavior in equilibrium, we would have 
to know little, indeed, about molasses. The single essential 
assumption would be that the molasses, under the force of 
gravity, would minimize the height of its center of gravity. 
with this assumption, which would apply as well to any other 
liquid, and a complete knowledge of the environment--in this 
case the shape of the bowl--the equilibrium is completely 
determined. Just so, the equilibrium behavior of a perfectly 
adapting organism depends only on its goal and its environ-
ment; it is otherwise completely independent of the internal 
properties of the organism (Simon, 1959, p. 255). 
In this, Simon points out the value of the microeconomic theory 
of the firm. By predicting differences in equilibrium states prompted 
by a broad range of disturbances, the model provides a sound basis for 
the prediction of general patterns of response. 
Simon continues his metaphor as follows. 
If the bowl into which we were pouring the molasses were 
jiggled rapidly, or if we wanted to know about the behavior 
before equilibrium was reached, prediction would require much 
more information. It would require, in particular, more 
information about the properties of molasses: its viscosity, 
the rapidity with which it 'adapted' itself to the containing 
vessel and moved towards its 'goal' of lowering its center of 
gravity. Likewise, to predict the short-run behavior of an 
adaptive organism, or its behavior in a complex and rapidly 
changing environment, it is not enough to know its goals. We 
must know also a great deal about its internal structure and 
particularly its mechanisms of adaptation (p. 255). 
In short, the microeconomic theory of the firm simply is not 
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suited to analyzing the more specific behaviors of firms in activities 
neither oriented nor related to the attainment of equilibrium states. 
To the extent that analysis is oriented to such foci, the strength of 
the microeconomic model's generality is diluted by its .weakness of 
imprecision. 
In another article, Simon summarized the challenges to the 
Classical Theory in terms of five general classes. Two (the distinc-
tions which separate long-term from short-term profits, and the role 
of psychic, non-monetary income in the calculation of profit) are 
largely semantic and not germane to this context. Three other 
classes of objection, however, are central to the further development 
of the microeconomic model. These are as follow. 
1. Satisficing behavior. Borrowing from the literature in 
psychology, Simon identifies profit-satisficing behavior as that which 
is willing to settle for profit levels less than the maximum possible 
so long as minimal thresholds are surpassed. Satisficing behavior is 
clearly inconsistent with the maximizing behavior upon which the 
classicial theory of the firm is based, and plays an important role in 
the modifications to the classical theory of the firm which arise out 
of the field of economics. 
2. OWner/Manager separation. The Classical Theory of the Firm 
defines organizations as instrumentalities serving the purposes of its 
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owners. Since the interests of owners are served solely through 
profit attainment, profit maximization is the only rational motivation 
for the firm. Implicit in this reasoning is a direct and unbroken 
association between the owners and the operations of the organization. 
An important source of challenge to the basic model lies in the 
observation that in modern corporations--which dominate the economy--
owners typically do not manage their firms; rather, they typically own 
a relatively small proportion of the company and, with other owners, 
hire managers to oversee the company's operations. To the extent that 
managers orient to goals other than those of the owners, the classical 
theory of the firm will not accurately predict the organization's 
operations. This point--that managers may pursue their own ends 
through company operations--is a very important source of ch~llenge to 
the classical theory. 
3. Imperfect Competition. Baumol (1967)1 Niskanen (1968), and 
most other authors challenging the microeconomic theory of organiza-
tional behavior phrase their remarks in the context of the large 
organization which exists in a market context other than the perfectly 
competitive. This is an important distinction. In microeconomic 
theory, profit maximization as an organizational pursuit is of para-
mount importance if organizations are to survive the competitive 
pressures of the market place. In monopolistic and oligopolistic 
industries, however, the relation between marginal costs and marginal 
revenues at equilibrium levels of demand and supply allow the firm to 
price its output higher than would be possible under perfectly 
competitive conditions. In short, the continued viability of the firm 
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need not hinge solely on its profit maximization; rather, the firm 
enjoys by virtue of the structure of its market an excess of revenues 
over and above those necessary to pay for the cost of doing business. 
The disposition of this organizational slack is the central focus of 
most economists' challenges to the microeconomic theory of the firm. 
Profit satisficing behavior is perhaps the most important of the 
three points cited above, and is consequently widely cited by authors 
addressing this general subject area (Cyert and March, 1956; Monsen 
and Downs, 1965; Cohen and Cyert, 1965; Simon, 1959; Baumo1, 1967; 
Niskanen, 1968; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). While explicit distinctions 
are rare, authors tend to identify two general classes of excess 
resources which ultimately derive from satisficing behavior. 
"Organizational slack," a term introduced by Cohen and Cyert (1965), 
is a body of unallocated resources which develop through the inter-
action of conservative orientations by managers with respect to revenue-
producing endeavors and with respect to costs: the first leads to 
higher revenues than planned, while the latter produces costs which are 
less than foreseen. While posited by many (such as Cyert and March, 
1956; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) as providing stability to organiza-
tional operations, the existence of these resources by definition 
detracts from profit maximization. A second group of authors suggest 
that managerial attentions tend to orient to goals other than profit-
maximization, and so create conditions under which excess resources 
may be generated. 
In either case, two derivative issues arise out of profit-
satisficing behavior. First, in being willing to settle for less than 
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maximal profit levels, owners are likely to exert less influence than 
might otherwise be the case in their control over the firm's operation 
and, second, in settling for less than maximal profits, owners permit 
the pursuit of other standards of success which, in their attainment, 
free organizational resources which otherwise would be reflected in 
profit. Each of these derivative points carried great significance in 
the suggestions tendered in the literature for modification of the 
classical theory. 
The least radical suggestions for changing the classical theory 
simply suggest that goals other than profit maximization seem to guide 
organizational behavior. A broad range of possible goals has been 
suggested, including revenue per se (Baumel, 1967), dividend payout 
(Kania and McKean, 1979), security (Schramm and Sherman, 1974), and 
growth (Niskanen, 1968). That these goals coexist with profit in 
firms' programs of operations is the more noteworthy inasmuch as it 
has been shown that only in rare cases will the maximization of any of 
these performance standards occur concurrently with profitmaximizationi 
in most cases they are incompatible and cannot be simultaneously 
served (Herendeen, 1974; Baumol, 1967; J. Williamson, 1966). The 
recognition of any of these alternative goals, then, connotes the prior 
existence of profit-satisficing behavior by owners. 
The separation of ownership and management in the modern corpora-
tion is a second important source of suggestions for modification to 
the Classical Theory of the Firm, and one which has generated con-
siderable attention. It is not, however, a new topic of discussion. 
Speaking to the removal of private firms from freely competitive 
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markets, Adam Smith wrote of a tendency toward "negligence, profusion, 
and malversion of [the company's] own servants, whose disorderly 
conduct seldom allows the company to exceed the ordinary rate of profit 
in trades which are altogether free" (1909, p. 481). Alfred Marshall 
(1948) similarly, though less colorfully, noted that among large 
corporations managers tend to be insulated from owners' control and 
safe from criticism. 
A number of authors have carried these observations into the 
more recent context by noting the continued insulation of corporate 
management from the control of owners. While Smith and Marshall 
recognized problems associated with this pattern of management, it was 
generally thought that competitive forces would mitigate the potential 
effects of such a separation on organizational performance. A number 
of more recent authors, however, note that no such control is apparent 
in the context of modern, large business firms (Monsen and Downs, 
1965; Gordon, 1962; Koplin, 1963). Rather, it is posited that mana-
gerial freedom from control has led to a high degree of latitude in 
the fulfillment of managerial responsibilities, and that this latitude 
can be manifested in any number of ways. 
Some maintain that this latitude is important to organizational 
efficiency in the absence of the competitive forces which framed Smith 
and Marshall's analyses (Cyert and March, 1956; Crew et al., 1971; 
Leibenstein, 1960, 1966). Where this is the case, the organization's 
response to market forces would parallel those predicted by the 
microeconomic model, but would do so for different reasons. Where 
competitive market forces influence organizational responses in the 
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microeconomic model, in the context of the large corporation, organi-
zational response is occasioned by astute management operating in lieu 
of market influences. 
Other authors maintain that the owner/manager split invariably 
impacts the relatiop between organizational operations and owners' 
goals. The exact nature of the impacts, however, is subject to a 
number of interpretations. 
Most conservatively, it is posited that management in this 
context will pursue more conservative policies than would owner-
managers in similar operational situations. This conservatism is 
likely to take a number of forms. First, in order to avoid estab-
lishing performance standards which may not be achievable insubsequent 
time frames, managers will endeavor to minimize variations in organi-
zational earnings from year to year (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Kania and 
McKean, 1979; Galbraith, 1967). Second, managers will seek to avoid 
risk (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Schramm and Sherman, 1974; Kania and 
McKean, 1979). with derivative implications of reduced profit, reduced 
growth, and reduced likelihood of bankruptcy. 
A second class of more direct impacts have been posited, including 
including a heightened tendency to orient toward revenue maximization 
(Baumol, 1967; Galbraith, 1967), hastened organizational growth 
(Galbraith, 1967; J. Williamson, 1966; Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964; 
C. Bernard, 1950), and higher rates of return on corporate assets 
(Herendeen, 1974). Common among these writings, however, is a general 
tendency to associate managerial orientations in controlling firms' 
operations with the interests of owners, which become more broadly 
defined as a result of the split. 
25 
A third class of effects have been associated with the diver-
gence of ownership and management. Here it is suggested that managers 
can and do exercise the latitude availed them by pursuing their own 
ends through the operation of the firm. So long as owners' interests 
are served through the realization of minimum profit and any other 
goals explicitly or implicitly recognized, managers are free to pursue 
their own ends with the company. Herendeen (1974) succinctly states 
the point that lithe relevant question is not whether profits are 
maximized, but whose profits are maximized" (p. 60). 
In this context, it is appropriate to assess organizational 
performance not only with respect to the interests of owners, but also 
those of managers. Cited as important considerations with respect to 
the latter are a number of motivators, among which are: security 
(Marris, 1964), lifetime income (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Niskanen, 
1968), organizational growth for its direct effects on income (Marris, 
1964: o. Williamson, 1964), luxurious emoluments (0. Williamson, 1964; 
Niskanen, 1968), and such non-monetary rewards as leisure, and power 
(Monsen and Downs, 1965; Niskanen, 1968; Azariadis et al., 1972). 
In summary, a large group of authors have sought to expand the 
Classical Theory of the Firm to include goal orientations other than 
strict profit maximization. Suggested modifications include goals 
which are identified with owners as well as a number which pertain to 
managers. 
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APPLICATION TO THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM 
It will be recalled that the principal differentiation between 
consumers and firms as posited by microeconomic theory centers on the 
differences between their respective motivations. 
Consumers, as noted by Samuelson (1964) and Koplin (1971), are 
oriented toward the maximization of their personal welfare--their 
utility--through optimization of their consumption mix. They tailor 
their purchases so as to maximize the total utility realized from 
their overall purchases, as follows. 
(1) U = Vl(Xl) + V2(X2) + .•• + Vi(Xi) + ••• + Vn(Xn) 
Firms, however, are singular in purpose and so orient toward 
maximizing behavior. Since their orientation involves profit, profit-
maximizing behavior follows. Samuelson, it will be recalled, 
formulated this relation as follows. 
(3) Max P = R - C 
The authors cited in the preceding pages have suggested that the 
microeconomic approach oversimplifies the actual case. It is more 
appropriate, they note, to envision firms as orienting to a range of 
simultaneous goals, which include profit as well as other motivations. 
In this situation, firms do not maximize, they optimize. One such 
case is presented as follows (Kania and McKean, 1979, p. 29). 
(6) U = f(Sl, S2, 53) 
where utility (U)--the generalized term used earlier to refer to 
consumer satisfaction, but now applied to organizational well-being--
accruing to a firm is a product of its profits (51)' its capital 
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growth (S2>' and its dividend payout (S3). 
Two characteristics of this formulation merit comment for their 
relevance to preceding discussions: the first deals with satisficing 
behavior applied directly to profit, and the second addresses which 
motivating factors are represented in firms' behavior. 
Satisficing behavior, as mentioned earlier, may be represented 
in this conceptualization in one of two ways. First, firms' owners 
may orient toward a multitude of goals and so seek to optimize the 
firms' overall utility as represented by utility function. If so, 
owners do not satisfice in the classic sense of the term; rather, they 
settle for less than maximal profit in order to devote resources to 
other ends. This allows them to maximize utility by optimizing the 
attainment of profit and other ends included in the organization's 
utility function. Second, owners may in fact satisfice with respect 
to the utility function as a whole, and therefore allow the discre-
tionary use of organizational slack by managers. This would make 
possible the use of organizational resources by managers in pursuit of 
their own ends. 
In both cases, the firm responds to a utility function and so 
pursues an optimal welfare position. In the first case, the following 
formulation, which essentially re-states the Kania and McKean model, 
applies. 
(7) U = f(VflXfl + Vf2Xf2 + ••• VfiXfi + ••• VfnXfn ) 
where U again represents the firm's utility, Vfi constitutes the value 
to the firm of the firm's ith measure of success, Xfi. This formula-
tion represents the utility-maximizing case where owners of the firm 
orient to a number of goals. The absence of organizational slack 
prohibits the incorporation of managers' goals into the utility 
function of the firm. 
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The second case, where owners pursue mUltiple goals but where 
they satisfice with respect to utility, may be summarized as follows. 
(8) U = f(LVfiXfi + VmlXml + Vm2Xm2 + ••• VmiXmi + ... + VmnXmn} 
Here, tVfiXfi represents the influence on the firm's welfare position 
attributable to the identified interests of the firm's owners; in 
terms of formula (3), this term constitutes the aggregated value of 
the individual terms. vmi is the value attached to the ith managerial 
goal, which is represented by the term Xmi. The sum of the utility 
values attributable to the various managerial goals constitutes the 
difference between available organizational resources and those 
resources identified by owners as minimally acceptable returns on 
their investment; in short, the sum of the VmiXmi terms represents 
the organizational slack introduced by Cyert and March (1963). 
It is, then, possible to summarize the recent contributions of 
economists to the Classical Theory of the Firm through the summary 
formulation which follows. 
(9) U = f(tvfixfi + tVmiXmi) 
This formulation is nothing more than a concise specification that 
organizational utility and, therefore, behavior, is explainable in 
terms of the rewards accruing first to the firm's owners and second 
to its managers. 
In general, this fundamental specification of organizational 
goals is not entirely inconsistent with those of the early 
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microeconomists. The orientation to utility maximization, as suggested 
earlier, in reality constitutes a more general case of the maximization 
model specified for profit. The addition of managers' interests to 
those of owners constitutes a fundamental variation from the classical 
model, but so long as managers maximize the utility derived from their 
employment of organizational resources, the utility maximization 
premise remains intact. The firm (and its management) in this context 
remains a rational, economic entity, and still orients its operations 
to the achievement of a finite range of ends. Koplin (1963) sum-
marizes the relation as follows: "The dominance of utility maximiza-
tion more simply but more fundamentally suggests that the proper 
definition of profit maximization is consistent with utility 
maximization" (p. 131). 
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
To borrow once again from Simon's metaphor, the revisions to the 
Classical Theory of the Firm described to this point allow for the 
further "fleshing out" of the microeconomic model. In so doing, the 
model's applicability is extended from the comparative analysis of 
equilibrium states to the less easily addressed realities of day-to-
day operation. The basic mode of analysis is, however, unchanged. 
1. The unit of analysis remains the profit-oriented firm. 
2. The firm retains its identity as an economic entity, seeking 
to enhance its position, however defined, to the greatest 
possible extent. 
3. The firm's relationship to the remainder of the world remains 
limited to that series of associations which are mediated 
through any of a variety of market contexts. 
4. Organizational well-being remains an absolute value: 
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welfare is not measured with specific reference to other 
firms, nor is it compared with any other extra-organizational 
entities. Change over time in the firm's welfare position 
constitutes the only relevant point of reference. 
As such, the model as developed to now bears a number of 
important limitations. 
First, it cannot be readily applied to organizations which do 
not operate for profit, or for which output is unrelated in a direct, 
causal sense to revenue. 
Second, it cannot be readily applied to organizations which 
operate as distinctly identifiable sub-units of larger organizations 
which themselves bear an integral identity. 
Third, the model does not accomodate organizational associations 
with extra-organizational entities which exist for reasons other than 
purely transactional interactions in market contexts. 
Of these, the necessity of a price/revenue component in the 
profit-based model, even as revised, is perhaps the greatest impedi-
ment to its applicability in areas where profit per se is not an 
applicable reality. Price p~rforms two critical functions in the 
classical model of the firm. 
First, price is the principal allocative device on the demand 
side of a market economy. Economic theory deals with the treatment of 
scarce resources. To the extent that a commodity or service is 
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unpriced, it is in the strictest sense not a scarce good. This is an 
important limitation. It is true that price alone is an incomplete 
index of the cost of a good or service, for it only very indirectly 
reflects non-market impediments to the good's attainment: time, acces-
sability, and numerous other variables may enter on the demand side 
of the transaction to limit clients' quests for the product. Nonethe-
less, the market price mechanism does largely determine a good or 
service's ultimate cost to the consumer, and it does interact with the 
prices of other goods and services to establish cost ratios between 
different goods and services which may well share relatively equal non-
price-related cost figures. That unpriced accessability may well be 
a desirable element of a program is a non-economic consideration, and 
as such it seriously violates the basic postulates of the economic 
mOdel of the firm. 
In a similar vein, the absence of a price mechanism as it per-
tains to organizational output precludes the use of revenue as a 
component in the analysis of organizational activity. Organizations 
seeking to maximize profits (or, conversely, to minimize losses) will 
consciously or unconsciously tailor their production to match incre-
mental per-unit costs with per-unit revenues (see note 4, Chapter II). 
The absence of a revenue component renders this relationship insoluble 
and undermines standard microeconomic approaches to the assessment of 
organizational activity. 
In the absence of a price component, an alternative conceptuali-
zation is necessary to the analysis of organizational behavior. Such 
a perspective has been developed under the general classification of 
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"organizational theory," based largely in the disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, public and business administration. The general 
field of organizational theory addresses a broad range of interest 
areas including intraorganizational issues, interorganizational 
topics, and organizational-environmental interactions, of which the 
last two are of most direct relevance to this dissertation's develop-
ment. The model developed will constitute one which is amenable to 
integration with the Classical Theory of the Firm, as originally 
formulated and as modified by subsequent writers, and indeed will in 
its greater generality be one of which the profit-maximizing case 
might be termed a specific application. 
The discussion of organizational theory will begin with a 
discussion of organizational definitions, a brief treatment of 
organizational environments, a discussion of organizational goal 
setting and, finally, a description of social exchange theory as it 
has been applied to organizational analysis. The section will conclude 
with the incorporation of these observations in a reformulation of the 
organizational utility function. 
Organizations 
The defining criterion of a formal organization--or an 
organization, for short--is the existence of procedures for 
mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of various, usually 
specialized, subgroups in the pursuit of joint objectives 
(Blau, 1968, p. 304). 
Stated alternatively, organizations are social entities designed 
to accomplish stated goals through group action (Katz and Kahn, 1972; 
Parsons, 1956; Lyden, 1975) •. 
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Formal organizations are deliberately established by the whole 
or part of a social aggregate to serve a goal identified as important 
and untreated. 
Organizations must serve a purpose of importance to entities 
outside the organization. Because scarce resources are necessary to 
organizational development, maintenance, and operation, the creation 
of a product which is of importance to some extraorganizational entity 
is essential if requisite resources are to continue in availability 
and, indirectly, if the organization is to survive. This observation 
connotes an open-system conceptualization within which organizations 
constitute a sub-unit of successively larger systems, each incor-
porating smaller systems as sub-components. 
In this sense, organizations as entities are quite consistent 
with those defined earlier in the Classical Theory of the Firm. In 
the microeconomic context, organizations perform a service (such as 
selling hardware or repairing shoes) in the pursuit of a higher, more 
prevalent motivation--the attainment of profit. 
The processes cited earlier by Koplin (input acquisition, the 
processing of resources, and ultimate dissemination of output) have 
been applied in organizational theory as well. Parsons (1956) noted 
that primary among the functions of organizations is goal attainment, 
the fulfillment of the functional necessity for which the organization 
was created. Perrow (1961) similarly but in more discrete fashion 
noted that organizations must secure inputs, marshal a technology, and 
coordinate members' activities in fulfilling the organizational 
function. Katz and Kahn (1972) suggest a seven-step description of 
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the means by which organizations serve their prescribed function. 
Less distinctly identified in organizational theory are the 
ultimate motivations which compel organizations to engage in prevalent 
behavioral modes, the equivalent to profit in the microeconomic 
model. Of considerable importance in this assessment is the relation 
of the organization to other components of the larger system in which 
it operates. Together, these extraorganizational entities are 
collectively referred to as the "environment," and they constitute 
the focus of the ensuing section. 
Environments 
Organizational analysts in the 1950's and 1960's increasingly 
recognized that while organizations bear a number of system-like 
characteristics themselves, seldom do they exist, or operate, in a 
vacuum. Rather, while organizations exist as systems in their own 
right, they are also components in larger systems representing their 
communities, their organizational networks, and others. These larger 
entities, and important components within each, are referred to as 
environments (Levine and White, 1972). Hawley (1968) notes that: 
"Environment includes all that is external to and potentially or 
actually influential upon an object of investigation" (p. 1). 
Organizational environments have been more narrowly defined as 
well. Dill (1962) defined the term as only those features of the 
organization's field which are capable of affecting, or being affected 
by, the organization. Dill, in noting that different roles within the 
organization involve interaction with different elements of the 
environment, coined the term "task environment" in order to denote the 
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multiplicity of environmental components which can bear upon organiza-
tional operations. Waldman (1972) noted that the organization may be 
most profitably modeled in terms of two general environmental 
components. The first, the "input component," is that group of people 
and organizations from which the organization receives resources and 
suppor t, while the second, the "ou tput component," is that environ-
mental component which relies on the organization for needed resources. 
From the perspective of the organization, the environment serves 
two general functions: it provides key resources, and it employs the 
organization's output. These two functions are closely related 
(Thompson and McEwen, 1972). The organization, it will be recalled, 
serves a function perceived by the environment as necessary; to the 
extent that it does in fact serve this function, the environment will 
avail requisite resources (Gawthrop, 1969) in the form of either 
revenue (in the commercial context) or other types of support. 
Of importance is the set of causal relations which link the 
organization and its environment. 
A sizable group of authors have noted that the environment is 
capable of generating change within organizations. Gawthrop (1969) 
notes that the organizations must continually react to changing 
environmental conditions if it is to survive, a general orientation 
shared by Gross (1969). The ability of constantly changing environ-
mental components to constantly alter the demands placed on the 
organization, and to enforce those demands through control of 
resources, supports the contention that organizational change is 
generally a product of environmental forces (Terreberry, 1968; 
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Khandwalla,1972). In parallel observations, other authors point out 
that organizational survival in the long run is largely determined by 
the organization's ability to adapt to altered operational demands and 
conditions (Gross, 1969; Rickson and Simpkins, 1972; Schein, 1970; 
Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Gawthrop, 1969; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
Others note that through such strategies as competition and 
cooperation (Thompson and McEwen, 1972), power (Rickson and Simpkins, 
1972), cooptation (Katz and Kahn, 1972), manipulation and environmental 
selection (Child, 1972) organizations are frequently in positions to 
influence their environments. 
The general picture developed by these authors is one of mutual 
influence whereby organizations and the environment are each subject 
to change induced by the other. 
At the risk of belaboring a point inferred above, it is pertinent 
to note that the environment associated with any given organization 
will in many respects be unique to that organization. As noted 
earlier, the entities comprising a relevant environment are in large 
measure determined by the functions which the organizational unit 
serves (Dill, 1962). Not only will these functions determine the 
nature of the organization's output component, but they will dictate 
the types and sources of necessary input resources as well (Katz and 
Kahn, 1972). As a result, organizations operating in proximal physical 
locations, in similar functional pursuits, or in otherwise like 
conditions are nonetheless likely to experience environmental contexts 
which are quite different. 
Overall, it is clear that the organization and the environment 
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exist in a state of continual interaction, and that changes in each 
are likely to be reflected through changes in the other. It is 
further appropriate to note that the organization's mandated goals 
constitute a pivotal focus in this interaction. The section which 
follows investigates the derivation of mandated organizational goals. 
Organizational Goals 
Etzioni (1975) describes organizational goals as desired states 
of affairs which the organization attempts to realize. Left un-
addressed in this definition, however, are whose goals constitute the 
driving force behind organizational activity. It was noted in the 
preceding discussion that environmental forces playa large role in 
determining the mandated goals of organizations. Implicit, however, 
in the concepts of organizational flexibility and reactions to changing 
environmental expectations is a recognition that organizations harbor 
goals which exist separately and distinctly from those functions 
mandated for them. This section will explore the literature pertaining 
to mandated goal setting and to organization-specific goals, and will 
culminate with the incorporation of each type of goal into a general 
utility function based on that developed earlier. 
Goal Setting: The Environment 
Organizations are founded when five conditions exist simul-
taneously (Stinchcombe, 1972). 
1. A group finds better ways to achieve ends which are not 
easily served within existing social arrangements. 
2. The future reflects a reasonable probability that the 
organization will pay for the trouble of founding it. 
3. Either the founders or some other desired group will 
realize the benefits returned by the organization. 
4. The founding group can obtain the necessary key resources 
to develop the organization. 
5. The founding group can avoid defeat by opponents. 
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Central to the first condition is the concept of goal derivation. 
Organizations are founded with an eye to achieving a desired state, and 
through their achievement of those states to attain both the necessary 
resources and the legitimization necessary to continued operation 
(Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Gross, 1969). 
To the extent that the environment is of critical importance in 
the evaluation of the stated goal's worth, in assessing the organiza-
tion's performance in pursuing it, and in maintaining the flow of key 
resources, the environment plays a key role in organizational survival 
(Thompson and McEwen, 1972). To the extent that the environment is a 
dynamic entity in its own right, however, its concepts of what consti-
tutes an appropriate goal can be somewhat fluid. As a result, a 
number of authors have noted that organizations must constantly re-
appraise their goals in light of the changing expectations of important 
environmental entities (Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Maniha and Perrow, 
1965; Magid, 1969). 
The linkage between the organization and its environment with 
respect to mandated goals is well documented. As noted earlier, 
however, there is reason to suspect that organizations respond to 
goals other than those for which they were expressly founded. 
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Goal Setting: The Organization 
Acknowledgement of the fact that organizations retain goal 
flexibility necessarily entails the parallel acknowledgement that 
organizations orient to goals other than those for which they were 
founded. If, per Gross (1969), organizational survival is contingent 
upon the organization's ability to maintain flexibility in its formal 
goals, then some motivational factor other than pursuit of its formal 
goals must compel the organization to embrace flexibility. It is 
additionally reasonable to anticipate that organizations which are 
protected from challenge might well orient to goals other than those 
for which they were founded. 
In both cases a process of "goal displacement" has been noted. 
Goal displacement is a phenomenon in which organizations replace the 
environmentally-derived goals for which they were founded with others 
which more directly serve the organization itself. As reflected in 
the two cases cited above, goal displacement has been addressed from 
two perspectives. 
In large, protected organizations, it has been noted that stated 
goals tend over time to be re-defined in terms of the finite steps 
required for their achievement. Catrice-Lorey (1973), in her study 
of the French social security administration, noted that organiza-
tional members had, over time, ceased to respond to client service as 
their primary responsibility. Instead, they oriented primarily to 
the regulations and processes which their individual jobs served. In 
this context, goal displacement refers to the replacement of 
organization-wide goals with the procedural requirements originally 
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developed to support the mandated goal. Catrice-Lorey identified this 
process as a pathological phenomenon associated with bureaucratization. 
Goal displacement has also been noted in a second context. 
J. Kenneth Benson (1975) has suggested that once an organization 
is established, organizational and managerial attentions turn to key 
resource (authority and money) acquisition and protection, at the 
expense of originally chartered organizational functions. During the 
displacement process, the latter come to be defined in terms of the 
new emphasis on resource acquisition. Benson notes that this process 
tends to diminish the functional distinctions which might otherwise 
differentiate organizations. This observation derives from the fact 
that stated goals, which are more or less unique to each organization, 
are displaced by goals which are derivative of the means initially 
employed in their achievement. Because the emergent set of goals 
arises out of activities--acquisition and protection of key resources--
which prevail among organizations of all types, the emergent goals 
themselves would tend to be relatively constant across organizations 
in spite of their various stated purposes. 
In each of these cases, the goals established by the environment 
tend to diminish in their influence over organizational activity as 
organization-specific goals emerge. 
This general class of observation is consistent with the economic 
models discussed earlier; indeed, the commercial enterprises addressed 
earlier provide a familiar case which can be employed to illustrate 
the goal displacement case acknowledged by Benson. Grocery stores, 
for example, are founded in order to respond to two sets of goals. 
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On the one hand, their purpose lies in dispensing food products to 
consumers. Additionally, however, they orient to the pursuit of 
profit, which is itself attained through the previously mentioned 
sales activities. In these terms, the observations above would 
recognize grocery sales as the stated purpose of the organization, 
displaced over time by the pursuit of profit. In the economic model, 
the two sets of goals are not only compatible but mutually necessary; 
in the context of organizational theory, however, which is largely 
based in public administration and non-profit operation, the two are 
not compatible and may be mutually exclusive. 
It is appropriate to note that both parties to the goal-setting 
process--the organization and the environment--interact in order to 
further their own interests. Relevant environmental elements seek 
through the organization to improve their own positions, while the 
organization is serving the environment promotes its own well-being. 
The two are associated in a mutually supportive association of benefit 
to each party. This association parallels that posited by economists 
in conjunction with parties to market transactions, although it by-
passes explicit reference to immediate reciprocity as employed by 
economists. Viewed in these terms, both profit-oriented and non-profit 
organizations may be examined through a common behavioral model. 
Social exchange theory is one such model. 
Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory applied to organizations, particularly to 
those in the non-profit sector, posits that organizations engage in 
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exchange transactions in order to enhance survival and authority. In 
this context, the organization relates to key environmental elements 
in hierarchic associations based on the ability of each party to the 
interaction to provide needed resources to the other. 
The organizational environment is important in exchange theory 
to the extent that it can influence resource supplies to organizations, 
and to the extent that it can influence interorganizational relations 
by delegating authority for resource distribution (Benson, 1975). The 
most important element of the environment is typically the organiza-
tional network, as defined by interaction patterns which directly or 
indirectly bear on the focal agency. Mindlin and Aldrich (1975) 
amplify this point by noting that " ••• organizations must be studied in 
the context of the population of organizations with which they are 
competing and sharing scarce resources" (p. 382). 
In this context, organizations are seen as entering into 
exchanges so as to improve their own position, either with respect to 
goods and services or with respect to less tangible ends which specify 
the nature of interorganizational hierarchic relations. 
The former of these ends are easily envisioned. Organizations 
possessing sufficient stocks of one resource--say, supplies or staff--
may exchange those resources either for other goods and services for 
which they have a need--perhaps funding or cooperation--or for 
reciprocal consideration at a later date which mayor may not involve 
previously specified commodities. 
O'Brien and Wetle (1975) developed a model of interorganizational 
exchange entitled the Organizational Interaction Model which provides a 
concise elaboration of interorganizational exchange principles. The 
Organizational Exchange Model is comprised of three elements: 
Commodities, Valuing Criteria, and Arenas (see Figure 1). 
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Commodities are the media of exchange and are of importance to 
organizations for their contributions to organizational operation and 
survival. Included as a representative but not exhaustive listing of 
exchange commodities are clients, funds, staff, technology, access to 
influentials, and access to information. 
Valuing Criteria are the standards by which the costs and 
benefits associated with exchanges are appraised. Thus, an organiza-
tion entering into a transaction with another agency would exchange 
commodities, as described above, with an eye to maintaining or 
improving its position in terms of one or more of the Valuing 
Criteria. Included among Valuing Criteria are autonomy, integration, 
domain, power, status, and ideology (world view). The valuing criteria 
in this model are paralleled by profit in the microeconomic model and 
more generally reflect goals by which organizational well-being is 
assessed. 
Arenas of Exchange are the transactional situations within 
which exchanges take place; they are the activities within which 
interorganizational exchanges occur. Those enumerated in Figure 1 
are: planning, hearings and meetings, contracts and letters of 
agreement, evaluation and monitoring, and client transfers. 
OVerall, transactions are seen as encompassing exchanges 
of commodities, each of which is appraised in accordance with 
each agency's valuing criteria, in the operational setting of 
Conunodities: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Clients 
FUnds 
Staff 
Technology 
Access to influentials 
Access to information 
Arenas: 
1. Planning 
2. Hearings and Meetings 
3. Contracts and Letters 
of Agreement 
4. Evaluation and Monitoring 
5. Client Transfers 
Source: O'Brien and Wetle, 1975 
Valuing Criteria: 
1. Autonomy 
2. Integration 
3. Domain 
4. Power 
5. Status 
6. Ideology 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Organizational Interaction Model 
"'" "'" 
an arena of exchange. In this context, a number of qualities can 
influence the determination of what constitutes "reciprocity" in 
exchange. 
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The valuing criteria together constitute one source of inter-
organizational valuation, which reflects the valuing hierarchies of 
each party to the transaction. The relative values evident in trans-
actions reflect the valuing hierarchies of each party to the trans-
action. The valuing criteria correspond to goals pursued through the 
organization's operations, and so correspond to the Xi terms employed 
in the various formulations developed earlier. The relative values 
associated with goals may additionally reflect such other variables as 
the organizations' positions in the interorganizational hierarchy, and 
in characteristics of the commodities and their distribution processes: 
in the minds of many authors, these two sources of variation are 
closely related (Blau and Homans, as cited in Waldman, 1972; Benson, 
1975; Emerson, 1962). 
Differential power positions among parties to a transaction 
allow the more powerful of the parties to influence the terms of 
exchange. Power in this sense is best described as the ability of one 
party to unilaterally affect another party's actions, with degrees of 
power envisioned as the degree of resistance which can be overcome in 
affecting such changes (Emerson, 1962). Benson (1975) notes that 
power can be achieved through two general strategies: organizations 
may ach~eve power through control of centralized functions in the 
network, or they may gain power through linkages to environmental 
elements. 
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The control of critical network functions is generally seen as 
entailing control over focal commodities, such as funding, information, 
or clients. By granting or withholding to other agencies supplies of 
critical commodities, organizations can influence those agencies' 
chances of survival and thereby achieve power. 
The development of linkages to the environment is an alternative 
strategy for amassing power. By being able to mobilize environmental 
support, the agency can gain leverage against other, competing 
organizations (Benson, 1975). 
The degree of leverage attainable through environmental linkages 
has been tied to the size of the group providing support, to the 
degree of mobilization possible, and to the social rank of the elements 
comprising the supportive body. 
In general, social exchange theory as applied to organizations 
by the organizational interaction model can be related closely to the 
Classicial and modified Classical Theories of the Firm. To the extent 
that the valuing criteria constitute a set of appraisal indexes which 
operate concurrently, organizations may be said to be utility maxi-
mizing, as was the case in the modified Classical model. Exchanges, 
designed to enhance participating organizations' positions with 
respect to these referents, correspond closely to the transactions 
of microeconomics. 
Differentiating social exchange theory from the microeconomic 
model are two points, summarized by Blau (1974). 
1. Social exchange may involve unspecified obligations, 
differentiating it from the precise, contractual exchanges 
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of economic transactions. 
2. Social exchange may engender relationships which extend 
beyond the actual transaction through "feelings of personal 
obligation, gratitude, and trust." 
These points of distinction, however, do not impede the reformu-
lations presented earlier, the exchange model described above may be 
presented as follows. 
(10) U = f(VelXel + Ve2Xe2 + ••• + VeiXei + ••• + VenXen) 
In this formulation U connotes utility, as it has in past 
formulas. Vei connotes the value ascribed to the ith goal, Xei, 
labeled Valuing Criteria in the Organizational Interaction Model. 
To now, three general classes of goals have been identified as 
contributing to organizational well-being. 
1. Organization-specific goals of an absolute variety. Profit, 
return on investment, and dividend payout are examples 
(these were identified in (7) as Xfi)' 
2. Managerial goals. Lifetime income, power, and emoluments 
are examples (these were identified in (8) as Xmi). 
3. Organization-specific goals of a relative variety. Power, 
autonomy, and domain are examples (there were identified 
in (10) as Xei). 
These may be simultaneously stated in a grand organizational 
utility function as follows. 
(11) U = f(~VfiXfi + ~VmiXmi + ~VeiXei) 
This formulation, based on terms identified earlier, can be employed 
as a general statement of organizational goals and, indirectly, of 
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organizational behavior. Simply stated, it stipulates that organiza-
tional well-being is based upon the organization's position with 
respect to commercial indicators, its position as identified through 
managerial aspirations, and its position with respect to other 
elements in its environment. Different organizations' overall 
positions can be expected to reflect different weightings with 
respect to each of the various criteria and, indeed, it is probable 
that certain organizations may evidence no success measures of one or 
more of the classes. By incorporating pertinent measures within each 
of the broad classes of goals, however, the decision making processes 
and the behavior influenced by those processes may be stated. 
Three points must be made by way of summary. 
First, organizations select from a multitude of goals in their 
specification of organizational strategies. Contingent upon the type 
of organization under study, upon the environmental setting within 
which the organization operates, and upon the internal structure of 
the organization, organizations can pursue a range of goals. 
Second, it is not realistic to assume that all desired states 
identified by the organization are of equal importance to it; it is 
more realistic to acknowledge an organization's pursuits as being of 
varying importance as reflected in an ordered hierarchy. That an 
organization pursues profit does not preclude the simultaneous pursuit 
of autonomy or market share. Moreover, that it pursues all three 
goals simultaneously does not connote that the three are of equal 
importance in the identification of appropriate strategies, or in the 
assessment of organizational well-being. 
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Finally, all of these goals are directly associated with the 
organization itself: none relate directly to entities outside the 
organization. In part, outside entities' welfare may be reflected 
indirectly through organization-specific measures, such as profit. 
Numerous organizational contexts exist, however, where profit is not 
an applicable referent, and where organizational functions and 
attention relate primarily to entities outside the organization: the 
human services industry constitutes such a context. This model does 
not address that class of goal. 
The following chapter is devoted to creating a conceptual 
setting within which this model may be applied to human service 
organizations. In this, the chapter will review the literature on 
community theory in order to identify potential influences on organiza-
tional behavior which might be unique to locality. Employing both the 
organizational and community discussions as foundations, the 
Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 197Gb) will be presented as a 
method for analyzing organizational behavior. 
CHAPTER III 
LOCAL MARKETS AND THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL 
It was noted early in this dissertation that locale in many ways 
constitutes the major operational setting for organizations in the 
human services industry. In the terms set forth in the preceding 
chapter, locale defines the scope of many environmental elements of 
importance to the organization, and in most cases defines the geo-
graphic scope in which it operates. To borrow from economic jargon, 
locale defines the market within which service agencies operate. For 
these reasons it is reasonable to anticipate that organizational 
operations in this industry may well be influenced by forces which 
are indigenous, and unique, to the local area. 
This chapter addresses local influences on organizational 
operation. It is comprised of three general sections. The first 
briefly synopsizes the literature treating community, with emphasis 
placed on community uniqueness. The second section introduces the 
Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976b), which relates organiza-
tional activity to the environments within which the organization 
operates. Finally, the third section specifies the model of organiza-
tional goals, based on the utility function developed in the first 
chapter, which will provide the foundation for the dissertation's 
analyses. 
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COMMUNITY: THE MARKET CONTEXT 
As noted elsewhere in this dissertation, a primary character-
istic of the human service industry is its operational concentration 
in relatively small geographic areas. As such, the spatial extent of 
relevant markets in this industry are largely defined by geographic 
area and by the social aggregate--the community--which lends signifi-
cance to its geographic area. In order to address organizational 
linkages to their markets--their environments--in this context, it is 
necessary to gain some understanding of community. 
Community is a phenomenon which has been widely addressed, and 
an extensive literature exists treating the topic. The wide attention 
leant to community has, however, led to little standardization of the 
definitions used in the field. Perhaps nowhere is this lack of 
unanimity more apparent than in the definition of "community." In one 
summary of the literature (Hillery, 1968), 94 definitions of the term 
were reviewed, with no two found to be identical in content. The 
greatest degree of consensus was found to encompass three elements of 
the definition: territoriality, social interaction, and a degree of 
identity which is unique to the community. These elements were found 
to be present in the writings of 69 of the 94 authors, of which the 
following are representative. 
Robert MacIver (1970) addressed the topic as follows. 
By community I mean any area of common life, village or town, 
or district or county, or even wider area. To serve the name 
community, the area must be somehow distinguised from further 
areas, the common life may have some characteristic of its own 
such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning. All 
the laws of the cosmos, physical, biological, and psychologi-
cal, conspire to bring it about that beings who live together 
shall resemble one another •••• These are the signs and 
consequences of an effective common life" (p. 30). 
A second conceptualization of the phenomenon, developed with 
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specific respect to the American reality, is generally consistent with 
that included above. 
A human community is a functionally related aggregate of 
people who live in a particular geographic community at a 
particular time, share a common culture, are arranged in a 
social structure, and exhibit an awareness of their uniqueness 
and separate identity as a group (Mercer, 1956, p. 65). 
Territoriality, as noted earlier, is of direct relevance to the 
focus of this dissertation. Unfortunately, while the value of terri-
toriality is widely acknowledged, the parallel issue of territorial 
boundaries has proven difficult to address. 
The importance of spatial propinquity to community is acknowl-
edged primarily for its facilitation of personal interaction between 
residents (J. Bernard, 1962; Warren, 1963; Stacey, 1969; Suttles, 
1972; Polsby, 1968; Coleman, 1957). One author writes, 
[i]t is the inescapable fact that people's clustering 
together in space has important influences on their daily 
activities which gives us perhaps our best clue to a defini-
tion of the community as a social entity (Warren, 1963, p. 9). 
Per Coleman (1957), interaction between inhabitants gains its 
importance not only from the cornmon identities it breeds, but also 
for the similarities in attitude and value that it promotes and for 
the enhancement of unanimity in perception (MacIver, 1970; Dewey, 
1954) • 
Boundaries, however, are generally conceded to be problematic 
(J. Bernard, 1962; Warren, 1963; Polsby, 1968; Suttles, 1972; Grimes 
et al., 1976). Po1sby (1968) provides a representative discussion of 
community boundaries as follows. 
The problem of setting boundaries on the community is, 
perhaps, ultimately insoluble except by arbitrary means, 
because it is freely conceded that externally made decisions 
may have a significant impact on the allocation of values and 
on important private and public decisions within the 
community, however defined (p. 158). 
Virtually all authors ultimately dismiss the concept of 
boundaries as being inappropriate to the concept of community, 
although Suttles (1972) discusses a number of conditions which can 
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promote the clarification of boundaries under certain circumstances. 
Jessie Bernard (1962) suggests that the concept of boundaries 
might well be replaced by that of margins. Noting that one element of 
community rests in the common interests of residents, she suggests 
that given communities might be identified as extending only to those 
points where common interests are defined differently. Because these 
interests are more likely to be gradually supplanted in a population 
than to be abruptly altered, the idea of marginal community areas 
where this process of supplanting can be identified gains some 
credibility. 
A more common approach to dealing with the problem of community 
boundaries lies in the concept of scale. Rather than addressing 
community as a discrete phenomenon, these authors address community 
identity as a variable subject to continuous gradations of strength. 
In this context, strength of community identity is related inversely 
to geographic scale (MacIver, 1970; Suttles, 1972). This approach is 
additionally recommended by its capacity for encompassing multiple 
community identities which may simultaneously exist for residents. 
Suttles (1972), for example, cites the face-block, the defended 
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neighborhood, the community of limited liability (a term borrowed from 
Janowitz, 1952), and the expanded community of limited liability as 
successively larger territorial entities each of which may be a source 
of identification for the individual. The same logic may be applied 
to cities, regions, states, or even nations. 
The subject of territoriality, then, while of critical importance 
to the study of communities, is a topic which has not been fully 
resolved. The predominant orientation to community parallels the 
"open system" concept, where individual community entities exist as 
components of larger systems. Each provides a source of identity to 
inhabitants, and each is capable to some degree of influencing 
activities and orientations in the others. Strength of community 
identity in this schema is inversely related to geographic scale. 
Uniqueness is a second widely-cited element of community, and 
one which has generated interest among a wide range of disciplines. 
Indeed, the typing of communities may constitute the most widely 
pursued aspect of community study. 
While communities tend to be identified by external entities in 
terms of such society-wide referents as racial composition, economic 
measures, and income (Suttles, 1972; Timms, 1971), there are addition-
ally a number of identificational sources which are unique to the 
community itself. Among these are the community's relation to its 
inanimate environment (Rickson and Simkins, 1972), its history (Aiken 
and Mott, 1970; Thernstrorn, 1970), its traditions (Thernstrom, 1970; 
Lowry, 1968), its economic structures (Logan, 1976; Miernyk, 1965), 
its political structures (Coleman, 1957), and its policies toward 
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growth and development (Logan, 1976). 
Of critical importance in the community's evolution is the fact 
that once established, these characteristics tend to influence subse-
quent development; community identification, in short, gains stability 
in part through the influences it exerts oveL the local development 
which leads to future conditions. 
In large measure, this influence is felt through selective demo-
graphic shifts. While conscious policies may be undertaken by locali-
ties to influence demographic turnover (Logan, 1976; Hunter, 1975), a 
considerable body of literature suggests that migrants self-select 
into locales within which they have social contacts (Craven and 
Wellman, 1973) or which they perceive as being most consistent with 
their needs and desires. 
The following citation is highly representative of those 
addressing self-selection in residential migration. 
The residential movement of individuals and groups is highly 
systematic. As a result of the existing structure of the 
residential system and of the positive feed-back induced by 
the patterns of information flow, residential mobility is 
channeled in particular directions. The principal spatial 
effect of the complex of individual aspirations, mental maps, 
capabilities and decisions, information flows, the structure 
of the market and the activities of a wide range of housing, 
financial and planning institutions, is to sift and sort the 
population into distinct residential clusters, organized in 
terms of the basic social differential considered important 
at the time and place concerned (Timms, 1971, p. 122). 
While other authors tend to address more narrowly these processes of 
selective residential movements, the dynamics cited by Timms have been 
broadly reported (Srole, 1972; Suttles, 1972; Fischer, 1975; Rees, 
1971; Logan, 1976; Bish and Ostram, 1973; Ostram, Tiebout and Warren, 
1961) . 
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The observations of these authors have been verified through the 
limited number of empirical analyses of community consistency. Logan 
(1976) found that population characteristics in a number of American 
cities remained quite constant between 1940 and 1960 in spite of 
intervening population turnover and growth. This finding is paralleled 
by those of Schnore and Alford (1963) comparing 1940 and 1960 popula-
tions, and Farley (1964) comparing SES characteristics of 1920 and 
1960 populations in selected cities. Suttles (1972) returned to the 
Chicago neighborhoods studied by Park and Burgess, finding that many 
had retained their identities even after having lost their ethnic 
populations. In another, similar analysis, J. Bernard (1962) found 
considerable stability in the identity of a community, in spite of 
population turnover. She summarizes her study as follows. 
The people ebbed and flowed; but the community of Springdale 
itself remained as an entity in its own right. In a similar 
way people come and go in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 
but the communities themselves, whether loved or hated, 
continue with identities of their own (p. 10). 
Consistency in community identity bears implications for the 
values shared by community members, and for the mechanisms through 
which those values are applied to common pursuits undertaken by com-
munity members acting in concert. 
Values have been defined as desired states of affairs (Williams, 
1967; George and Wilding, 1972). Values bear not only on the identi-
fication of goals but also on the means undertaken in their realization 
(Williams, 1967), it is reasonable to anticipate that communities 
would be to some extent identifiable through their value systems. 
Indeed, a number of authors have suggested that this is the case 
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(Angell, 1974; Laumann et al., 1977; stacey, 1969; J. Bernard, 1968). 
Writing with respect to communities, J. Bernard (1968) writes: 
(a) normative structure is either inherited from the past or 
self-consciously instituted in each subsystem, and conformity 
to its demands is usually sufficient to guarantee that the 
[necessary] functions will be performed (p. 163). 
Addressing the same topic, Angel (1974) writes that "moral integration 
involves a mutually consistentsetof norms derived from common values, 
norms which members of the group, community, or society have internal-
ized as guides to their behavior" (p. 610). 
While many of the values operant in local settings are derived 
from larger societal units (Angell, 1974; Warren, 1963), a number of 
studies have demonstrated that differing local values concerning 
various focal topics can have demonstrable effects on local activity 
as well. Addressing anti-black sentiment at the regional level, 
Middleton (1976) found significant differences between the south and 
non-south. Flinn (1970) found that differences between localities in 
residents' adoptions of innovative truck farming practices were 
mirrored in local orientations toward innovation in general; this 
finding has been found in other settings and on other scales by Marsh 
and Coleman (1954), Young and Coleman (1961), and Rogers and Burge 
(1962) . 
In the context of this dissertation, community-specific values 
derive their primary importance through their influences on the 
operations of organizations serving the resident population. Kroll 
(1962) makes perhaps the most direct linkage between values and 
collective action through his suggestion that values represent patterns 
of belief which set social priorities in the relations which link 
government and society. Other authors address this linkage with a 
greater eye to the processes through which the linkage is made. 
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Dewey (1954) posits that people join together to form a Public 
when they find themselves commonly and indirectly affected by activi-
ties over which they have no control. With organization, Publics can 
create governments in order to serve their interests, staffed by 
officials serving as "factors doing the business of others in securing 
and obviating consequences that concern them" (p. 19). Dahl (1961), 
addressing the relations between established governments and their 
constituencies, sees in electoral activities a similar communication 
of value orientations between constituents and elected officials. 
Not so widely documented is the degree to which local organiza-
tional endeavors are influenced by values and conditions which are 
unique to their locales. Schimpeler and GrecO (1972) explicitly 
relate the goals of the community to the process of transportation 
planning, while Kaplan (1973) suggests that value orientations among 
a resident population must be considered as focal determinants in the 
process of social planning. Saltzstein (1977) is one of few to test 
such associations empirically, finding that local applications for 
federal grants reflect primarily the values and orientations of local 
officials, and bear no significant associations with various measures 
of need. 
While empirical support for linkages between local conditions 
and organizational endeavor are yet scarce, there does exist con-
siderable theoretical justification for such an expectation. 
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First, at least among human service organizations, the relevant 
market is locally defined. When organizational well-being, however 
defined, is contingent upon organizational appeasement of demand as 
manifested in the context of a relevant market, there exists a direct 
tie between organizational success and those forces which underlie 
demand. Where those forces are determined primarily through local 
processes, it is reasonable to anticipate a direct relation between 
locale and organizational behavior. In one, well-documented sense, 
this association is likely to be ramified in the types of organiza-
tions serving locales (Winsborough, 1962; Logan, 1976), which tend to 
differ with the economic bases supporting local commerce. 
In a less strictly economical sense, the degree to which locale 
constitutes the organization's relevant environment can be expected to 
reflect itself in the operations of locally-located organizations 
(Warren, 1963). For agencies which are operationally related exclu-
sively to a single locale, the impacts of local values and conditions 
are likely to be great. 
The Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976b) provides a model 
capable of assessing linkages between locale and organization, and 
constitutes the subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL 
The theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter II constitute 
widely endorsed foundations employed in the analysis of organiza-
tional behavior. As is summarized in that chapter's concluding pages, 
the many similarities apparent between the Classical Theory of the 
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Firm and the various other analytical approaches allow for their 
combination in a general statement of organizational behavior. The 
final utility function of the chapter, (11), shows how such a function 
might be phrased in its most general form. As noted, the utility 
function is comprised of three general classes of goals: profit and 
other absolute indexes, managerial goals, and non-commercial organiza-
tional goals of a more relative nature. The values attached to each 
component in the model, the V terms, serve the general purpose of 
indicating the relative valuations assigned to each of the various 
goals. This model serves as the conceptual point of departure for 
the Primitive Economy Model (PEM) (O'Brien, 1976b) which specifies 
that organizational behavior is best understood in terms of both intra-
and extraorganizational goals. 
The PEM adds to the basic exchange-based conceptualization an 
extraorganizational class of goals derived largely from the field of 
economic anthropology. Through this, the model ties transactions not 
only to the concept of specific reciprocity entailed in the market 
context, but also to the values and societal orientations which exist 
in the larger social context within which the transactions take place. 
Transactions conforming to the former case are those serving intra-
organizational goals of the type discussed in the preceding chapter, 
while those consistent with the latter type are oriented to impacts 
and beneficiaries outside the organization. 
Distinguishing the two transactional contexts are the spheres of 
intended consequences associated with the transactions, and a number 
of characteristics by which the transactions may be distinguished. 
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Because the former class of transactions--those serving various intra-
organizational goals--were covered in the preceding chapter, these will 
not be discussed further here. What does call for elaboration, however, 
is the derivation of extraorganizational goals and beneficiaries as a 
class of motivations for organizations. 
The Primitive Economy Model relates organizational behavior in 
part to the societal context in which the organization operates. 
Organizations in this model are envisioned as instruments of the 
environment. They are consciously originated by a cognizant social 
body to complement the facilities already available to it. As such, 
the defining characteristics of organizations are reflective of the 
qualitative features of the society in which they were inspired. In 
essence, the traditional, historical, and integrative qualities 
characteristic of the society, as well as its goals, become critical 
characteristics of the organizations developed by that society. 
At the most fundamental level, this orientation suggests that 
the exchange-based models of behavior discussed in the preceding 
chapter constitute only one segment of a wider range of exchange-
related transactions typically taking place in modern societal bodies. 
While most individuals and organizations can, and must, pursue desired 
ends in the market context, other ends exist which the social body as 
a whole (or in significant part) can most appropriately pursue through 
the development of organizational intermediaries. Human service 
organizations constitute one such type of organizational intermediary 
which, in their founding and operations, embody the initial goals and 
the underlying motivations which compelled the founding society to 
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take action. 
There is support for this conceptualization in a number of 
literatures, perhaps the most fertile of which is economic anthropology. 
Karl Polanyi, for example, noted in The Great Transformation that 
economic transactions in underdeveloped and archaic cultures are 
reflective of and, indeed, components of larger social institutions 
(Dalton, 1968). The transactions themselves are not the appropriate 
units of analysis in these societal contexts, but rather serve to 
illustrate operational mechanisms derived from more fundamental social 
relationships which establish norms governing the economic functions 
of resource extraction, production, and distribution. Polanyi noted 
that only with the advent of capitalism did the concept of an autono-
mous market emerge to replace the social function of resource distribu-
tion with the economic function of resource allocation. In later 
efforts to collectively control certain market functions, Polanyi saw 
a re-imposition of social values over the valueless market mechanism 
(Polanyi, 1944). In short, the values which lead to the manifestation 
of local concern in the development of human service agencies are 
potentially of critical importance in the operations of those agencies 
as they respond to the collective demands of a mobilized constituency. 
John Dewey (1954) provides a conceptual framework within which 
societal orientations and motivations could be integrated into the 
organizations founded by a collective to serve its interests and 
purposes. As noted earlier, Dewey suggests that when members of a 
group are similarly affected by an event or process beyond their 
control, they can organize into a recognizable organization in order to 
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gain a measure of influence over their problem. Under supportive 
conditions, this class of organization can be elevated to a govern-
mental role in response to the identified needs, orientations, and 
mandates of its constituency. In short, the government, and other 
organizations similarly founded, are closely tied to their founding 
constituencies. This process is consistent with the Polanyi thesis 
described above. 
In this context, organizations--particularly publicorg3nizations--
could well be expected to mirror the expectations of constituents in 
their operations as well as those specific to the organizations 
6 themselves. 
Thus, organizations are, in effect, the instrumentalities through 
which a public undertakes to advance ends perceived to be in the 
public's benefit, but which are for a range of reasons not as attainable 
through other mechanisms. This interpretacion is fully consistent with 
those described in the preceding chapter in conjunction with 
6 
An important distinction separates the common interest goals 
identified in the PEM from the external costs and benefits (more 
generically termed "externalities") of microeconomic theory. Externali-
ties have been defined as "unpriced effects produced jointly with other 
priced goods and services" (Koplin, 1971, p. 249). While recognizing 
that impacts derivative of the focal transaction or process accrue to 
parties outside the organization as well as within it, the concept of 
externalities is differentiated from the PEM's common-interest criteria 
by intent. In the case of externalities, costs and benefits accruing 
to extraorganizational entities are not considered in the organizational 
decision leading to the initiation or continuation of the externality-
producing activity. In the PEM, however, those extraorganizational 
benefits and costs associated with an organizational activity ~ 
incorporated or, alternatively stated, internalized, into the decision 
making process. The purposeful identification, valuation, and internal-
ization of extraorganizational benefits and costs into the decision 
making process distinguishes the PEM's common-interest criteria from the 
externalities of microeconomics. 
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organizational initiation in a more general context (for example, 
Stinchcombe,1972). 
While the characteristics of transactions undertaken in each of 
the two modes reflect differentiating distinctions,7 the two classes 
of goals themselves are of greatest importance to this dissertation 
and will constitute the focus of the remaining pages in this chapter. 
The basic differences in intended consequences distinguishing 
the Primitive Economy Model from those of microeconomics and social 
exchange theories are summarized in Figure 2, on the following page. 
Organizational behavior in the human service industry constitutes 
one focus of analysis where the Primitive Economy Model promises 
particular rewards. Three qualities of the industry contribute to 
this applicability. First, the preponderance of non-profit 
7o 'Brien (1976b) suggests six distinctions which differentiate 
transactions envisioned in the Primitive Economy Model from those 
addressed in microeconomic and social exchange theories. These dis-
tinctions are summarized in the following manner. 
rrransactional 
k:haracteristic 
~de of Transaction 
Complexity of Exchange 
Microeconomic 
and Social 
Exchange Theories 
Direct, Simultaneous, 
Specific 
Dyadic 
Determinants of Exchange Transactants' needs 
Benefactors of Exchange 
Commodities of Exchange 
Valuing Criteria 
Transactants 
Primarily tangible 
Market forces 
Primitive Economy Model 
Direct and indirect, 
Simultaneous and 
Sequential, Specific 
and Generalized 
Dyadic and "multiple 
unit-oriented" (p. 13) 
Needs of transactants 
and of other selected 
interests 
Transactants and other 
selected parties 
Tangible, intangible 
Market forces plus 
expressive and symbolic 
criteria 
Microeconomic Model 
Social Exchange Model 
Primitive Economy Model 
Organizational 
Effects on 
Intraorganizational 
Goals 
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Environmental 
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Goals 
No 
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Goals 
No 
No 
Yes 
Figure 2. Applicability of microeconomic, social exchange, and primitive economy models 
to intra- and extraorganizational factors in organizational utility function 
0'1 
VI 
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organizations in this industry neutralizes the concentration on profit 
per se. Second, the extraorganizational orientation of agencies in 
this industry promotes the inclusion of non-organizational impacts in 
decision making. Finally, the local scale of the markets within which 
agencies in different locales operate suggests that the operational 
realities facing agencies will be differentiated in terms of conditions 
and characteristics which distinguish the communities themselves. 
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL: SPECIFICATION 
As described above, the Primitive Economy Model constitutes a 
modification of the behavioral models employed in social exchange 
theory and in microeconomic theory. Like these, it stipulates that 
organizations maintain goals, the pursuit of which influence organiza-
tional operations, policies, and decision making. The contribution of 
the Primitive Economy Model lies in its addition of extraorganizational 
goals to the intraorganizational orientations specified in the other 
two perspectives. The following pages will be devoted to the PEM's 
explication and derivation. 
The first chapter was oriented to a description and general 
specification of a decision making model reflecting in the most general 
of terms the simultaneous influence of three general classes of 
motivators. From the Classical Theory of the Firm was borrowed the 
concept of profit, a critical measure of success in the private sector. 
From economic modifications to the Classical theory came two classes 
of motivators: the first represented alternative motivators for firms' 
owners and included such indexes as return on investment and growth, 
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while the second specified goals which arose out of managerial aspira-
tions, including such as lifetime income maximization and emoluments. 
From organizational exchange theory came a third class of motivators 
reflecting organizational relations to extraorganizational entities, 
including power, autonomy, and domain. As a group, these three classes 
of motivators were specified in a grand model of organizational 
behavior through formula (II), as follows. 
(11) U = f(~VfiXfi + ~VmiXmi + ~VeiXei) 
While subject to meaningful distinctions which in many contexts 
warrant or demand their separate identification, it is possible to 
simplify the formula (11) in order to simply note that utility is 
influenced by the simultaneous interaction of a range of goals which 
are derived from sources within the organization. Restated in this 
manner, organizational behavior's linkage to intraorganizational goals 
can be specified through the following formula. 
(12) U = f ( ~VIi XIi) 
where U, as always, denotes utility, VIi denotes the absolute value 
ascribed to the ith intraorganizational, Xli. While this specification 
neutralizes any advantages which might accrue from the more precise 
function which discretely recognizes each of the three classes of intra-
organizational goals, it promises rewards through its brevity in 
applications where greater precision is unwarranted. 
As noted above, the Primitive Economy Model adds an extra-
organizational component to the organization's utility function. In 
this, the PEM internalizes into the decision making process an extra-
organizational element which in most other models is left untreated or 
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else dismissed. Such a model can be operationalized as in (13), below. 
(13) U = f((EVIiXIi) + (EVEjXEj » 
To the terms introduced earlier, this formulation adds VEj' 
representing the value associated with the jth extraorganizational goal 
which itself is represented by XEj. 
The first element of (13), (VIiXli) is oriented to the inclusion 
of intraorganizational criteria as reflected in (12), above; this class 
of criteria can be referred to as self-interest criteria, for they 
reflect the organization's own interests. The second half of the 
formulation, (VEjXEj)' is a parallel component addressing desired 
states which exist primarily outside of the focal organization; this 
class of criteria can be termed common-interest criteria, for they 
refer to the interests of entities outside the organization. 
In this formulation, organizational decision making and behavior 
is a determinant both of direct benefits to the organization and of 
benefits which are perceived by the organization as accruing to other 
selected entities. Three qualities recommend this conceptualization to 
the study of organizational behavior. 
First, the model retains the internal relationships which 
constitute the foci of microeconomic and social exchange theories. This 
is important: no organization operates to the exclusion of its own 
needs, nor long can it. Those who seek to stUdy organizations and fail 
to address the survival orientation are likely to fall short of 
complete success. 
Second, the model addresses the external class of goals. In the 
introduction to this chapter, human service agencies were described as 
69 
the creations of a cognizant public acting in order to facilitate its 
achievement of some desired state. At least in its inception, then, 
the organization is solely oriented to external (to it) benefits. Goal 
displacement notwithstanding, an agency's survival in this light is 
contingent at least in part on the degree to which it satisfies its 
sponsors' expectations, and it is these that are reflected in the 
organization's extraorganizational goals. 
The third element of the model which extends its usefulness lies 
in the weighting coefficients, shown earlier as Vi and Vj. Exclusive 
of these coefficients, the model would lend equal weight to the ·various 
internal and external goals. Since this is likely to seldom be the 
case, the weighting coefficients allow for adjustment of the criteria's 
relative importance to the organization in the specification of its 
utility function. 
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL: ANALYTICAL APPLICATION 
The general specification of the PEM as reflected in (13) 
indicates that organizational well-being constitutes the sum of its 
position with respect to various indicators of intraorganizational and 
extraorganizational success, weighted to reflect differential valuation 
by the organization, as follows. 
(13) U = f ( (~VI i XIi) + (EVEj XEj» 
The actual operationalization of this conceptualization, however, 
is hindered by all of the various impediments which have been recognized 
in the cost-benefit analysis literature as hindering the valuation of 
non-economic conditions (Clawson and Knetsch, 1966). The full 
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utilization of this formulation will ultimately hinge upon the treatment 
of the problems identified in that literature. 
However, it is possible to provide initial testing of the formu-
lation through assessment of variance in the basic components of the 
model, and this constitutes the focus of this dissertation's research 
question. By learning from respondents how they perceive the potential 
benefits associated with given courses of action in response to a hypo-
thetical phenomenon, prevailing patterns of organizational goals and 
their respective valuations may be identified. The instruments from 
which the dependent variables for this dissertation were taken consti-
tute such an attempt (see Chapter IV). 
Necessarily missing from this approach to testing is any measure 
of cost, except as implicitly recognized by respondents. This general 
absenting of the cost component of organizational activity leads to a 
simplification of the decision making process, but not necessarily one 
which neutralizes the value of the exercise. To the extent that 
informants are asked to identify the benefits associated with given 
responses to a specified event, the influences of differential costs 
are negated: cost considerations are held constant through the specifi-
cation of a single mode of response. 
A further simplification has been made in this particular 
application. Because little is known of the extraorganizational 
component of the utility function, and because profit as a motivator is 
not directly applicable to non-profit organizations, the goals poten-
tially identified by respondents as being important to their firms were 
limited by the items included in the interview instrument. Rather than 
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being free to specify which goals prevail in their decision making 
processes, respondents were free only to specify the degree of impor-
tance attached to each of 24 criteria as specified by the research team. 
Thus, the formulation actually tested in this particular application of 
the Primitive Economy Model is as follows. 
(14) U = f( O:VIiX) + O':VEjXEj» 
Here, X connotes the fact that the benefit terms were exogenously fixed, 
so that respondents were free only to indicate degrees of importance 
attached to each. 
In all, then, the valuation terms, VIi and VEj, are the only 
components of the formulation which can reflect variance, and it is 
through these that the Primitive Economy Model will be initially tested 
in this dissertation. The operational premise through which testing 
will take place is a derivative of the Primitive Economy Model, termed 
the Differential Mix Hypothesis. 
The Differential Mix Hypothesis posits that organizations of a 
given type will tend to reflect in their operations patterns of goals 
which are different from those pursued by organizations of another type. 
Drawing both on intraorganizational and extraorganizational goals, this 
premise simply notes that the operational orientations of firms consti-
tutes one means of classifying firms and, inversely, represents a means 
of verifying classification systems derived through other approaches. 
Thus, one might anticipate finding systematic differences in patterns of 
goal valuation among profit-oriented organizations than would be found 
among non-profit agencies, for example. Similarly, one could expect 
different goals to be represented in the utility functions of 
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organizations in the extractive industries than would pertain to firms 
manufacturing consumer goods. Educational institutions would likely 
pursue different goals than would health-care institutions. Finally, 
and of primary interest in this dissertation, human service agencies in 
one locale might be expected to pursue a mix of goals which are differ-
ent from those pursued in a different community. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, the differential mix hypothesis will be implemented 
by classifying organizations according to the cities within which they 
operate. 
The analytical application of the differential mix hypothesis 
involves the assessment of variance associated with the valuing terms 
(VIi and VEj in (15». By identifying organizations in terms of whatever 
classificational device is selected (as here, by community), analysis of 
variance and covariance techniques can be employed to assess the value 
of the classifying scheme in explaining variance. To the extent that 
these analyses reveal meaningful contributions to variance, the value 
of the classificational scheme as an appropriate means of identifying 
organizations is substantiated. Alternatively, where analysis reveals 
no meaningful contributions to variance, the value of the classifying 
scheme in that particular application can be called into question. 
The differential mix hypothesis will be applied in this disserta-
tion to test for the contributions of locale in explaining variance 
encountered in the valuation terms. By identifying organizations in 
terms of the cities within which they operate l differences in valuation 
between cities may be identified. This approach will be described more 
fully in the ensuing chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The dissertation research presented in the following two chapters 
addresses the application of the Primitive Economy Model to organiza-
tional decision making among agencies in the aging services industries 
of six western cities. The analysis is guided by a single research 
question: Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits 
of entering into interagency agreements vary by city? If they do, the 
general underpinnings of the Primitive Economy Model--that organizations 
pursue goals other than those directly impacting the organization 
itself--are supported. If organizations are found to systematically 
respond to different patterns of extra-organizational "goals" from city 
to city, then a pattern of goal development will have been identified 
through microeconomic and organizational theories. The presence of 
different operational orientations is testable through the analysis 
of organizations' confrontations with identical situations in different 
locales, and this strategy constitutes the heart of the dissertation 
research being reported. 
The dissertation is based on data obtained from personal inter-
views with human service agency personnel in six western cities. 
Interviews were completed during June and July, 1977, as part of a 
research project, entitled Testing a Community Intervention Model 
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1978), funded through Grant Number 90-A-I020/01 by 
the Administration on Aging, DHEW. 
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The six cities selected for study were chosen in conjunction with 
a set of criteria including population, relation to neighboring cities, 
and the existence of Area Agencies on Aging. They are located in six 
states and range throughout the western region of the country. 
Within each of the cities, approximately 30 organizations were 
contacted for interviews, as determined through a two-staged sampling 
technique termed "snowball sampling" (Griffith et al., 1973; Roistacher, 
1974). In each city the directors of human service coordinating 
agencies provided a list of agencies with which their own organizations 
maintained most frequent contact. The agencies named by these infor-
mants became the sample from which data for the study was obtained. 
Each city's sample included five or six "broker agencies," agencies 
which arrange for other agencies to provide services, and approximately 
25 "direct service agencies," those agencies which actually provide the 
service to the client. 
The interview schedule was created employing insights gained both 
through extensive literature review, and through analysis of organiza-
tional data obtained in a prior study by O'Brien and Wetle (1975). The 
instrument was pre-tested in the Portland, Oregon area and modified as 
necessary prior to its use in actual data collection. Designed for use 
with informants in administrative roles, the instrument was adminis-
tered through personal interviews with 183 informants, holding the 
positions of local agency director, assistant director, or department 
head. 
The author of this dissertation served as a Research Assistant in 
the study described above, and was involved in the project from its 
inception through its completion. Job responsibilities included 
participation in the conduct of background research, questionnaire 
development, data analysis, and report writing. 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
As noted earlier, the research reported in this dissertation 
addresses the following research question. 
Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits 
of entering into interagency agreements vary by city? 
This question will be addressed through the Differential Mix 
Hypothesis, a corollary of the Primitive Economy Model. As described 
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in the previous chapter, the Differential Mix Hypothesis is a non-
directional statement which suggests that different classes of organiza-
tions will pursue different mixes of goals in their utility functions, 
as determined by systematic distinctions in their mandated functions, 
their relevant environments, and other factors. Since an important 
element of the social service industry is the local scope of its 
relevant environment, it is realistic to anticipate systematic differ-
ences in the goals pursued by service agencies as one moves between 
different local markets. These differences are reflected in formula 
(14) through the valuing coefficients, Vli and VEj. Since two classes 
of criteria are under study, the differential mix hypothesis is pursued 
in two predictive statements. 
1. It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in 
the intraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations 
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements. 
2. It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in 
the extraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations 
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements. 
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There is reason to suspect, however, that the effects of inter-
local differences will not be uniformly reflected in both classes of 
decision making criteria. It is realistic to anticipate that organiza-
tional orientation to the self-interest criteria will reflect a degree 
of continuity as one moves from city to city, regardless of the values 
and orientations of the local community. Further contributing to a 
potentially diminished reflection of local variation in the self-
interest criteria are the federal guidelines and requirements which 
accompany the funding of many of these organizations, the professional 
orientations of many of the practitioners, and the influences of widely-
accepted business procedures. The Common Interest criteria, however, 
are expected to be quite reflective of local conditions. Because these 
organizations are posited as being fundamentally oriented to the social 
ecology within which they are operated, and because they are expected 
to reflect a continued dynamic interaction with the communities through 
which their markets are defined, it is realistic to anticipate consid-
erable differences between organizational orientations to these criteria 
as one moves between locales. Accordingly, local variation in the 
operational procedures and orientations attached to the intraorganiza-
tional criteria is predicted to be less than among the extraorganiza-
tional criteria, which are seen as arising to a greater extent out of 
local conditions. This observation leads to a third hypothesis. 
3. It is hypothesized that the differences found to exist between 
cities with respect to the ~organizational criteria will exceed 
those associated with the intraorganizational criteria. 
The effects of locational differences in the values attached to 
the decision making criteria will be examined both before and after 
parceling out the effects of selected organizational variables. 
DESIGN 
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Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the dissertation's 
design. The dependent variable, "Interaction Decision Criteria," is 
depicted as reflecting a set of organizational variables as well as 
characteristics of the community context within which the organization 
operates. In practice, the associations of the organizational variables 
with the dependent variable are parceled out prior to the introduction 
of the community "contextual" variable in an analytical technique 
termed "contextual analysis" (Farkas, 1974; Meyer, 1970; Wright, 1977). 
It is hypothesized that this series of analyses will disclose associa-
tions between organizational goal orientations and the communities 
within which the organizations operate. To the extent that this 
finding is realized, its application to local service strategies will 
contribute to more effective service provision. 
SAMPLE 
The sampling strategy employed in the selection of organizations 
to be included in the stUdy was comprised of a two-step process: the 
first stage involved the selection of cities to be addressed, and the 
second involved identifying organizations within those cities. Each 
Covariates 
(Organizational 
Variables) 
Organizational 
Resources 
(Defined on Pp. 113-114) 
Independent Variable 
(Locational 
Variable) 
Organizational Uncertainty >, Conununity 
(Defined on Pages 114 through 120) ~ (Defined on Pp. 110-113) 
Organizational Goal 
(Defined on Page 120-121) 
Figure 3. Research design 
Dependent Variables 
Interaction Decision 
Criteria (Defined on 
Pages 90 through 107) 
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OJ 
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step will be addressed individually. 
Cities 
Six cities were studied during the course of the project. 
1. San Bernardino, California 
2. Tacoma, Washington 
3. Las Vegas, Nevada 
4. Tucson, Arizona 
5. Boulder, Colorado 
6. Salt Lake City, Utah 
The cities were purposively selected according to a number of 
criteria which are listed below in approximately their order of 
importance. It should be noted that no widely accepted guide exists 
for the selection of cities for use in surveys of this type. While 
locale-related theoretical bases exist in a wide range of disciplines, 
the concise application of this broad body of thought to the actual 
selection processes appropriate to survey research does not exist. The 
selection criteria described below constitute the factors identified by 
the research team as being most important to the theoretical under-
pinnings of the research being undertaken, and additionally reflect 
considerations born of cost and manageability. Key characteristics of 
the cities are summarized in Table I. 
1. Independence. It was hoped that the cities included in the 
study would be independent of other, larger cities with respect to the 
delivery and direction of human services. It will be noted from Table I 
that two cities included in the study are quite close to the nearest 
city of equal or greater size, these being Boulder and Tacoma. In each 
TABLE I 
CITIES: SELECTED FACTS 
Distance From 
Nearest City Percentage 
of Equal or of Population Number of 
City Population Greater Size Non-White AM in City? Organizations 
San Bernardino, 104,394 48 37.9 Yes 28 
California 
Tacoma, 154,555 12 10.7 Yes 32 
Washington 
Las Vegas, 125,641 178 17.1 No * 31 
Nevada 
Tucson, 262,933 96 29.1 Yes 31 
Arizona 
Boulder, 66,870 20 7.0 Yes 30 
Colorado 
Salt Lake City, 175,813 340 9.7 Yes 31 
Utah 
Source: 1972 City and County Data Book (1970 Census), International City Management Assn., 1977. 
-
~ implemented at the state level. 
- -----
ex> 
a 
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case, informants in those cities were contacted prior to the implementa-
tion of the study in order to ascertain the degree of independence 
evidenced in the focal city's human services networks. In each case, 
assurances were given that these functions were, in fact, independent. 
2. General Location. The study was limited by two factors to 
the western states. First, by limiting the study to a general region 
of the country, potential cultural differences attributable to wide 
regional separations could be to some extent avoided. Budgetary 
parameters limited the total number of cities which could be included 
in the study, and therefore limited the extent to which macro-regional 
distinctions of various types could be controlled. The second rationale 
in limiting the study to the west was more directly budgetary in nature. 
The western location of the research agency conducting the study meant 
that travel costs to western destinations would be more economical than 
would travel to more distant points. 
3. Size. The study sought to study organizational relationships 
as encountered in different local contexts, and for this reason mid-size 
cities were selected as study sites. Large cities were avoided since 
the multiplicity of their district identities could introduce local 
heterogeneity to AAA service areas. Small cities were avoided for fear 
that their service sectors would not be independent of outside 
influeneces. The cities ultimately selected ranged in size from just 
over 66,000 to approximately 262,000. 
4. State. It was decided that in order to achieve the goal of 
the stUdy it was necessary to select cities so that no two were located 
in the same state. This precaution insured both widespread regional 
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representation, and greater differentiation between locales. 
4. Area Agency on Aging. It was desired that each city have an 
Area Agency on Aging, and this goal was realized in every city but one. 
Las Vegas is located in a state where the Area Agency on Aging was 
implemented at the state level, and was purposively included in the 
sample to provide a contrasting case. 
5. Ethnicity. Ethnic composition of the cities was a desired 
source of variance. Two sources of non-white ethnic composition were 
predominant, these being Black and Spanish-surnamed. While distribu-
tions between cities do not approach continuity to as great a degree 
as might be hoped, a considerable range was included with respect to 
each minority group. 
6. Cooperation. A final consideration which resulted in the 
elimination of one city from the sample was the degree of cooperation 
encountered in the early stages of the selection process. Because 
considerable distances were involved, it was important that some 
measure of receptivity be offered. 
Organizations 
Within the cities, organizations were selected through a "snowball 
sampling" technique (Griffith et al., 1973; Roistacher, 1974). 
Generally, this approach involves contacting a party displaying desired 
characteristics and requesting a listing of other parties with whom 
contacts are maintained. Named individuals are then used as the actual 
sources of data. This technique allows for the study of linkages 
without the prior imposition of structure by the researcher. 
With specific reference to the data gathering techniques 
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employed in this study, initial contacts were established with the 
directors of six coordinating agencies in each city. In the sense 
employed here, coordinating agencies are organizations which fulfill 
service mandates by enlisting and coordinating the service offerings of 
other, direct service organizations. In each locale, the directors of 
the Area Agency on Aging, the local public health department, the 
local United Way, the adult services agency serving the local jurisdic-
tion, the local Title XX agency, and the local mental health coordinating 
organization were requested to provide the names of agencies to which 
the highest level of funding was provided. The named agencies 
constitute the sample from which data was obtained. In each city 
approximately 30 organizations were selected for the sample: of the 
30, it was desired that five or six be broker agencies, and approxi-
mately 25 be service organizations. 
It is clear that this sampling strategy does not conform to the 
random sampling mode. While there is merit in this observation and in 
the reservations which follow, other considerations contribute to the 
desirability of this strategy for this particular study. 
As was mentioned earlier, the cities employed in the study were 
purposively selected to conform to a set of criteria. It was explicitly 
recognized that city size very likely confounds the relationships under 
study. By limiting the sample to the range represented it is recog-
nized ~hat findings and implications will be tenuous when extended to 
cities of other scales. 
Within the cities, organizations were also selected by other than 
random means, and the non-random method of sampling may well be seen as 
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impacting on the generalizability of the study's findings to a universe 
of other organizations. While the strategy for selecting agencies for 
study was designed to conform as closely as possible to the snowball 
technique described earlier, the responses of contacted respondents 
undoubtedly reflect an operational component: to the extent that this 
is the case, network embeddedness may well have been supplanted by 
characteristics more reflective of the agency's service or administra-
tive style. To the extent, however, that sampling strategies within 
each of the six cities are identical, there is no reason to believe 
that intercity comparisons will be affected. In essence, the portion 
of each service community included in the sample was obtained through 
identical methods and therefore should be considered comparable. 
~breover, there is every reason to believe that similar techniques in 
other cities would produce similar agency samples, so that generaliza-
tion across cities of this scale is reasonable. 
Finally, this method of sampling guarantees that contacted 
organizations will have had prior interorganizational experience of 
the type being studied, so that information gained through interview 
and questionnaire is more likely to accurately portray organizational 
concerns than might be the case were random sampling methods employed. 
In all, the sampling strategy employed here allows for the 
identification and contacting of agencies of the desired type at least 
possible cost while not adversely affecting generalizability within 
the scope envisioned by the researcher. 
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Respondent Selection 
The sample developed for the earlier study drew from a total of 
183 organizations. Table 2 shows how these organizations were distrib-
uted among the six cities. 
TABLE II 
ORGANIZATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN CITIES 
San 
Bernardino 
28 
Tacoma 
32 
Las 
Vegas 
31 
Tucson Boulder 
31 30 
Salt Lake 
City 
31 
The sample employed in the dissertation analysis is based upon the 
original study's sample, but differs from it by virtue of three addi-
tional selection criteria which will be explained below. These include 
Interview Type, Respondent Position, and Missing Information. 
Interview Type 
Of the 183 personal interviews, 20 were eliminated from the sample 
for one of two reasons relating to circumstances surrounding the inter-
view. Thirteen of these interviews were undertaken during the early 
phases of the study and were designed primarily to identify other 
agencies in the various communities which might be employed in the 
actual gathering of data. While these agencies provided sufficient 
information of various types to be included in the data set for the 
original study, their contribution of information needed for this 
dissertation was insufficient to justify their inclusion. Additionally, 
seven agencies were eliminated from the sample in accordance with the 
recommendation of interviewers. Among these were agencies where the 
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contacted person appeared to be ill-informed in operational topics of 
importance to the study, and other organizations where there was reason 
to suspect either the veracity of the informant or the operational 
status of the agency. 
Organizational position 
Administrators included in the dissertation's sample are of three 
job types. 
1. Agency Directors 
2. Assistant Directors 
3. Department Heads 
This limitation is an extension of the principles recognized in 
the sample selection processes of the original study. Because respon-
dents in each organization were to be tapped for information on the 
organization and not as units of observation in their own right, it was 
acknowledged that they should be in a position to report authoritatively 
on the actions of their agency and on the processes by which decisions 
were undertakeni those in managerial and administrative roles were 
identified as best suiting this criterion. The limitation of data 
sources to these three positions carries the original logic one step 
further by eliminating regional directors (who must respond to other 
than local influences) and other, less authoritative informants from 
the sample. 
The limitation of data sources to these three positions addition-
ally serves the end of improving comparability between organizations, 
eliminating potential variance arising out of differences in pe~spective 
arising out of differences in responsibilities. 
Deleted from the sample were 19 respondents with job responsi-
bilities extending beyond the local service area, or with non-
administrative positions such as direct service workers and support 
staff. These included 13 Regional Directors, three city or county 
employees in other than administrative positions, two direct service 
workers, and one volunteer. Represented are four broker agencies, 12 
direct service agencies, and three advocate organizations. 
Missing Information 
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Not all of those contacted provided responses to all of the items. 
Missing information here, as in social research generally, constitutes a 
dilemma to the researcher. While the absence of pertinent data makes 
difficult the assessment of interrelationships between bodies of data, 
the elimination of all data given by a respondent because of non-response 
to one or a limited number of items constitutes a potentially large loss 
of valuable information. 
In an effort to address both of these considerations, the following 
strategy was developed for dealing with missing information among the 
items used in developing the study's dependent variables. 
Informants were retained in the sample if in their responses to 
items on the dependent variable instruments they left no more than three 
items unanswered per instrument, of the 12 included on each. This 
mechanism is designed to optimize the extent to which respondents could 
be operationalized in terms of the dependent variables employed in the 
analysis. Missing information as encountered with respect to the 
independent variables was not addressed, except through standard 
deletion techniques. 
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The inclusion of respondents in spite of their non-response to 
various items was accomplished as follows. If a respondent answered 
nine or more of the 12 items, a value was attached to missing items 
equal to the local mean value for that item. 
This solution addresses both considerations cited above. First, 
it means that in addressing individual respondents, no less than 75% of 
t'he data describing each will in fact be attributable to information 
provided by each. Second, respondents may be retained in the investi-
gation who otherwise would have been lost. 
Final sample size, then, constitutes the number of informants who 
hold the position of agency director, assistant director, or department 
head, and who provided sufficient information to allow reasonable 
treatment of the dependent variables. In all, 78.3% of all organiza-
tions contacted during the study are reflected in data employed in this 
dissertation. Table III summarizes the sample by city, including 
the number and proportion of each city's informants employed in the 
development of each class of dependent variables. 
TABLE III 
FINAL SAMPLE BY CITY 
Number / Percent of Total Interviews 
S.B. Tacoma L.V. Tucson Boulder SLC Total 
Intraorganizational 28 28 21 23 21 24 145 
Criteria 100.0 84.4 64.5 71.0 66.7 74.2 76.5 
Extraorganizational 28 28 23 23 21 24 147 
Criteria 100.0 87.5 74.2 74.2 70.0 77.4 80.3 
Total Interviews 28 32 31 31 30 31 183 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
The interview schedule employed in the larger study on which this 
dissertation is based was 24 pages in length and required from 45 to 90 
minutes to administer. All interviews were completed by trained 
personnel. 
Two data-gathering techniques were employed in the interview 
schedule. The first involved structured questions presented orally by 
the interviewer, while the second format employed multi-measure 
instruments (henceforth referred to as checklists) which the informants 
completed independently in the presence of the interviewer. The entire 
instrument was extensively pre-tested in the Portland, Oregon area 
prior to its use in data collection •. 
The items which formed the interview instrument were selected in 
order to plumb both the commodities around which organizations inter-
act, and those organizational and environmental characteristics which 
might influence interorganizational interactions. 
The data for this dissertation were derived from selected 
structured questions and from a number of the checklists, as described 
in the ensuing pages. 
VARIABLES 
Variables employed in this dissertation are of three general 
types. The first addresses the objectives of organizations in their 
entry into interagency agreements: these are treated in the analytical 
model as dependent variables. The second type of variable is 
descriptive of organizations and of their interactions with various 
environmental elements: these are treated generally as intervening 
variables. The third class of variable is the community identity of 
responding organizations; this variable is employed as the disserta-
tion's independent variable. 
Dependent Variables 
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The comparative study of community behaviors demands the identi-
fication and employment of a stimulus which is capable of generating 
reactions which themselves become the objects of study. Two problems 
surface in this context. First, events which impact similarly and 
sufficiently on numerous locales to produce comparable reactions in 
each tend to be sporadic and unpredictable. Second, the nature of the 
event producing such reactions will frequently not be of a type which 
is supportive of reactions consistent with the desired object of 
study. 
Researchers tend to fall into three patterns in their reactions 
to this situation. One group, including the political power analysts 
(as exemplified by Dahl, 1961; Coleman, 1972; McClelland and Form, 
1964) tend to operate without precipitating events per se, rather 
seeking to describe relationships as evidenced in reactions to 
recurrent events. A second group, including the "disaster researchers" 
(including B. Bell, 1978, and Kilijanek and Drabek, 1979), maintain 
readiness to enter the field until such time as a satisfactory event 
occurs. A third approach to studying community behavior involves the 
creation of hypothetical events and seeks to identify and measure how 
respondents would react were such an event to actually occur. 
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Where a precipitating event of some type is necessary, one of the 
last two approaches is necessary. There are predictable costs and 
benefits attached to each, generally based upon the trade-off which 
exists between gaining actual versus reported indications of behaviors 
and upon manageability in the field segments of the research project. 
The data analyzed in this dissertation were generated through 
the "hypothetical event" approach. 
Each respondent was asked to read a card describing a hypothetical 
event which would present a context within which responses to two 
instruments would be sought. The hypothetical event was described as 
follows. 
Assume that legislat10n is passed enacting Human Services 
Revenue Sharing. The program will be implemented by the 
designation of a local government agency to broker and monitor 
the pass through and use of the services funds. The actual 
service monies will be awarded through contracts with various 
local service agencies such as the one you work for. 
Assume that your agency is approached to participate in the 
program. To do so will result in certain modifications in 
your program and in your funding picture. In order to parti-
cipate, your agency must negotiate a contract setting down 
the terms of this interagency agreement. 
We are specifically interested in what factors you would 
consid~r in attempting both to decide whether or not to seek 
to participate in the program, and later, assuming you were 
interested, in how you would set your priorities relative to 
the specifics involved in the contract. 
Upon having read the hypothetical problem statement, each respon-
dent was handed two checklists, the first entitled "Interagency 
Agreements," and the second entitled "Interagency Agreements and the 
Community." These instruments provide the basis for the study's 
dependent variables. Each instrument was comprised of 12 items, with 
responses invited on a five-point scale ranging from "very important" 
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with a value of one, to "not at all impol"tant," with a value of five. 
Each of these checklists was designed to provide information on 
one of the two distinct classes of organizational motivators posited by 
the primitive economy model, intra- and extraorganizational goals. The 
first, entitled "Interagency Agreements" was designed to tap the 
intraorganizational class of goals, while the second, "Interagency 
Agreements and the Community," was designed to address extraorganiza-
tional motivators. On both instruments, four measures each were 
oriented to assessing market factors, community factors, and 
organizational factors. 
In sum, the two checklists represent instruments designed to tap 
separate and conceptually independent dimensions in the organizational 
decision making process. The independence of the two checklists was 
tested statistically, with analysis indicating that the two are 
8 independent in statistical fact as well as in theory. 
Intraorganizational Criteria 
Addressed by Instrument 1, "Interagency Agreements," intra-
organizational criteria are measures of those goals by which an 
organization identifies its success in terms of its own needs and 
desires. These criteria pertain primarily to rewards to the agency 
itself, and only secondarily if at all to entities outside the 
BAn important preliminary investigation involved the testing of 
items and aggregate measures from each of the two instruments for 
degree of correlation between instruments, since relative independence 
is critical to work to be reported later in the dissertation. Reported 
more fully in Appendix I, entitled "Tests of Mutual Independence of 
Instruments I and II," items on each of the instruments, and composite 
variables operationalized through aggregation of those items, were 
found to be relatively uncorrelated across instruments. 
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organization. 
Instrument 1 contains 12 items designed to measure various intra-
organizational criteria, as follow. Measures descriptive of the items 
are presented in Table IV, while the instrument itself is included in 
Appendix III. 
In considering such agreements, it is important .•• 
1) to use such opportunities to increase the range of 
services your organization offers. 
2) to avoid entanglements that diminish your agency's 
independence and self direction. 
3) to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since 
future obligations may be hard to count on. 
4) to avoid making the terms of such arrangements a 
public matter. 
5) to advance the professional interests of your staff 
in any new programs. 
6) to avoid new activities that do not match your 
agency goals. 
7) to concentrate on the bread and butter issues like 
maximizing your share of the contract money. 
8) to use such opportunities to increase the size of 
your agency staff and departments. 
9) to stress clear agreements which avoid long run 
entanglements with other organizations. 
10) to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain. 
11) to further the wishes of your board. 
12) to maximize the return from the agreement to your agency. 
The intraorganizational criteria were operationalized through 
three composite measures based on these 12 items. 
Two were obtained through factor analysis. Using the SPSS 
TABLE IV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ITEMS FROM INSTRUMENT 1, 
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS 
Item 
Instrument 1: Interagency Agreements 
1. Increase range of services your 
agency offers 
2. Avoid entanglements that diminish 
independency and self-direction 
3. Negotiate terms on here-and-now 
basis 
4. Avoid making terms of arrangements 
a public matter 
5. Advance professional interests 
of staff 
6. Avoid new activities that do not 
match agency goals 
7. Concentrate on bread-and-butter 
issues 
8. Increase size of staff and 
departments 
9. Stress clear agreements, avoiding 
long run entanglements 
10. Protect agency by driving a 
hard bargain 
11. Further the wishes of your board 
12. Maximize the return from the 
agreement 
n x 
145 1. 779 
145 1.821 
145 2.531 
144 4.194 
145 2.379 
144 2.083 
141 2.660 
146 3.452 
145 1.959 
141 2.979 
141 2.454 
140 2.107 
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s 
1.123 
1.093 
1.260 
1.049 
1.192 
1. 305 
1.077 
1. 261 
1.144 
1.176 
1. 206 
1.080 
(Nie et al., 1975) package of statistical computer programs, the 12 
items enumerated above were factor analyzed employing a principal 
components procedure followed by a varimax rotation. A pairwise 
deletion option was used to generate the initial correlation matrix 
to be factored. Four factors were extracted, accounting for 55.9% of 
total variance. 
The four factors, including the individual items' loadings, are 
shown in Table v. 
The first two factors, representing 37.5% of total variance and 
73.8% of explained variance were selected for use in the analysis. 
Throughout the study, variables were assigned to factors 
according to the following criteria. 
1. Variables with factor loadings exceeding .30 were included 
with that factor. 
2. Variables with loadings on two factors exceeding .30 were 
assigned to the factor upon which they loaded most highly. As no 
variable loaded on both intraorganizational criteria factors, this 
proved to be no problem here. 
Factor 1 is comprised of the following six items. 
1) to avoid making the terms of such arrangements a 
public matter. 
2) to advance the professional interests of your staff in 
any new programs. 
3) to concentrate on the bread and butter issues like 
maximizing your share of the contract money. 
4) to use such opportunities to increase the size of your 
agency staff and departments. 
5) to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain. 
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TABLE V 
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA: ROTATED 
FACTOR LOADINGS BY ITEM 
Factor: I 
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II III IV 
Agency Not Not 
Item Conceptual Label: Enhancement Autonomy Used Used 
1. to use such opportunities to 
increase the range of services 
your organization offers. 
2. to avoid entanglements that 
diminish your agency's inde-
pendence and self direction. 
3. to negotiate terms on a here-
and-now basis since future 
obligations may be hard to 
count on. 
4. to avoid making the terms of 
such arrangements a public 
matter. 
5. to advance the professional 
interests of your staff in 
any new programs. 
6. to avoid new activities that 
do not match your agency 
goals. 
7. to concentrate on the bread 
and butter issues like 
maximizing your share of 
the contract money. 
8. to use such opportunities to 
increase the size of your 
agency staff and departments. 
9. to stress clear agreements 
which avoid long run entangle-
ments with other organizations. 
10. to protect your agency by 
driving a hard bargain 
11. to further the wishes of your 
board. 
12. to maximize the return from 
the agreement to your agency. 
.262 
.057 
.179 
(.456) 
( • 434) 
.048 
( • 656) 
(.472) 
.061 
( • 441) 
.100 
(.434) 
-.062 .123 -.050 
(.378) .009 .437 
(.410 ) .152 .186 
.102 .016 .077 
.031 .242 .193 
.046 .001 .643 
.221 -.094 .040 
-.021 .088 -.036 
(.873) .089 .039 
.241 .370 .064 
.114 .768 .017 
.238 .327 -.111 
6) to maximize the return from the agreement to your 
agency. 
Generally, Factor I appears to represent a profit motivation in 
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organizational behavior, though its inclusion of staff advancement and 
publicity avoidance broadens its scope somewhat. These items notwith-
standing, the presence of three items pointedly emphasizing various 
aspects of net benefit maximization and a fourth citing "driving a 
hard bargain" clearly point to an orientation encompassing the concepts 
of profit maximization as described in the first chapter. Accordingly, 
this factor is entitled "Agency Enhancement." 
9 Agency Enhancement evidences a reliability coefficient of .688. 
Factor II includes three items, as follows. 
1) to avoid entanglements that diminish your agency's 
independence and self direction. 
2) to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since future 
obligations may be hard to count on. 
3) to stress clear agreements which avoid long run 
entanglements with other organizations. 
Two related dimensions are apparent in this factor. The first 
addressed the ability of organizations to regulate their own internal 
affairs as potentially affected by interorganizational agreements. 
Organizational avoidance of "entanglements that diminish your agency's 
independence and self direction," and of "long-run entanglements with 
9Reliability coefficients were computed through the following 
formula. 
where, 
rkk = reliability coefficient 
k = number of items in scale -rij = mean correlation between items 
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other organizations" clearly reflect concerns over the preservation of 
self-determination in organizational activity. The second dimension 
involves time, through orientation toward negotiations on a "here and 
now basis," and avoidance of "long run entanglements." Together, 
these two dimensions clearly reflect the concept of autonomy, the 
ability of the organization to pursue its own interests and responsi-
bilities in the absence of extraorganizational direction. 
The reliability coefficient of Autonomy is .588. 
The two factors are operationalized through the aggregation of 
scores associated with each of the component items. A number of 
methods exist for the creation of composite variables from individual 
measures (Susmilch and Johnson, 1975; Alwin, 1973; Nie et al., 1975). 
This study employs a method described by Susmilch and Weldon (1975) 
involving the unweighted addition of scores to component items to 
create a composite index, a process referred to as "linear combination" 
(Nunnally, 1967). While this procedure has been shown to be less 
effective in meeting each of four important criteria (validity, 
univocity, reliability, and correlatedness) than other methods, its 
overall performance has been shown to be equivalent or better than 
other methods tested (Susmilch and Johnson, 1975; Alwin, 1973). It is 
pertinent to multi-point scales, is widespread in its applicability, is 
well adapted to the emphasis of complex measures over the simpler 
variance associated with single-item measures (Nunnally, 1967), and is 
economical in its operation. 
The aggregation of items from this instrument and, subsequently, 
from Instrument 2 yields an index which inversely measures the 
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importance ascribed to each of the composite measures. This quality 
arises out of the scaling of responses through a "1" for "very 
important" through "5" for "not at all important." Summary statistics 
for these measures, as presented in the tables, reflect this inverse 
scaling. In the reporting of the multiple regression analyses in the 
next chapter, however, the signs representing the direction of the 
association between independent and dependent variables will be 
reversed, allowing direct interpretation of the relation between 
reported importance of the criteria and the various dependent variables. 
A third measure of ~ntraorganizational criteria was created 
through the simple addition of all items on the instrument. This 
aggregation is designed to provide a summary measure of organizational 
interest in organization-specific goals of all the various types. 
Because of its generality in addressing internal assessment criteria, 
the measure is entitled "Internal Orientation."lO 
Internal Orientation generates a reliability coefficient of .696. 
Tables VI and VII summarize the three intraorganizational 
dependent variables. 
Extraorganizational Criteria 
Extraorganizational criteria are measures of those goals by which 
an organization identifies success in terms of its perceptions of the 
lOItem-total correlations linking each of the individual measures 
and the overall index, Internal Orientation, range from a low of .3195 
to a high of .6176. All correlacions were generated from a sample of 
145 respondents, and all reflect probability levels of p<.OOl. The 
magnitude of these correlations and the fact that all are positive are 
seen as supporting the inclusion of all individual items in the 
aggregate index, Internal Orientation. 
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needs and desires of entities outside the organization. Also to be 
employed as dependent variables, these criteria pertain primarily to 
entities outside the organization and only secondarily, if at all, to 
the agency itself. 
Addressed by Instrument 2, "Interagency Agreements and the 
Corranunity," the extraorganizational criteria are addressed through 12 
items, as follow. Statistics descriptive of the items are presented 
in Table VIII. A copy of the Instrument is included in Appendix III. 
In considering such agreements, it is important ••• 
1) to use the opportunity to link many community agencies 
for close coordination. 
2) to avoid allowing the program to become a competitive 
struggle among many organizations. 
3) to exclude agencies which have been uncooperative with 
past community efforts. 
4) to promote a sense of cooperation among agencies in 
the corranunity. 
5) to minimize the share of the resources which go for 
agency building and administration. 
6) to avoid participation if the distribution process is 
likely to be dominated by a few self-serving agencies. 
7) to set an example of fair play in conducting the 
negotiations. 
8) to seek consultation with community leaders before 
settling on specific terms. 
9) to increase the positive regard of agencies for one 
another. 
10) to discourage the award of funds to agencies with a repu-
tation of not following through with their agreements. 
11) to use the funds for strengthening the capacity for 
human services delivery in the community. 
12) to assure open input from client representatives. 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY MEASURES OF INTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLE n 
11 
X s 
Agency Enhancement 145 17.781 4.250 
(Factor 1) 
Autonomy 145 6.280 2.564 
(Factor 2) 
Internal Orientation 145 30.354 6.602 
(Overall Aggregate 
Measure) 
Agency 
Enhancement 
(A) 
Autonomy 
(B) 
Internal 
Or ienta tion 
(C) 12 
TABLE VII 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN 
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A 
r = 
p = 
n = 
r = .2734 
p = .001 
n = 145 
r = .8569 
p = .001 
n = 145 
Actual 
Range 
6 - 27 
3 - 15 
12 - 44 
B 
.6347 
.001 
145 
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Possible 
Range 
6 - 30 
3 - 15 
5 - 60 
C 
llAfter adjustment for up to three missing items (see pp. 87-88). 
12Internal Orientation shares items with Agency Enhancement and 
Autonomy, and so is not considered to be independent. 
TABLE VIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ITEMS FROM INSTRUMENT 2, 
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS AND THE COMMUNITY 
Item 
1. link many agencies for close 
coordination 
2. avoid allowing program to become 
a competitive struggle 
3. exclude agencies which have been 
uncooperative 
4. promote a sense of cooperation 
among agencies 
5. minimize share of resources for 
agency building, administration 
6. avoid participation if dominated 
by self-serving agencies 
7. set an example of fair play in 
negotia tion 
8. seek consultation with community 
leaders 
9. increase positive regard of 
agencies for one another 
10. discourage funds to agencies who 
do not follow through 
11. use funds for strengthening human 
services capacity 
12. assure open input from client 
representatives 
n x 
147 1.354 
147 1.517 
145 3.455 
147 1. 245 
147 2.000 
145 2.241 
147 1. 537 
147 1.918 
147 1.510 
145 1. 903 
147 1.156 
146 1.377 
102 
s 
.717 
.972 
1. 220 
.579 
1.1.40 
1.272 
.851 
1.046 
.882 
1.026 
.463 
.795 
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Five measures of extraorganizational criteria were employed in 
the analysis. Four paralleled those measures derived for the intra-
organizational criteria, while one was developed through non-
methodological approaches. 
Using the techniques described earlier, three measures were 
derived through factor analysis of the 12 items in Instrument 2, 
Interagency Agreements and the Community. This analysis produced 
three factors, whose rotated loadings are presented in Table IX. All 
three factors were selected for use in subsequent analysis. Together, 
they account for 50.6% of total and 100% of explained variance. 
The first factor is comprised of five items, as follow. 
1) to promote a sense of cooperation among agencies in 
the community. 
2) to set an example of fair play in conducting the 
negotiations. 
3) to increase the positive regard of agencies for one 
another. 
4) to use the funds for strengthening the capacity for 
human services delivery in the community. 
5) to assure open input from client representatives. 
This factor contains items which are oriented to the more 
figurative aspects of strengthening interorganizational linkages. Four 
of the five items reflect this theme, including the promotion of "a 
sense of cooperation," establishing "an example of fair play," 
improving the mutual "positive regard of agencies," and the general 
strengthening of services I "capacity for human services deli very." Not 
so readily related is the fifth item, relating to "open input from 
client representatives." Possibly explaining the tie which links this 
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TABLE IX 
EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA: ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS BY ITEM 
Factor: I II III 
Expressive 
Item Conceptual Label: Coordination Coordination Exclusion 
1. to use the opportunity to link .272 
many community agencies for 
close coordination. 
2. to avoid allowing the program .097 
to become a competitive strug-
gle among many organizations. 
3. to exclude agencies which have -.013 
been uncooperative with past 
community efforts. 
4. to promote a sense of coopera- (.601) 
tion among agencies in the 
community. 
5. to minimize the share of the .110 
resources which go for agency 
building and administration. 
6. to avoid participation if the 
distribution process is likely 
to be dominated by a few self-
serving agencies. 
.126 
7. to set an example of fair play (.579) 
in conducting the negotiations. 
8. to seek consultation with .216 
community leaders before 
settling on specific terms. 
9. to increase the positive regard (.539) 
of agencies for one another. 
10. to discourage the award of .132 
funds to agencies with a reputa-
tion of not following through 
with their agreements. 
11. to use the funds for strength- (.511) 
ening the capacity for human 
services delivery in the commu 
community. 
12. to assure open input from 
client representatives. 
(.527) 
( • 508) -.197 
(.566 ) .214 
.013 .409 
.538 -.074 
(.403) .238 
.130 .480 
.293 .130 
( . 312) .077 
.359 .087 
.076 .704 
.045 .094 
.127 .062 
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item to the other four is the recognition of clients--at least in the 
figurative terms which prevail in this factor--as a contributing 
component in the service industry. Because of the degree of abstrac-
tion evidenced in these items, and because of their general orientation 
to improving system-wide relations and processes, the factor is 
entitled "Expressive Coordination." 
.731. 
Expressive Coordination evidences a reliability coefficient of 
The second factor is represented by four items. 
1) to use the opportunity to link many agencies for close 
coordination. 
2) to avoid allowing the program to become a competitive 
struggle among many organizations. 
3) to minimize the share of the resources which go for 
agency building and administration. 
4) to seek consultation with community leaders before 
settling on specific terms. 
This factor describes more active components in the strengthening 
of interorganizational ties. Where the factor described above was 
comprised of the symbolic elements of improving intra-industry ties, 
this factor is oriented more to the choreographing of active organiza-
tional efforts to improve the system's operation, and possibly its 
linkages to the broader locale. The linking of "agencies for close 
coordination," the avoidance of "competitive struggle[s]," and the 
minimization of "agency building" all relate to interagency goals of 
improving service delivery through improved performance. The fourth 
item, involving "consultation with community leaders," would also fit 
this general pattern, perhaps extending it to the larger context of the 
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overall community. Reflecting the" action orientation" of the four 
items of which it is composed, and in keeping with the coordinative 
focus of the items, this factor is entitled "Instrumental Coordination." 
.526. 
Instrumental Coordination generates a reliability coefficient of 
The third factor is comprised of three items. 
1) to exclude agencies which have been uncooperative tvi th 
past community efforts. 
2) to avoid participation if the distribution process is 
likely to be dominated by a few self-serving agencies. 
3) to discourage the award of funds to agencies with a 
reputation of not following through with their 
agreements. 
The contents of this factor had been identified prior to the 
factor analysis as a composite measure to be used in data analysis, 
designed to assess a specific component of organizational orientation. 
Its surfacing as a viable factor was thus not a complete surprise as 
such, but was rather a confirmation of prior work. The measure was 
originally constructed to index the degree to which organizations 
mobilize to exclude other agencies from interorganizational endeavors, 
and was entitled "Exclusion." 
The reliability coefficient of Exclusion is .568. 
An additional composite measure was developed as an index of 
functional contact with community elements outside the service 
industry. While not surfacing as a factor in the factor analysis 
described above, the theoretical ties linking interorganizational 
networks with their community environments in the Primitive Economy 
Model suggest that community distinctions will likely evidence 
themselves with respect to this variable. Labeled "Outside Input," 
this index was operationalized through the addition of responses to 
the following two items. 
Outside Input generates a reliability coefficient of but .208, 
reflecting both the small number of items employed in the variable's 
derivation, and their low (r = .114) intercorrelation: 
1) to seek consultation with community leaders before 
settling on specific terms. 
2) to assure open input from client representatives. 
As with the intraorganizational criteria, an overall composite 
score was also developed in order to gain a general measure of 
organizational attention to extraorganizational measures of success. 
Entitled "External Orientation," this measure constitutes the sum of 
11 . h . 13 responses to a ltems on t e lnstrument. 
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External Orientation reflects a reliability coefficient of .744. 
The extraorganizational dependent variables are summarized in 
Tables X and XI. 
Independent Variables 
The study will employ two general types of independent 
variables. The first type is community-specific, of which there is 
one. The second type involves organizational characteristics, selected 
13Item-total correlations linking each of the individual 
measures and the overall index, External Orientation, range from a low 
of .3574 to a high of .6167. All correlations were generated from a 
sample of 147 respondents, and all generate probability levels of 
p<.OOl. The magnitude of these correlations, and the fact that all are 
positive are seen as supporting the inclusion of all individual items 
in the aggregate index, External Orientation. 
Variable 
Instrumental Coordination 
(Factor 1) 
Expressive Coordination 
(Factor 2) 
Exclusion 
(Factor 3) 
Outside Input 
External Orientation 
(Overall Aggregate 
Measure) 
TABLE X 
SUMMARY MEASURES OF EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
n14 X s 
147 6.929 2.549 
147 8.401 3.069 
147 7.601 2.568 
147 3.296 1.388 
147 21. 319 5.581 
14After adjustment for up to three missing items (see pp. 87- 88). 
Actual 
Range 
5 - 18 
4 - 17 
3 - 15 
2 - 8 
12 - 46 
possible 
Range 
5 - 25 
4 - 20 
3 - 15 
2 - 10 
5 - 60 
I-' 
o 
CD 
Expressive 
Coordination 
(A) 
Instrumental 
Coordination 
(B) 
Exclusion 
(C) 15 
Outside 
Input 
(D)15 
External 
Orientation 
(E) 15 
TABLE XI 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A B C 
r = 
p = 
n = 
r = .4815 
p = .001 
n = 147 
r = .1901 .1909 
p = .011 .010 
n = 147 147 
r = .6212 .5776 .1382 
p = .001 .001 .048 
n = 147 147 147 
r = .7673 .7711 .6353 
p = .001 .001 .001 
n = 147 147 147 
D E 
.6149 
.001 
147 
15EXclusion and Outside Input share items with Expressive Coordination and Instrumental 
Coordination. External Orientation shares items with all other measures. 
I-' 
o 
\0 
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for their potential in impacting organization-environment interactions, 
and for their ease in being identified by policy-makers and 
implementers. Six variables are of the latter type, including 
organizational reliance on federal funding, four measures of environ-
mental turbulence, and organizational goal. The organizational goals 
are employed in the analyses as covariates. 
The independent variables are discussed in the following pages, 
and are summarized in Tables XII and XIII. 
Community 
Community constitutes the study's independent variable and 
represents the local service market. As noted earlier, the literature 
is not specific as to what exactly constitutes a community, except that 
the social reality may well not conform to jurisdictional boundaries 
(Suttles, 1972; Stacey, 1969; Janowitz, 1952). This notwithstanding, 
the question of geographic scale is addressed with authors generally 
concluding that larger scale correlates with lesser community homo-
geneity (MacIver, 1970; Suttles, 1972). Based upon the latter 
conceptualization and mindful of the former, this dissertation analysis 
will operationalize the construct of community by employing service 
areas. These approximate urban jurisdictional boundaries and are 
dictated by the nature of the sample in use. Thus when speaking of, 
say, Tacoma, the service area centering upon Tacoma is the actual area 
being studied, as defined by the spatial distribution of organizations 
named by Tacoman service personnel as being components of the area's 
service network. The actual "community" under study is functional, 
TABLE XII 
SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (BASED UPON SAMPLE 
EMPLOYED IN INTRAORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSES)16 
Actual -n X s Ranqe 
Orqanizational Variables 
Organizational Resources 140 35.514 35.684 o - 100 
Local Public Uncertainty 126 18.405 6.761 o - 28 
State and Federal Uncertainty 131 13.580 4.596 2 - 20 
Clients Uncertainty 141 13.489 2.127 6 - 16 
Interorganizational 129 4.736 1. 757 o - 8 
Uncertainty 
Organizational Goal 
Broker 21 - - -
Direct Service 103 - - -
Advocate 21 - - -
Community 
San Bernardino 28 
Tacoma 28 
Las Vegas 21 
Tucson 23 
Boulder 21 
Salt Lake City 24 
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Possible 
Ranae 
0 - 100 
o - 28 
0 - 20 
o - 16 
0 - 8 
-
-
-
16145 organizations were found suited for the intraorganizational 
analyses by virtue of information on the dependent variables. Devia-
tions between 145 and the numbers presented in this Table represent 
missing information. 
1. Organizational r = 
Resources p = 
n = 
2. Local Public r = 
Uncertainty p = 
n = 
3. State & Federal r = 
Uncertainty p = 
n = 
4. Client r = 
Uncertainty p = 
n = 
5. Inter- r = 
Organizational p = 
Uncertainty n = 
I 
- ------ ----- ----- ------
TABLE XIII 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Organiza- Local State & 
tional Public Federal 
Resources Uncertainty Uncertainty 
~ 
-.0941 ~ .142. 132 
.3009 .3148 ~ .001 .001 132 123 
.1555 .1618 .1271 
.030 .033 .072 
146 130 134 
.0508 .0555 .0620 
.285 .278 .248 
127 115 123 
Client 
Uncertainty 
~ 
.0941 
.144 
130 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncertainty • 
~ 
..... ..... 
N 
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although it correlates closely with spatial boundaries. In the course 
of the study, "Community" will be employed as a classificatory device 
of nominal order, with each of the cities being a class within the 
larger variable. While somewhat unusual in approach, this is in 
keeping with commonly accepted techniques (Kerlinger, 1973; Blalock, 
1972; Nunnally, 1967i Hays, 1973). Table XII summarizes each city's 
representation in the sample. 
Organizational Variables 
The organizational variables will be employed as control 
variables allowing for the more accurate assessment of community-
related differences. As mentioned above, three types of organiza-
tional variables will be employed. 
1. Organizational Resources. Organizational Resources will 
represent organizational reliance upon federal sources for funding. 
As such, it reflects organizational dependence on entities outside the 
service market, and constitutes an inverse proxy for local autonomy 
in organizational decision making. Roland L. Warren (1967) notes 
that one characteristic determining the degree to which communities 
maintain autonomy and identity is the extent to which organizations 
within the community have autonomy over their operations; organiza-
tional autonomy, he notes, varies inversely with the degree to which 
the organization depends upon entities outside the local area for 
support. The funding patterns of many social service agencies is such 
that a proxy for extracommunity funding and, potentially, control 
is available through a measure of organizational reliance on federal 
funding. This variable will be operationalized through the use of 
self-reported data obtained during the interview process which 
reported the percent of budget obtained from federal sources. 
Reported in percentages and therefore of ratio order, the information 
was ascertained through a question presented in the earlier stages of 
the interviews. The question is presented in Appendix III, and 
statistics descriptive of the responses are presented in Table XII. 
2. Organizational Uncertainty. As was discussed earlier, 
environmental turbulence is a descriptor not so much of the organiza-
tion or the environment alone, but rather of the relationship which 
links the organization with its environment. For this reason, it is 
reasonable to assume that organizations operating within a locale will 
encounter different degrees of turbulence simply as a result of their 
interactions with different environmental components. While the four 
turbulence measures are conceded to have a major environmental 
component to their composition, they will be termed "organizational 
variables" throughout the dissertation. The measures employed here to 
represent organizational uncertainty are based on those of the report, 
as developed by another analyst. 
The four measures were developed through the factor analysis of 
three instruments included in the interview instrument, as reflected 
in Table XIV. The factor analytical work has done employing a 
principal components procedure and varimax rotation. These scales 
were developed using all 335 respondents to the original study, and 
not just the 183 who constitute the sample for this dissertation. 
Each of the three instruments was designed to tap a distinct 
aspect of organizational-environmental interaction. Based largely on 
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TABLE XIV 
FACTOR ANALYSIS: ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS 
IN DEVELOPMENT OF UNCERTAINTY MEASURES 
Factor: I II III IV 
Conceptual Label: Local State Ii Interorga-
Public Federal Client nizational 
Instrument Items Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Community Orientation Checklist 
1. Local Elected Officials .5619 
2. State Governmental Agencies .4501 .5870 
3. Federal Governmental .6929 
Agencies 
4. Local Service Organizations .6996 
5. The Press and Other Media .6466 
6. Professional Associations .7328 
7. Advocate Groups for Clients .7800 I 
8. Regulatory Bodies .5975 I 
9. Clients .7187 
Pressures for Change Checklist 
1. Meeting Requirements for .4618 
Funding Sources 
2. Anticipating New Federal .6116 
Programs 
3. Responding to Public 
Opinion 
4. Avoiding Organizational 
Stagnation 
5. Complying with Legal or .4863 
Legislative Requirements 
6. Reducing Costs Per Unit of 
Service 
7. Replacing Outdated Practices 
Community Change Checklist 
1- The Number of Organizations .4231 
Competing with Your 
Organiza tion 
2. Public Demand for Your .4026 
Services 
3. The Number of New Government .6651 
Regulations That Apply to 
the Services You Provide 
4. The Number of Elderly Clients .4331 
Your Organization Serves 
5. The Kinds of Clients You Serve .4032 
6. General Public Belief in The 
Urgency of Services for the 
Elderly 
7. Conflict with Other Organiza- .3964 
tions Over the Kinds of 
Services You Provide 
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findings developed in a prior study (O'Brien and Wetle, 1975), these 
were oriented to identifying the environmental entities which directly 
or indirectly influence organizational activity. Together, the three 
tap the degree to which the expectations and demands of various 
environmental groups reflect in the agency's onging decision making 
processes, the extent to which they have been influential in the past, 
and the degree to which organizations perceive their relevant environ-
ment as undergoing change. In each case, input and output components 
of the environment are identified, though the lack of specificity in 
the theoretical bases offered by the literature made difficult the 
further identification of specific environmental entities. Accordingly, 
the project's senior investigators based their selection of several of 
the specific environmental components employed in the instruments on 
conceptual grounds and on their own prior research. The instruments 
are included in Appendix III. 
The first of the instruments addressing uncertainty, entitled 
"Community Orientation," is comprised of nine items, each representing 
an environmental entity potentially capable of influencing agency 
operations, as follows. 
For each sector listed below, please indicate the extent to 
which their evaluation of your agency function is a major 
cause of concern for your organization. 
1) Local Elected Officials 
2) State Governmental Agencies 
3) Federal Governmental Agencies 
4) Local Direct Service Organizations 
5) The Press and Other Media 
6) Professional Associations 
7) Advocate Groups for Clients 
8) Regulatory Bodies (i.e., boards and commissions not 
included in categories above) 
9) Clients 
Respondents were asked to register the degree of concern they 
register with respect to each. A five-point scale was developed for 
this purpose, where one pole registered "very much of concern," and 
the other represented "of no concern whatsoever." 
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The second Instrument used in this analysis, entitled "Pressures 
for Change," sought respondents' perceptions of seven influences 
potentially capable of impacting organizational activities and 
direction. The questions presented in the instrument are as follow. 
Thinking about changes you have made in the past, please 
indicate the importance of each in influencing your organiza-
tion's change decisions. 
1) Meeting requirements of funding sources 
2) Anticipating new federal programs 
3) Responding to public opinion 
4) Avoiding organizational stagnation 
5) Complying with legal or lesislative requirements 
6) Reducing costs per unit of service 
7) Replacing outdated programs. 
As before, responses were taken on a five-point scale with "very 
important" at one pole, and "not at all important" at the other. 
The third instrument is entitled "Community Change" and is 
designed to document respondents' perceptions of how their respective 
communities had changed over the past five years. In a real sense, 
this instrument documents market change. Seven items comprised the 
instrument, as follow. 
Using the past five years as a frame of reference, please 
indicate whether each of these factors has increased or 
decreased in your organization. 
1) The number of organizations competing with your 
organization. 
2) Public demand for your services. 
3) The number of new government regulations that apply to 
the services you provide. 
4) The number of elderly clients your organization serves. 
5) The kinds of clients you serve. 
6) General public belief in the urgency of services for 
the elderly. 
7) Conflicts with other organizations over the kinds of 
services you provide. 
118 
Again, a five-point scale was used to document responses, with 
"increased" at one pole, "remained the same" at the mid-point, 
"decreased" at the other pole. 
The factor analysis of the three checklists yielded the loadings 
reflected in Table XIV. It will be noted that, for the most part, the 
integrity of the instruments was reaffirmed in the factor analysis. 
This was anticipated. Factor composition, however, does not perfectly 
match the checklists. 
LocaZ PubZic Unceptainty represents the degree of concern felt by 
members of the organization about various local groups, or "publics," 
in the community. Examples of these groups would include elements of 
the media and various professional groups. 
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The variable was operationalized through the procedures outlined 
earlier, using the scores obtained from the following items. 
a) Local Elected Officials (as a source of concern to 
the agency). 
b) Local Direct Service Organizations (as a source of 
concern to the agency). 
c) The Press and Other Media (as a source of concern to 
the agency). 
d) Advocate Groups for Clients (as a source of concern to 
the agency) • 
e) Regulatory Bodies (as a source of concern to the 
agency) • 
f) Clients (as a source of concern to the agency). 
State and FederaL Uncertainty is defined as the degree of concern 
felt by the organization over pressures exerted by state and federal 
agencies. Examples would include requirements exerted by funding 
agencies, and legislative and legal restraints. 
This variable was derived using the following items: 
a) State Governmental Agencies (as a source of concern 
to the agency) • 
b) Federal Governmental Agencies (as a source of concern 
to the agency). 
c) Meeting Requirements of Funding Sources (as an 
influence in the organization's change decisions) • 
d) Anticipating New Federal Programs (as an influence in 
the organization's change decisions). 
e) Complying with Legal or Legislative Requirements (as 
an influence in the organization's change decisions). 
CLients Uncertainty is the extent to which the diversity of 
clients and their demand for the organization's services had increased 
or decreased. 
The following items were used to develop a value for this 
variable. 
a) Public Demand for Your Services (has increased or 
decreased for your organization). 
b) The Number of New Government Regulations that Apply 
to the Services You Provide (has increased or decreased 
for your organization). 
c) The Number of Elderly Clients Your Organization Serves 
(has increased or decreased for your organization). 
d) The Kinds of Clients You Serve (has increased or 
decreased for your organization). 
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InterorganizationaZ Uncertainty constitutes the extent to which 
there has been an increase or decrease in the number of organizations 
competing with the focal organization, as well as conflict with other 
organizations over types of service provision. 
items. 
The variable was operationalized through the use of the following 
a) The Number of Organizations Competing with Your 
Organization (has increased or decreased for your 
organization). 
b) Conflict with Other Organizations Over the Kinds of 
Services You Provide (has increased or decreased for 
your organization). 
3. Organizational Goal. This variable describes the role of the 
organization in the overall service system. The limitation of the 
dissertation's scope to human service agencies recommends a three-fold 
classificatory variable describing organizational function which is 
specifically designed for this industry (Burki, 1978), as follows. 
Agencies were classified according to their own self-descriptions, as 
confirmed by the judgements of the original research team. 
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Service organizations are the agencies which actually supply the 
service to a clientele. These agencies' access to funding is based on 
their provision of service. The sample employed in this dissertation 
includes 115 service agencies. 
Broker organizations have as their primary function the develop-
ment of service strategies, and the completion of arrangements leading 
to service delivery by service organizations. Rarely do broker 
organizations provide services themselves. This sample includes 27 
broker organizations. 
Advocate organizations have as their primary responsibility the 
representation of a class of client in agitating for needed service 
options, and the mobilization of members of the client group to act in 
their own behalf. Advocate organizations generally do not in them-
selves provide human services to clients; rather, they represent the 
client in the larger service industry. Twenty-one advocate organiza-
tions were included in the sample. 
Summary of Independent Variables 
Statistics descriptive of each of the independent variables are 
presented in Table XII, for those firms included in the intraorganiza-
tional analyses. 
Table XIII presents Pearson's product moment correlations between 
the interval order independent variables. with a highest correlation 
of .3149, these variables were deemed generally consistent with 
assumptions of independence accompanying the analytical methods 
employed in the dissertation. It should be additionally noted that 
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with only one exception, the correlations of the four turbulence 
measures generally reflect independence. As such, the assumption that 
they reflect different forms of organizational uncertainty is generally 
supported. 
Table XV provides descriptive statistics of those firms deleted 
from the intraorganizational analyses in terms of the dissertation's 
independent variables. In no case are measures based on deleted firms 
significantly different from those related to firms employed in the 
analyses. 
ANALYSIS 
As will be developed more fully in the next chapter, three 
methodological techniques are employed in the dissertation's analysis: 
analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, and multiple regression 
analysis. Each will be undertaken through the SPSS package of computer 
programs (Nie et al., 1975). These techniques are consistent with the 
properties of the variables described above. 
It will be recalled that two general classes of dependent 
variables were described: intraorganizational criteria and extra-
organizational criteria. Each measure employed within these general 
classes is a product of summative scaling techniques, and therefore 
generally consistent with the characteristics of interval scales. 
The independent variables generally conform with the properties 
of two scales of measurement. Organizational Resources is a propor-
tional measure and therefore of ratio scale. The four Organizational 
Uncertainty indexes, like the criterion measures above, are summative 
TABLE XV 
SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (BASED UPON SAMPLE 
DELETED FROM INTRAORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSES) 17 
Actual -
n X s Ranqe 
brganizational variables 
Organizational Resources 13 39.846 45.911 a - 100 
Local Public Uncertainty 11 18.091 6.123 6 - 28 
State and Federal Uncertainty 7 12.143 5.786 4 - 17 
Clients Uncertainty 12 13.000 2.374 9 - 16 
Interorganizational 5 4.200 1.304 3 - 6 
Uncertainty 
Organizational Goal 
Broker 6 
Direct Service 11 
Advocate 1 
Community 
San Bernardino 0 
Tacoma 0 
Las Vegas 5 
Tucson 2 
Boulder 7 
Salt Lake City 4 
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possible 
Ranqe 
a - 100 
a - 28 
a - 20 
a - 16 
o - 8 
1718 organizations were deleted from the intraorganizational 
analysis for reasons of missing information on the dependent variables. 
Deviations between 18 and the numbers presented in the Table represent 
missing information. 
indexes and therefore generally consistent with the properties of 
interval scales. 
Community and Organizational Goal are nominal measures. The 
application of these variables to regression analysis will be under-
taken through the development of dummy variables, a technique which 
has been widely employed and found to be appropriate for regression 
analysis (Miller and Erickson, 1974; Nie et al, 1975). 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports the findings of the research, as developed 
in pursuit of the research question and hypotheses presented in the 
preceding chapter. 
The reporting of analytical results will be undertaken in three 
parts. 
First, results will be very generally summarized in the section 
which immediately follows. The full reporting of results is a 
lengthy undertaking, and in focusing on the details of analytical 
findings, it can be difficult to maintain the context within which 
analyses were planned and executed. By summarizing the results prior 
to their more complete reporting it is hoped that a context can be 
established which will assist the reader in addressing the more 
detailed reporting to follow. 
The full textual discussion of results will immediately follow 
the summary described above. Textual discussion will address all 
analytical results involving Community, and all involving organiza-
tional variables with probability levels of p<.lO. As will be further 
discussed in the dissertation's last chapter, this relatively generous 
probability level reflects the exploratory nature of this research, and 
a willingness to risk Type I error in exchange for reduced possibilities 
126 
of committing Type II error. The discussion of results will begin with 
those analyses addressing the intraorganizational criteria as dependent 
variables, and will conclude with those involving the extraorganiza-
tional decision making criteria. 
Finally, the tabular presentation of all analytical results is 
provided in Appendix II. 
ANALYTICAL RESULTS: SUMMARY 
The data yield no support for the first hypothesis, calling for 
inter ci ty differences in the or ientations of organizations toward 
intraorganizational measures of success. Analyses employing three 
measures of intraorganizational decision making criteria--Agency 
Enhancement, Autonomy, and Internal Orientation--as dependent variables 
demonstrated that no significant differences exist between organiza-
tions in the six cities in their respective valuations of this class 
of goals. 
The second hypothesis, suggesting intercity differences in 
organizational orientation to extraorganizational impacts, received 
greater support from the data than did the first. Five measures of 
extraorganizational criteria were developed: Expressive Coordination, 
Instrumental Coordination, Exclusion, Outside Input, and External 
Orientation. Here, intercommunity differences were found to exist 
with probabilities of p<.076 (External Orientation), p<.08l (Expressive 
Coordination), p<.l27 (Instrumental Coordination), p<.13l (Outside 
Input), p<.229 (Exclusion). While none of these measures reflect 
commonly accepted standards of statistical probability (p<.05), four 
of the five are generally consistent with other standards as they 
relate to exploratory research (Hays, 1973). 
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The third hypothesis, calling for greater intercity differences 
among the extraorganizational criteria than among the intraorganiza-
tional criteria was deemed fully supported by the analyses. All 
measures of intercity differences among the extraorganizational 
criteria were found to exceed all intercity difference measures 
among the intraorganizational criteria. 
ANALYTICAL RESULTS: TEXTUAL PRESENTATION 
The pages which follow are devoted to discussion of the disserta-
tion's analytical results. Analysis is comprised of three steps. 
First, each of the eight dependent variables is analyzed for 
intercommunity differences, without employing any of the organiza-
tional variables as controls. One-way analysis of variance is employed 
for this purpose with Community as the single independent variable. 
This independent variable is comprised of six levels, each representing 
one of the six cities. 
Second, each dependent variable is analyzed through analysis of 
covariance in order to assess interco~~unity differences, employing 
each of the organizational variables individually as controls. 
Third, each dependent variable is analyzed through multiple 
regression analysis. Here, all organizational variables are employed 
as controls, with community-related contributions to variance assessed 
only after parceling out that associated with organizational charac-
teristics. This is comparable to analysis of covariance with multiple 
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covariates, the regression technique employed primarily to surmount 
limitations on covariates encountered in the SPSS package (Nie et al., 
1975). 
The second and third analytical phases conform to a methodolog-
ical technique termed "contextual analysis." In contextual analysis, 
the contributions to variance attributable to a locational or environ-
mental (contextual) variable are analyzed only after having controlled 
for the contributions of variables which are explicitly related to 
observational units within the various contexts. 
The theoretical and conceptual significance of the analytical 
results will be discussed following the presentation of findings from 
each of the two sets of regression analysis. 
Intraorganizational Criteria 
Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance relating community to the Intraorganiza-
tional Criteria produced no statistically significant results. As 
reflected in the small deviations from the grand mean and the 
probability levels provided in Table XVI, in none of these analyses 
was Community found to be a significant factor in explaining organiza-
tional emphasis on an intraorganizational decision making criterion. 
As a result, the hypothesis predicting intercommunity differences in 
reported patterns of intraorganizational criteria was found to be 
unsupported in this series of analyses. 
Grand Mean 
San Bernardino 
Tacoma 
Las Veqas 
TucsOn 
Boulder 
Salt Lake City 
P < 
F = 
'----~_~ ~L==_ 
TABLE XVI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS 
FROM GRAND MEAN BY INTRAORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Agency Internal 
Enhancement Autonomy Orientation 
17.78 6.28 30.35 
-.03 -.28 -.60 
.50 -.35 .07 
-1.43 .51 -1.03 
1.00 .59 1.18 
.66 -.38 1. 23 
-.84 .05 -.69 
.365 .650 .787 
1.096 .666 .485 
---- ~-~ 
5,139 5,139 5,139 
I 
I 
~ 
N 
\0 
Analysis of Covariance 
The analysis of covariance employed in this stage of analysis 
involves the testing of intercommunity differences with respect to 
each of the three measures of intraorganizational decision criteria, 
individually employing each of the six selected organizational 
variables as covariates. In all, 18 analyses of covariance are 
represented in this pursuit. Results of analyses are summarized in 
Tables XVIII, XIX, and XX. 
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As reflected in deviations from the grand means and in the 
probability levels summarized in the three tables, in no case was 
Community found to be an effective variable for explaining variance 
among the three independent variables. In the analysis where 
Community proved strongest in its association with a decision 
criterion, the statistical significance of its relation was well 
short of accepted probability levels (with Agency Enhancement as the 
dependent variable and Organizational Goal as the covariate). The 
analyses of covariance, then, lend no support to the first hypothesis. 
Two other observations are noteworthy with respect to these 
analyses. 
First, as reflected in Tables XVIII through XX, in no case is 
the inclusion of an organizational variable as covariate in the 
analysis of a dependent variable accompanied by an improvement in 
Community's performance as a predictor to a probability level of 
p<.lO. In the most favorable case, with Agency Enhancement and 
Organizational Goal as dependent variable and covariate respectively, 
Community's contribution to variance reflects a probability level 
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of p<.143. 
Second, the results of a number of the analyses evidence that 
the covariates themselves are to varying extents effective in 
explaining variance in the dependent variables. Summarized in 
Table XX, each organizational variable will be briefly mentioned 
though as elsewhere attention will be restricted to those covariates 
with F values reflecting probability levels of p<.IO. 
Organizational Resources is not an effective predictor with 
respect to any of the three dependent variables. 
Organizational Goal, as is evidenced in Table XVII, is an 
effective predictor of all three internal decision making criteria 
(with Agency Enhancement, F=5.645, df=2,137, p<.004; with Autonomy, 
F=4.322, df=2,137, p<.OI5; with Internal Orientation, F=4.273, 
d=1,137, p<.Ol6). This pattern of distinctions is based primarily on 
the differences in orientation which are evident between Advocate 
Agencies and Broker Agencies. These distinctions are evident in the 
figures relating to Broker Agencies (with Agency Enhancement, F=8.426, 
df=l,l37, p<.004; with Autonomy, F=3.829, df=l,l37, p<.052; with 
Internal Orientation, F=5.237, df=l,137, p<.024). The differences 
evidenced between Advocate Agencies and Direct Service Agencies are 
not statistically significant, indicating that these two types of 
agencies are similar in their orientations to the intraorganizational 
criteria. 
Local Public Uncertainty does not reflect statistically signifi-
cant associations with any of the three intraorganizational criterion 
measures. Its strongest relation involves Internal Orientation 
TABLE XVII 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE: COVARIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DECISION MAKING CRITERIA, p<.lO 
Decision Making Criteria 
Agency I Internal Enhancement Autonomy Orientation 
Organizational 
Resources 
Organizational 
F=5.645, df=2,l37 F=4.322, df=2,l37 F=4.273, df=2,l37 
Goal 
p<.OO4 p<.015 p<.Ol6 
-------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------------
F=8.426, df=l,l37 F=3.829, df=l,l37 F=5.237, df=l,l37 
Broker 
p<.OO4 p<.052 p<.024 
-------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------------, 
Direct 
F=.333, df=l,l37 F=.l74, df=1,137 F=.886, df=1,137 i 
Service 
p<.565 p<.677 p<.492 
I 
, 
I 
Local Public 
F=3.626, df=1,119 
i 
Uncertainty 
p<.059 
State and F=7.08l, df=1,124 F=3.606, df=1,124 
Federal I 
Uncertainty 
p<.009 p<.060 
Clients I Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
F=3.39l, df=1,l22 F=4.848, df=1.122 
zational 
Uncertainty 
p<.068 p<.030 _._. ...... 
LV 
N 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 17.78 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino -.03 
Tacoma .50 
Las Vegas -1.43 
Tucson 1. 00 
Boulder .66 
Salt Lake City -.84 
P < .365 
F = 1. 096 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XVIII 
AGENCY ENHANCEMENT: GRAND MEAN AND 
COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE 
with with 
Hith with Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty tainty 
17.78 17.78 17.60 17.79 
-.03 -.03 -.04 -.01 
.50 .50 .11 .67 
-1. 31 -1.43 -1.47 -1.66 
1.00 1.00 1. 30 1. 45 
.67 .66 .35 -.25 
-.97 -.84 -.30 -.48 
.358 .143 .542 .350 
1.111 1.681 .814 1.126 
5,133 5,137 _2,1~9_ 5JJ-2~t 
with 
Client 
Uncer-
tainty 
17.80 
.08 
.50 
-1.45 
.97 
.64 
-.86 
.381 
1.069 
5 !).34 
with 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
taintv 
17.79 
.06 
.80 
-1.12 
1.17 
-.20 
-.96 
.429 
.987 
5,122 
, 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I 
I 
, 
..... 
l.~ 
LV 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 6.28 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino -.28 
Tacoma -.35 
Las Vegas .51 
Tucson .59 
Boulder -.38 
Salt Lake City .05 
P < .650 
F = .666 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XIX 
AUTONOMY: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY 
DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE 
With with 
With With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty taintv 
6.28 6.28 6.19 6.32 
-.28 -.28 -.15 -.21 
-.32 -.35 -.19 -.32 
.66 .51 .53 .66 
.59 .59 .71 .30 
-.37 -.38 -.58 -.25 
-.15 .05 -.29 -.09 
.743 .690 .669 .814 
.544 .613 .641 .448 
With 
Client 
Uncer-
taintv 
6.33 
-.25 
-.25 
.46 
.54 
-.43 
.00 
.795 
.475 
5,133 5,137 5,119 5 ,]._24~~?_, 134 
With 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
taintv 
6.41 
-.30 
-.21 
.47 
.59 
-.35 
-.11 
.696 
.605 
_~_5,121 ____ ..... 
w 
"'" 
r-
With 
No 
Covarl.ates 
GRAND MEAN 30.35 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino -.60 
Tacoma .07 
Las Vegas -1.03 
Tucson 1.18 
Boulder 1. 23 
Salt Lake City -.69 
-. 
P < .787 
F = .485 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XX 
INTERNAL ORIENTATION: GRAND MEAN AND 
COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE 
-
With With 
With With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal taintv taintv 
30.33 30.35 30.33 30.45 
-.58 -.60 -.59 -.52 
-.01 .07 -.07 .47 
-.74 -1. 03 -.82 -1.16 
1. 20 1.18 1.48 1.46 
1. 26 1.23 .70 .42 
-.98 -.69 -.51 -.54 
.726 .492 .883 .929 
.566 .886 .347 .270 
5,133 5,137 5,119 5,124 
with 
Client 
Uncer-
taintv 
30.43 
-.43 
.11 
-1.10 
1.10 
1.16 
-.76 
.840 
.411 
5,134 
With 
Interorgani-
zationa1 
Uncer-
taintv 
30.44 
-.55 
.72 
-.62 
1.44 
.26 
-1.19 
.761 
.519 
5,122 
I-' 
W 
\..'1 
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(F=3.625, df=1,119, p<.059). 
State and Federal Uncertainty reflects one statistically signi-
ficant relation, with Agency Enhancement (F=7.081, df=1,124, p<.009). 
This uncertainty measure also shares a statistically non-significant 
relation with Internal Orientation (F=3.606, df=1,124, p<.060). 
Interorganizational Uncertainty is involved in a single 
statistically significant association, with Internal Orientation 
(F-4.B4B; df=1,122; p<.030). It additionally evidences a non-
significant rleation with Agency Enhancement (F=3.391; df=1,122; 
pcOGB) • 
In sum, Community is not indicated through these analyses of 
covariance to be associated systematically with any of the Intra-
organizational Decision Making Criteria, though certain of the 
selected organizational variables do evidence associations. 
Organizational Goal shares statistically significant associations with 
all of the intraorganizational criterion measures, State and Federal 
Uncertainty is related to Agency Enhancement, and Interorganizational 
Uncertainty is associated with Internal Orientation. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
The multiple regression analyses to be reported were implemented 
using the step-wise option provided in the SPSS package (Nie et al., 
1972). For the purposes of this series of analyses, all variables 
were left in their original state (see Chapter 4) except for 
Organizational Goal and Community. These were "dummied" through 
standard techniques {Miller and Erickson, 1974; Blalock, 1972; 
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Nie et al., 1975). 
As mentioned above, the stepwise multiple regression feature 
of the SPSS package was employed in the analysis. Variables were 
entered into these analyses in two discrete steps. First, all 
organizational variables (Organizational Resources, Organizational 
Goal, and the four Organizational Uncertainty measures) were entered 
as a bloc of covariate measures. Within the group, the SPSS program 
entered variables in the order of their contributions to variance. 
When all organizational variables (covariates) had been entered or 
deleted through the program's default option, the cities were entered 
simultaneously as a group. 
The SPSS program does not offer a statistic to measure the 
aggregated contribution to variance of grouped, separate variables. 
This is an important deletion for the purposes of this study, for 
primary interest is focused on the performance of the cities as a 
group, and not each individually. In order to address this short-
coming, an F value was computed for the contribution of Community to 
each formulation, as follows. 
F = 
where F = 
SSRi2 = 
SSRil = 
df
i2 = 
(SSRi2 - SSRil)/ (dfi2 - dfil) 
(SSresi2 / dfi2 ) 
F value 
regression sum of squares immediately 
after entering the Community variable. 
regression sum of squares immediately 
prior to entering the Community variable. 
degrees of freedom immediately after 
entering the Community variable. 
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= degrees of freedom immediately prior 
to entering the Community variable. 
= residual sum of squares immediately 
after entering the Community variable. 
This statistic allows the treatment of all cities as a group, 
and is further recommended through its compatability with e3sily 
accessible and understood F tables. 
Employing these procedures, each of the Intraorganizational 
Criterion measures was employed as dependent variable in one of a 
series of three multiple regression analyses. Results of these 
analyses are reported in the following pages and in Appendix II in 
terms of the dependent variables employed in each analysis. 
1. Agency Enhancement. Tables XXI and XXII summarize the 
results of the multiple regression analysis employing Agency 
Enhancement as a dependent variable. 
Only two covariates evidence statistically significant associa-
tions. The Broker Agency component of Organizational Goal reflects 
the strongest association with Agency Enhancement, reflecting a 
weaker orientation toward Agency Enhancement than is evidenced among 
Advocate Agencies. 
The second covariate found to be significantly related to 
Agency Enhancement is state and Federal Uncertainty. The relation is 
direct, indicating that increased turbulence at those echelons is 
accompanied by increased orientation among service agencies toward 
organizational welfare maximization. 
As reflected in Tables XXI and XXII, variation between communi-
ties contributes little to the explanation of variance in Agency 
TABLE XXI 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, AGENCY 
ENHANCEMENT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE18 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Organizational Broker 1 -.312 -------t---------------~----------------Goal Direct 
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 2 .278 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorganiza-
tional 
Uncertainty 
Independent Variable 
------------~-------Communityl 
139 
P 
.012 ---------
.008 
180nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included. 
19community was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN020 
AGENCY ENHANCEMENT 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.03 
Las Vegas -.12 
Tucson .03 
Boulder .05 
Salt Lake City -.08 
p < .684 
F = .621 
df = 12,102 
20Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
140 
Enhancement. 
As noted above, Agency Enhancement was found in the multiple 
regression analyses to share associations with Organizational Goal 
and with State and Federal Uncertainty. 
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Organizational Goal was found in the analyses of covariance to 
be significantly associated with all measures of the intraorganiza-
tional decision making criteria, although the multiple regression 
analyses reflect associations only with Agency Enhancement and, as 
will be reported later, IntraorganizationalOrientation. This pattern 
of association undoubtedly reflects the pervasive effects on organiza-
tional orientations and operations which separate the different 
organizational classes represented by classes of this variable. 
Perhaps nowhere are these differences more apparent than with 
the types of issues subsumed within Agency Enhancement. When viewed 
in terms of Waldman's (1972) input and output components, Broker 
Agencies must be viewed as among the input components of advocacy and 
direct service agencies: Broker Agencies disperse funds to the 
others. In the context of the service industry, then, it is realistic 
to expect Broker Agencies to exhibit a different orientation to 
funding and related issues thdn would the other organizational types. 
The latter, in turn, might well be expected to share relatively 
similar orientations toward this class of commodity. Both expecta-
tions are supported in the data. Broker Agencies reflect an orienta-
tion toward Agency Enhancement of significantly lesser strength than 
is evidenced among the other two classes of agencies. Advocate and 
Direct Service Agencies, on the other hand, reflect very similar 
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views with respect to this class of criterion. While not of direct 
relevance in this dissertation, Benson's (1975) explication of social 
exchange theory would lead one to anticipate that intra-systemic 
power associations would similarly reflect the patters of differentia-
tion encountered in these analyses. 
state and Federal Uncertainty is demonstrated to be directly 
associated with organizational emphasis on Agency Enhancement. As 
was noted in the early phases of this dissertation, human service 
agencies typically derive a considerable proportion of their resources 
from agencies at the state and federal levels. The mean proportion of 
total agency funding derived from federal sources alone by agencies 
in this sample, for example, is over 36%. As such, this finding ties 
concern over funding and related issues to the inability to predict 
events among funding sources. This finding is consistent with the 
work of authors who note strong propensities among organizations to 
achieve stability, and the work of Benson (1975), Mindlin and 
Aldrich (1975), and O'Brien and Wetle (1975), who note the importance 
of funding and related commodities to organizational well-being. 
In another sense, the finding is consistent with Dill's (1962) 
concept of task environments. The ties between aging service 
organizations and state and federal agencies are largely indirect. 
While the funding derived from these sources is, as noted above, of 
considerable importance, much of the federal money going to individual 
agencies is actually dispensed by intermediary, broker agencies. As 
such, direct contact between service and governmental organizations 
is likely to be infrequent. That their indirect influence is 
sufficiently strong to be manifested in these analyses and not, as 
will be noted, in those addressing Autonomy suggests a relatively 
narrow sphere of influence. 
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2. Autonomy. As reflected in Tables XXIII and XXIV, neither 
organizational variables nor Community were found to share statisti-
cally significant associations with Autonomy. One organizational 
variable, Local Public Uncertainty, however, was found to evidence 
a positive association with Autonomy reflecting a statistical 
significance of p<.09. 
As noted above, only Local Public Uncertainty evidences a 
reportable association with Autonomy, reflecting a direct relation. 
This result is noteworthy in several respects. 
First, the associations between Autonomy and the organiza-
tional variables are quite different from those involving Agency 
Enhancement. This distinction suggests that at least to an extent 
the two are functionally independent when assessed in terms of 
environmental influences on the organization. Where the organiza-
tion's emphasis on Agency Enhancement was found to be influenced by 
the agency's function and by uncertainty at the state and federal 
levels, orientation to Autonomy is associated with turbulence of a 
local nature. This bifurcation of influences is not entirely 
consistent with Benson's (1975) description of power relationships, 
which suggests that patterns of funding distribution will be reflected 
in power relationships between organizations and, conversely, 
potential loss of Autonomy. Rather, this set of results suggests an 
operational independence between the two commodities, as is posited 
TABLE XXIII 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, 
AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE21 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Organizational Broker 
-cIrect--------------~----------------Goal 
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 2 .179 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorganiza-
tional 
Uncertainty 
Independent Variable -------------22-----Community 
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P 
-----------
.090 
210nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included. 
22community was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXIV 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN023 
AUTONOMY 
Community Beta 
Tacoma .00 
Las Vegas .14 
Tucson .12 
Boulder .04 
Salt Lake City .04 
P < .789 
F = .482 
df = 12,102 
23Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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by O'Brien and \'V'etle (1975). This, in turn, suggests that the 
operational realities facing human service agencies involve not only 
the balancing of expenditures and acquisitions, as suggested by the 
notion of utility functions, but that the "markets" within which the 
transactions take place are distinct. This is generally consistent 
with the writings of Dill (1962) and Gawthrop (1969) through the 
linkage of certain of the commodities with specific task environments. 
A second source of significance in this finding lies in the 
nature of the local entity with which autonomy is related. Local 
Public Uncertainty is associated generally with the local output 
component, to borrow Waldman's term (1972). That the local output 
component, Client Uncertainty, is not represented in this body of 
findings is supportive of Waldman's dichotomy of organizational 
environments. In this context, the association suggests that local 
input into the operational endeavors of local service agencies can 
exist in lieu of total control over monetary resources through, 
presumably, threats to or enhancement of agency autonomy. Again, the 
independence of Autonomy is a valued resource in itself is supported. 
3. Internal Orientation. As shown in Tables XXV and XXVI, the 
overall aggregate of the intraorganizational measures, Internal 
Orientation, was found to share statistically significant associations 
with none of the independent variables, though it does evidence non-
significant associations with three organizational variables. 
The Broker Agency component of Organizational Goal was the first 
variable entered into the equation, though it proved ultimately not to 
be the strongest in its association, with a last-step beta significant 
TABLE XXV 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, INTERNAL 
ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE24 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Organizational Broker 1 -.226 
Goal -5Irect ------------ ----------------
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 2 .195 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorganiza-
tional 3 -.174 
Uncertainty 
Independent Variable 
----CommunIty~5-----
147 
P 
.080 -------------
.064 
.064 
240nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included. 
25C . . b . ommun1ty was programmed to be the last var1a Ie entered 1nto 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXVI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN026 
INTERNAL ORIENTATION 
Community Beta 
26Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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at p<.080. 
State and Federal Uncertainty is indicated to be directly 
associated with Internal Orientation, with an alpha of .064. 
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Interorganizational Uncertainty also reflects a non-significant 
(p<.064) association with Internal Orientation. Indicated to be a 
negative association, this relation would indicate that as stability 
in the local service inudstry increases, agencies' proclivities 
toward maximizing their own welfare decrease. 
Patterns evidenced in the analytical results reported above 
suggest that the first two of the three associations reflect in large 
degree the construction of Internal Orientation. As noted in 
Chapter IV, Internal Orientation is a sumrnative scale comprised of 
all items contained in Instrument 1. As such, it includes the other 
two intraorganizational criterion measures which are selectively 
comprised of certain of the items from Instrument 1. Accordingly, 
Internal Orientation can be expected to evidence to a lesser extent 
those associations primarily involving variance in the items 
comprising the other two, more selectively constructed intraorgaiza-
tional measures. This possibility appears to be the case with 
associations involving Organizational Goal and Autonomy. Both 
independent variables were found more strongly associated with other 
intraorganizational criteria than with Internal Orientation. 
The association relating Internal Orientation and Interorganiza-
tional Uncertainty, however, is independent of associations with other 
intraorganizational measures. A negative association, it signifies 
that greater Interorganizational Uncertainty is associated with lesser 
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organizational emphasis on intraorganizational measures of success. 
This result is largely inconsistent with writings in the field of 
organizational analysis. Benson (1975), for example, posits that 
organizations in a system compete with one another for necessary 
resources. Under these circumstances one would anticipate greater 
emphasis on intraorganizational well-being as the interorganizational 
field becomes less predictable. 
It is clear that some alternative explanation for this finding 
is necessary. First, it is appropriate to note again that the more 
explicit measures of intraorganizational well-being, Agency Enhance-
ment and Autonomy, were not similarly related to Intraorganizational 
Uncertainty, although together they comprise a major component of 
Internal Orientation. Three additional measures from Instrument 1 
contribute to Internal Orientation, addressing orientations to expand 
the range of agency services offered, the avoidance of activities not 
consistent with agency goals, and the furthering of the wishes of 
agency directors. From these, it would appear that the operational 
conservatism evident in this association may well be associated with 
organizational orientations toward alterations in domain as they 
might be expected to relate to interorganizational stability. To the 
extent that domain comprises an organizational characteristic of 
importance in associations with outside agencies as well as with other 
environmental components, the advent of interorganizational 
uncertainty might well be expected to generate an element of con-
servatism toward change of any type in domain. In short, reduced 
orientation toward Internal Orientation during times of heightened 
interorganizational uncertainty may well represent a compensatory 
behavior by organizations in the pursuit of a more stable inter-
organizational field. 
A Word About Community 
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In no analyses was Community found to be an effective predictor 
of organizational emphasis on an intraorganizational decision 
making criterion. 
These findings suggest that orientation to intraorganizational 
measures of success is derived from sources other than local environ-
ments. The fact that no meaningful intercommunity differences were 
found directs attention to levels of social aggregation larger than 
the locale. While regional factors could produce such a pattern of 
results (all cities, it will be recalled, are situated in the American 
west), there exist a number of theoretical bases for ascribing these 
orientations to broader societal levels of national or larger scale. 
Microeconomic theory constitutes one basis for this expectation. 
The profit motivation as developed by Smith (1909) and Marshall (1948) 
is a common drive associated with all profit-oriented organizations. 
While no measures employed in these analyses directly reflect profit--
indeed, very few organizations in the sample are profit-oriented--the 
parallels developed by subsequent authors would support the generaliza-
tion of profit-related behavior to other classes of organizational 
goals. O~ganizational pursuits of growth (Niskanen, 1968; Galbraith, 
1967), security (Schramm and Sherman, 1974), consistency (Monsen and 
Downs, 1965), managerial benefits (0. Williamson, 1964), and revenue 
maximization (Baumol, 1967) are all supported by reasoning which 
parallels those employed by earlier economists in support of profit 
maximization. 
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The literature on Community also provides general support for 
this pattern of results. The nesting of areal objects of identifica-
tion suggested by MacIver (1970), Janowitz (1952), Hillery (1968), 
and others draws attention to the potential for influences born of 
higher levels of aggregation manifesting themselves throughout 
smaller aggregates. In this context, organizational motivations 
emanating from sources of national or higher scale could be expected 
to be reflected to greater or lesser degree among organizations 
throughout the nation. Warren (1963) and Coleman (1957) both suggest 
that the influence of local conditions is in large part predicated on 
the absence of competing extralocal influences on organizational 
behavior. In the case of the intraorganizational decision making 
criteria, it is apparent that extralocal value orientations 
predominate. 
Extraorganizational Criteria 
As was the case with the Intraorganizational Criteria discussed 
in the preceding pages, all measures of Extraorganizational Criteria 
were analyzed through three distinct analytical processes: analysis 
of variance with Community as independent variable, analysis of 
covariance employing each of the Organizational Variables as 
covariates with Community as independent variable, and multiple 
regression analysis employing the Organizational Variables as a set 
of independent variables and Community as the independent variable 
entered last into the analysis. 
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It will be recalled that where the Intraorganizational Criteria 
were operationalized through three composite measures, the Extra-
organizational Criteria were operationalized through five aggregate 
measures: three are factor-based and one is an overall aggregate. 
These measures share their derivations with those representing the 
intraorganizational measures. An additional index was developed from 
the items of Instrument 2 in order to assess a type of organizational-
environmental interaction not evidenced through factor analysis. 
Analysis of Variance 
Table XXVII summarizes the analyses of variance relating 
Community to the extraorganizational variables. The results of these 
analyses are more fully presented in Appendix II. 
It is apparent that Community does not reflect statistically 
significant associations with any of the five measures of extra-
organizational decision making criteria. Only one association, that 
relating Community to Outside Input, registers a probability level 
of better than p<.lO. 
Analysis of variance, then, does not in itself produce results 
which are supportive of the study's second hypothesis, relating 
different performance orientations to the different communities. 
Analysis of Covariance 
As with the analyses of intraorganizational criteria reported 
earlier, this stage of analysis assesses the degree to which community 
differences explain variance in the five measures of Extraorganiza-
tional Decision Making Criteria, while controlling individually for 
Grand Mean 
San Bernardino 
Tacoma 
Las Vegas 
Tucson 
Boulder 
Salt Lake Ci ty 
p < 
TABLE XXVII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN BY EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Instrumental Expressive Outside 
Coordination Coordination Input Exclusion 
6.87 6.66 3.24 7.51 
.36 .42 .38 .31 
.16 .06 .01 -.74 
1.08 .68 .23 -.11 
-.52 .30 .15 -.18 
-.54 -.94 -.67 .85 
-.58 -.61 -.20 .03 
.159 .160 .096 .345 
External 
Orientation 
21.04 
1.09 
-.52 
1.65 
-.40 
-.63 
-1.17 
.353 
.-. 
U'I 
"" 
each of the six organizational variables. In all, 30 separate 
analyses of covariance were implemented. The full results of these 
analyses are reflected in Appendix II, and are summarized in Tables 
XXVIII - XXXIII. 
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In general, it can be said the community is a more effective 
predictor of extraorganizational criteria than of intraorganizational 
criteria. Where Community did not reflect an association with an 
intraorganizational criterion sufficiently strong to generate an 
alpha of less than .10, in 11 cases among the extraorganizational 
criteria associations reflect this probability level and in three 
cases statistical significance exceeds p<.05. 
Expressive Coordination constitutes the criterion where the 
association appears to be strongest, for Community registers two 
statistically significant associations with this measures (with 
Organizational Goal, F=2.618, df=5,139, p<.027; and with Inter-
organizational Uncertainty, F=2.716, df=5,124 1 p<.024). 
The third significant association is evidenced between Community 
and Outside Input, with Organizational Goal as the covariate (F=2.4ll, 
df=5,139, p<.039). In addition, three non-significant associations 
are indicated between Community and Outside Input (with Organizational 
Resources, F=l.970, df=5,l33, p<.087; with State and Federal 
Uncertainty, F=1.987, df=5,124, p<.085; and with Interorganizational 
Uncertainty, F=2.085, df=5,124, p<.078). 
Two additional extraorganizational criterion measures are linked 
to Community through associations reflecting alpha levels between .05 
and .10. 
TABLE XXVIII 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: COVARIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
DECISION MAKING CRITERIA, p<.lO 
Covariate Contribution, 
Community As Instrumental Expressive Outside External 
Independent Variable Coordination Coordination Exclusion Input Orientation 
Organizational F = 
Resources df = 
P < 
Organizational F = 
Goals df = 
P < 
Local Public F = 
Turbulence df = 
p < 
State & Federal F = 
Turbulence df = 
p < 
Clients F = 
Turbulence d£ = 
P < 
Interorgani- F = 6.206 4.151 
zationa1 df = 1,124 1,124 
Turbulence p < .014 .044 
- --- ---------- - -----
I-' 
U1 
0'1 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 6.87 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino .36 
Tacoma .16 
Las Vegas 1.08 
Tucson -.52 
Boulder -.54 
Salt Lake City -.58 
P < .159 
F = 1.620 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XXIX 
INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION: GRAND MEAN AND 
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE 
with With 
With With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty tainty 
6.93 6.93 6.88 7.01 
.30 .30 .38 .30 
.31 .11 .37 .18 
1.17 1. 29 .91 1.09 
-.58 -.58 -.73 -.54 
-.60 -.60 -.43 -.34 
-.58 -.64 -.68 -.83 
.087 .075 .229 .190 
1. 973 2.053 1.400 1.515 
5,133 5,139 5,119 5,124 
With 
Client 
Uncer-
taintv 
6.87 
.46 
.09 
1.08 
-.52 
-.54 
-.58 
.157 
1. 627 
5,134 
With 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
taintv 
6.98 
.33 
.10 
1.16 
-.43 
-.75 
-.78 
.116 
1.811 
5,124 ..... 
U1 
-...J 
With 
No 
Covar1ates 
GRAND MEAN 6.66 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino .42 
Tacoma .06 
Las Vegas .68 
Tucson .30 
Boulder -.94 
Sal t Lake City -.61 
P < .147 
F = 1.664 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XXX 
EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION: GRAND f.1EAN AND 
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE 
with With 
With With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty tainty 
6.66 6.79 6.73 6.69 
.41 .28 .47 .28 
.10 -.07 .23 -.07 
.74 1. 34 .43 .81 
.29 .17 .02 .27 
-.95 -1.07 -.73 -.82 
-.66 -.75 -.63 -.69 
.160 .027 .424 .218 
1.618 2.618 .995 1.430 
5,133 5,139 5,119 5,124 
With 
Client 
Uncer-
tainty 
6.61 
.51 
-.15 
.72 
.35 
-.90 
-.57 
.124 
1. 768 
5,134 
With 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
tainty 
6.83 
.28 
-.43 
1.35 
.32 
-.89 
-.88 
.023 
2.716 
5,124 
I-' 
U1 
<Xl 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 7.51 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino .31 
Tacoma -.74 
Las Vegas -.11 
Tucson -.18 
Boulder .85 
Salt Lake City .03 
P < .345 
F = 1.134 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XXXI 
EXCLUSION: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY 
DEVIATION BY COVARIATE 
With With 
with With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tiona! Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty taintv 
7.51 7.60 7.51 7.57 
.31 .22 .29 .28 
-.81 -.83 -.46 -.55 
-.18 .38 -.17 -.15 
-.18 -.27 -.13 -.11 
.85 .76 .49 .90 
.06 -.06 .04 -.07 
.340 .360 .759 .581 
1.144 1.106 .523 .760 
5,133 5,139 5,119 5,124 
----- --- ----- -----
with 
Client 
Uncer-
taintv 
7.49 
.35 
-.89 
-.09 
-.16 
.87 
.05 
.207 
1.462 
5,134 
With 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
taintv 
7.68 
.02 
-.66 
.25 
.10 
.67 
-.13 
.607 
.723 
5,124 
I 
I 
I-' 
VI 
\0 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 3.24 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino .38 
Tacoma .01 
Las Vegas .23 
Tucson .15 
Boulder -.67 
Sal t Lake City -.20 
p < .096 
F = 1.912 
df = 5,139 
'- ---- - ---
TABLE XXXII 
OUTSIDE INPUT: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY 
DEVIATION BY COVARIATE 
With with 
With With Local State & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty taintv 
3.28 3.30 3.27 3.30 
.34 .33 .39 .38 
.08 -.05 .10 -.03 
.27 .49 .20 .25 
.11 .10 .13 .... 22 
-.71 -.72 -.61 -.70 
-.20 -.25 -.37 -.39 
.087 .039 .160 .085 
1. 970 2.411 1.621 1. 987 
5,133 5,139 5,119 5,124 
--- - --- - ---- - -
with 
Client 
Uncer-
taintv 
3.25 
.38 
.06 
.22 
.14 
-.68 
-.21 
.105 
1.861 
5,134 
-----
With 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
taintv 
3.36 
.32 
-.08 
.46 
.19 
-.66 
-.46 
.072 
2.085 
5,124 
I 
i 
- I-' 0'1 
o 
With 
No 
Covariates 
GRAND MEAN 21.04 
DEVIATIONS FROM 
GRAND MEAN 
San Bernardino 1.09 
Tacoma -.52 
Las Vegas 1.65 
Tucson -.40 
Boulder -.63 
Salt Lake City -1.17 
p < .353 
F = 1.119 
df = 5,139 
TABLE XXXIII 
EXTERNAL ORIENTATION: GRAND MEAN AND 
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE 
With With 
with With Local state & 
Organiza- Organiza- Public Federal 
tional tional Uncer- Uncer-
Resources Goal tainty tainty 
21.32 21.04 21.12 21. 27 
1.02 .81 1.14 .86 
-.40 .80 .14 -.44 
1.72 3.01 1.17 1. 76 
-.47 -.68 -.84 -.38 
-.69 -.91 -.67 -.27 
-1.19 -1.44 -1.27 -1. 59 
.341 .072 .431 .351 
1.142 2.080 .983 1.124 
5,133 5,139 5,119 5,124 
With 
Client 
Uncer-
tainty 
20.97 
1.32 
-.95 
1.72 
-.33 
-.56 
-1.10 
.253 
1.337 
5,134 
with 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncer-
tainty 
21.50 
.63 
-1.00 
2.75 
-.02 
-.97 
-1.80 
.078 
2.036 
5,124 
I-' 
0'1 
I-' 
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Instrumental Coordination is linked to Community through 
associations involving two covariates (with Organizational Resources, 
F=1.973, df=5,133, p<.087; and with Organizational Goal, F=2.053, 
df=5,139, p<.075). 
External Orientation is similarly linked to Community through 
associations involving two covariates (with Organizational Goal, 
F=2.080, df=5,139, p<.072; and with Interorganizational Uncertainty, 
F=2.036, df=5,124, p<.078). 
Overall, two observations are pertinent with respect to these 
findings. First, Community evidences a pattern of associations with 
various of the extraorganizational criteria which support the study's 
second hypothesis, calling for intercommunity differences with 
respect to these measures. Second, the study's third hypothesis, 
calling for greater intercommunity distinctions among the extra-
organizational criteria than among the intraorganizational measures, 
would appear supported through the analyses presented to now. 
The covariates themselves present a different pattern. Where, 
in the analyses with the intraorganizational criteria as dependent 
variables, the organizational variables were involved in seven 
reportable associations, they reflect only two such associations with 
the extraorganizational measures. 
Both associations involve Interorganizational Uncertainty, first 
with Expressive Coordination (F=6.206, df=l,124, p<.014) and second 
with External Orientation (F=4.l5l, df=1,124, p<.044). 
It would appear from these analyses that the organizational 
variables, unlike Community, are much more effective in predicting 
variation among the Intraorganizational Criteria than among the 
Extraorganizational measures. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
In accordance with the procedures followed in the analyses of 
the Intraorganizational Criteria, the final analytical step in the 
examination of the Extraorganizational Criteria involves multiple 
regression analysis. As before, all organizational variables were 
applied to the analysis prior to the addition of the focal variable, 
Community, through stepwise techniques (Nie et al., 1975). Results 
of these analyses are fully reported in Appendix II. 
The operationalization and treatment of all variables and of 
the analyses themselves are identical to the practices described 
earlier for the intraorganizational measures. 
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1. Instrumental Coordination. Tables XXXIV and XXXV summarize 
the mUltiple regression analysis of expressive coordination. 
It is apparent that none of the organizational variables entered 
into the equation evidence statistically significant associations 
with Instrumental Coordination. Indeed, only two produced statistical 
significance measures more favorable than p<.20, as is reflected in 
Table LV, Appendix II. 
Community also reflects a non-significant association (p<.127). 
The F test for this association is stronger than any yet encountered 
in the multiple regression analyses. 
As noted above, none of the organizational variables evidence an 
association with Instrumental Coordination, indicating that 
TABLE XXXIV 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, INSTRUMENTAL 
COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE27 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Broker 
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P 
Organizational ------- ---------------- ----------------- ----------Goal Direct 
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
zational 
Unceltainty 
!E~~2~~~~~!_Y~E~~~!~_ 
Community28 6 -- .127 
270nly Community and independent variables with last step p<.lO 
are included. 
28community was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXXV 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMl1UNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN029 
INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.02 
Las Vegas .17 
Tucson -.10 
Boulder -.13 
Salt Lake City -.13 
p < .127 
F = 1. 761 
df = 10,104 
29Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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organizations of all types represented in the organizational variables 
share common orientations toward this decision making criterion. This 
universality of orientation toward the substantive coordination of 
organizational endeavors stands in contrast to differences evidenced 
in earlier analyses between organizations with different goals and 
between organizations in different states of environmental turbulence. 
This absence of differences is noteworthy, for it suggests that 
at least with respect to this criterion coordinated agencies share 
their orientations with coordinating organizations. This commonality 
would bode well for such organizations as Area Agencies on Aging 
which are charged with systematizing the operations and service 
offerings of direct service agencies. First, it allows for the early 
establishment of common orientations with agencies potentially to be 
included in a service network. It has been noted that this is one 
means of generating coordination in a service provision network 
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1978). Second, it promotes the potential inclusion 
of additional agencies to existing networks through the demonstrability 
of the network's contribution to operational coordination. 
It is additionally noteworthy that no class of environmental 
turbulence was found to reflect an association with Instrumental 
Coordination. Where one type of environmental uncertainty was found 
to share associations with each measure of intraorganizational criteria, 
no such association is evident in this analysis. As such, organiza-
tional orientation to Instrumental Coordination is demonstrated to be 
largely unassociated with the turbulence measures employed in this 
dissertation, within the ranges encountered in this data. 
Organizational orientation to Instrumental Coordination, then, 
is unresponsive to variations in the organizational characteristics 
and environmental uncertainties addressed in this study. 
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There is a reasonably good indication, however, that Community 
affects this class of organizational orientation. Community surfaces 
as the strongest predictor of organizational emphasis on Instrumental 
Coordination, though the association is significant at a level of 
butp<.127. There is considerable theoretical support for this type of 
association. That communities can be differentiated on the basis of 
identifying characteristics has been posited by a number of authors 
(Logan, 1976; MacIver, 1970j J. Bernard, 1962), as cited in the 
dissertation's third chapter. That these distinctions may be expected 
to reflect in organizational operations within locales has been 
suggested as well (Dewey, 1954; Coleman, 1957; Warren, 1963). 
In all, it would appear that organizational orientation to 
Instrumental Coordination reflects very little variation born of 
organizational characteristics, nor or uncertainty among local input 
and output components, the interorganizational field, or state and 
federal agencies. More important in explaining these differences is 
the locale within which organizations are located. 
2. Expressive Coordination. The multiple regression analysis 
of Expressive Coordination is summarized in Tables XXXVI and XXXVII. 
As with Instrumental Coordination, the organizational variables 
as a group are not good predictors of organizational orientation 
toward Expressive Coordination. While one measure does evidence a 
statistically significant association, the remaining six variables 
TABLE XXXVI 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, EXPRESSIVE 
COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE30 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Broker 
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P 
Organizational ---------------------- ---------------f------------Goals Direct 
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncertainty 1 -.244 .010 
Independent Variable ----------7--31------Corrnnunlty 7 -- .081 
300nly Community and independent variables with last step 
p<.lO included. 
31conununity was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXXVI I 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN032 
EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.07 
Las Vegas .17 
Tucson .00 
Boulder .09 
Salt Lake City -.14 
P < .081 
F = 2.023 
df = 11,103 
32Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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fail to surpass probability levels of p<.20. 
The one variable which is demonstrated to be associated with 
Expressive Coordination is Interorganizational Uncertainty (p<.Ol). 
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A negative association is indicated between this independent variable 
and Expressive Coordination, indicating that lower levels of local 
turbulence among members of the service industry are normally accom-
panied by increased organizational orientations toward the strength-
ening of interorganizational linkages. 
Community proves to be more strongly associated with Expressive 
Coordination than has been found to be the case with any previously 
discussed dependent variable (p<.081). 
Expressive Coordination, like Instrumental Coordination, reflects 
a relatively high degree of association with Community. Unlike 
Instrumental Coordination, however, Expressive Coordination is found 
to be additionally associated with one measure of environmental 
turbulence, Interorganizational Uncertainty. 
This latter result reflects the high degree to which the 
horizontal integration of service agencies is founded on symbolic 
foundations. As was noted earlier, much of the effort surrounding the 
development of these networks involves the aggregation of previously 
existing organizations into new interorganizational systems which 
themselves are oriented to a given target population. Participating 
agencies continue to perform their original function; through their 
participation in the network, however, they orient to new clients and 
communicate with other agencies in terms of new issues. In this 
context, symbolic support of and by other agencies is likely to be of 
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considerable importance in terms of client referrals and, perhaps more 
importantly, in terms of legitimization. This type of support is 
expressive, and is frequently cited by practitioners in the field. 
That expressive support declines in periods of high interorganizational 
uncertainty seems a realistic result in this context. 
This result is also consistent with those elements of the 
organizational literature which suggest inverse relationships between 
uncertainty in the organizational network and organizational inter-
action with other agencies. Frequently based on Exchange Theory, 
these authors (Benson, 1975; Mindlin and Aldrich, 1975) note that as 
interorganizational turbulence increases, organizational attention 
increasingly turns inward, implying heightened emphasis on the security 
of the organization itself in a competitive environment. This phase 
of the literature, however, is primarily oriented to that class of 
organizational criteria which are treated in this dissertation through 
the intraorganizational decision making criteria. In this respect, 
only one measure of the Intraorganizational Criteria, Internal 
Orientation, was found to display such a relationship. Among the 
Extraorganizational Criteria, the measure reflecting the greatest 
"action orientation" to interorganizational coordinative endeavors, 
Instrumental Coordination, was found largely unassociated with Inter-
organizational Uncertainty. This finding would suggest that functional 
emphasis on coordinative endeavors by affected organizations exists 
relatively independently of turbulence within the organizational 
network; what are associated are the expressive, more symbolic aspects 
of support for coordinative endeavor. Together I these results would 
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seem to suggest that--at least within the ranges represented in this 
data--organizational reactions to interorganizational turbulence may 
well be more narrowly defined than is often posited. Orientations to 
such criteria as are reflected in Agency Enhancement and Autonomy are 
largely unrelated, though other internal issues, possibly domain, are 
accorded more attention. Interorganizational endeavors as actually 
manifested in organizational emphasis on coordinative action are 
similarly unaffected, although the degree to which such endeavors are 
symbolically supported diminishes. 
As was the case with Instrumental Coordination, Expressive 
Coordination reflects a degree of association with Community. Again, 
the existence of this association is consistent with the contributions 
of many authors in that field. Coleman (1957), for example, has noted 
that not only will issues generating conflict vary between locales, 
but so will the means by which conflict is resolved. Fllrther, once 
successful conflict resolution is achieved, the means employed in the 
first, precedent-setting case will tend to be employed in later 
instances. Particularly to the extent that coordination entails 
conflict (O'Brien and Wetle, 1975), much of Coleman's analysis can be 
applied directly to the arena of human service provision. As noted 
elsewhere, the work of Dewey (1954), MacIver (1970), and J. Bernard 
(1962) are generally supportive of this result as well. 
3. Exclusion. Summarized in Tables XXXVIII and XXXIX, the 
patterns evidenced in the analysis of Exclusion are at odds with those 
encountered in the analyses of extraorganizational criteria reported 
to now. The most apparent difference lies in the fact that the 
TABLE XXXVIII 
S~mRY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, 
EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE33 
Covariates 
Organizational 
Resources 
Broker 
Step 
Entered 
Last Step 
Beta 
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P 
Organizational 
Goal --~-------------------~---------------------------Dlrect 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncertainty 
Service 
!~~~~~~~~~~-~~£~~~~~ 
Community 34 
2 
1 
8 
.190 .072 
-.188 .055 
.229 
330nly Community and independent variables with last step 
p<.lO are included. 
34community was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XXXIX 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN035 
EXCLUSION 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.19 
Las Vegas .05 
Tucson -.10 
Boulder .09 
Salt Lake City -.04 
p < .229 
F = 1.403 
df = 12,102 
35Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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organizational variables evidence themselves to a greater extent in 
this analysis than in the preceding two. Additionally, Community 
plays a more limited role with respect to this dependent variable. 
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The organizational variables evidencing reportable associations 
with Exclusion are Local Public Uncertainty and Client Uncertainty. 
While neither relation is statistically significant (p<.072 and .055, 
respectively), their presence in the formulation leads to an 
interesting picture of the local service industry. The association 
between Local Public Uncertainty and Exclusion is direct, indicting 
that heightened tendencies toward exclusionary strategies accompany 
increased community turbulence. Just the opposite relation is 
evidenced with respect to client uncertainty, where increased turbulence 
is inversely associated with exclusionary policies. 
Community-related distinctions would appear to play a lesser role 
with respect to Exclusion than is encountered with respect to the other 
Extraorganizational Criteria (p<.229). 
Perhaps the most interesting of the analyses conducted among the 
Extraorganizational Criteria is that involving Exclusion. Two organi-
zational variables were found to be associated with Exclusion: Client 
Uncertainty was found to be inversely associated, while Local Public 
Uncertainty was found to be directly related. 
These associations are consistent with Waldman's (1972) dichotomy 
of environments according to elements' relations to the flow of support 
to and from organizations. In the context of the local environment, 
Local Public Uncertainty is clearly descriptive of instability among 
agencies' input components; conversely, Clients Uncertainty is 
associated with the output component. That the two reflect opposite 
associations with organizations' use of exclusionary tactics with 
other agencies is supportive of Waldman's notation of their more 
generally opposite relationships with service agencies. 
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The direct association between Exclusion and Local Public 
Uncertainty is generally reflective of exchange theorists' suggestions 
that organizations make use of selected environmental support in their 
dealings with other agencies (Benson, 1975~ Mindlin and Aldrich, 1975). 
By mobilizing support outside the system, the agency's potential for 
generating influence within the system is enhanced. The nature of the 
support generated outside the service industry, however, is important. 
Benson posits that the effectiveness of such support varies with its 
scale and with the status of its members. In very general terms, this 
description portrays the general characteristics associated with the 
input component, as reflected in Local Public Uncertainty. 
That Exclusion is negatively associated with Client Uncertainty 
suggests that agencies tend on the whole to support one another in 
the face of uncertainty in the output components. The exact implica-
tions of this result are not identifiable in this data set. It is 
possible, for example, that agencies join together in order to provide 
system-wide responses of a conciliatory nature~ if so, AAA's job 
would be easier in times of client unrest. Alternatively, agencies 
may join to present a united front against the "foe," with quite 
different implications. What is sure from this analysis, however, is 
the fact that r~sponses to changing client demands is demonstrably 
different from those precipitated by demands from the non-client 
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population. 
4. Outside Input. As reflected in Table XL, no organizational 
variable is associated with Outside Input to a sufficient degree to 
generate a probability level better than p<.lO. 
Community, as shown in Table XLI, accounts for insufficient 
variance to achieve statistical significance measures of p<.lO. 
Outside Input, a measure of the extent to which agencies 
emphasize inputs from community entities outside the service market, 
evidences no associations with any of the organizational variables. 
As was the case with Instrumental Coordination, this absence of 
associations generally suggests that to the extent that determinants 
of this openness exist, they are not associated with commonly 
recognized characteristics of organizations. 
Of particular interest is the fact that no measures of 
organizational-environmental association were found to evidence 
associations with Outside Input. Benson (1975) suggests that various 
components of the environment may well be recruitable by organizations 
for mobilization against other organizations during episodes of inter-
organizational conflict. Because certain environmental elements are 
capable of greater influence than others, most notably input components 
over output components (as noted above), Benson suggests that agencies 
may court members of the former for support in difficult times. Since 
one means of recruitment available to agencies in this industry is 
through the advisory function, it could be suggested that Outside 
Input and Local Public Uncertainty, if no other source of environ-
mental uncertainty, might be associated. This association is simply 
TABLE XL 
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, 
OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE36 
Covariates 
Organizational 
Resources 
Broker 
Step 
Entered 
Last Step 
Beta 
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P 
Organizational 
Goal --------Direct -----------------------------r------------
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncertainty 
Service 
!~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~!~ 
comrnunity37 7 .131 
360nly Community and independent variables with last step 
p<.lO are included. 
37cornmunity was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XLI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN038 
OUTSIDE INPUT 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.12 
Las Vegas .02 
Tucson -.08 
Boulder -.28 
Salt Lake City -.17 
p < .131 
F = 1. 746 
df = 10,104 
38Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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not evident in this data, nor are others relating to funding sources, 
clients, or other agencies. 
Community is shown to be a non-significant predictor of Outside 
Input, evidencing an association with a significant level of p<.131. 
This association is of insufficient strength to provide explicit 
support for expectations of intercity differences in organizational 
openness to extraindustry direction. 
5. External Orientation. Again as indicated in Table XLII, 
External Orientation is indicated through the analysis to be relatively 
independent of the organizational variables. The one exception to the 
more general case is Interorganizational Uncertainty, where the 
association is indicated to be inverse; less interorganizational 
turmoil is associated with greater external orientation. This finding 
is consistent with discussions advanced earlier with respect to 
Expressive Coordination. 
Community evidences a non-significant association with External 
Orientation (p<.076), indicating that different locales are oriented 
in varying degrees to this criterion. This pattern is reflected in 
Table XLIII. 
External Orientation evidences an association with only one 
organizational variable; a negative relation with Interorganizational 
Uncertainty. 
In the same way that Internal Orientation, the overall 
aggregative measure of orientation to intraorganizational well-being, 
shares associations found to exist with various of its component 
measures, this overall measure of extraorganizational emphasis can be 
I 
TABLE XLII 
SU~mRY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, EXTERNAL 
ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 39 
Step Last Step 
Covariates Entered Beta 
Organizational 
Resources 
Organizational Broker 
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P 
------- ------------ ---------------- -----------Goal Direct 
Service 
Local Public 
Uncertainty 
State & Federal 
Uncertainty 
Client 
Uncertainty 
Interorgani-
zational 
Uncertainty 1 -.201 .036 
!~~~2~~~~~~_~~£!~~!~ 
Corrununi ty40 7 -- .076 
390nly Community and independent variables with last step 
p<.lO are included. 
40community was programmed to be the last variable entered into 
the analysis. 
TABLE XLIII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,BETA VALUES RELATING 
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN041 
EXTERNAL ORIENTATION 
Community Beta 
Tacoma -.13 
Las Vegas .18 
Tucson -.09 
Boulder -.09 
Salt Lake City -.15 
p < .076 
F = 2.057 
df = 11,103 
41Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify 
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino. 
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expected to reflect the associations of narrower measures subsumed 
within. To a large extent this is likely the case here, reflecting 
the association found to relate Interorganizational Uncertainty with 
Expressive Coordination. 
There is reason, however, to suspect that a more substantial 
significance is involved. Analysis involving the aggregate measure 
of emphasis on intraorganizational goals, Internal Orientation, found 
that this focus of interest was inversely associated with Inter-
organizational Uncertainty. This result was ascribed in earlier 
discussion to domain-related issues which reflect one aspect of 
organizations' functional associations with other organizations. 
Missing, however, was any complementary increase in emphasis on such 
intraorganizational performance measures as are represented by Agency 
Enhancement or Autonomy. In this result, inversely linking Internal 
Orientation with Interorganizational Uncertainty, is evident a similar 
orientation favoring conservatism in interorganizational endeavors in 
the context of greater risk in the organizational field. Emerging 
from these results is a suggestion that interorganizational contacts 
involve a more complex mix of motivations than is widely recognized in 
the organizational literature. Rather than serving only the long-run 
well-being of the organization through direct or indirect impacts on 
the flow of requisite resources, it would appear that interorganiza-
tional interaction may well be pursued for purposes entirely 
independent of individual organizations' perceptions of what might be 
good for them alone. This is an interesting possibility, and merits 
further investigation. 
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A Word About Community 
Community is associated with the extraorganizationa1 decision 
making criteria to a greater and more consistent extent than was found 
to be the case through the intraorganizationa1 analyses. While no 
extraorganizationa1 association was found to be statistically 
significant as such, four of the five associations evidenced less 
than a one in seven probability of being attributable to chance. 
These generally supportive probability levels, and the fact that four 
of the five associations establish a pattern of association with 
Community, lend indirect support to the notion of inter-community 
differences. While these significance levels fall shor~ of conven-
tional tests of significance, the patterns apparent in the findings 
suggest that forces other than mere chance are at work in the analyses 
and that judgment as to the veracity of findings should be suspended 
for the moment. This point will be further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational Decision Making Criteria: 
Summary 
This section is designed to synopsize the findings of 64 
separate analyses (intraorganizationa1 and extraorganizationa1) 
undertaken during the first phase of the study. Where the previous 
pages of this chapter are oriented to brief discussions of the 
separate analyses, the pages to follow will be oriented to broader 
discussions of the patterns evidenced throughout the analyses. These 
will be analyzed with respect to conclusions and policy implications 
in the next chapter. 
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It will be recalled that the analyses undertaken in this 
dissertation were oriented to the pursuit of a single research 
question: "Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits 
of entering into interagency agreements vary by city?" The research 
question was addressed through three hypotheses, as follow. 
It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in the 
intraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations 
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements. 
It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in the 
extraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations 
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements. 
It is hypothesized that the inter-community differences found to 
exist for extraorganizational criteria will exceed those found to 
exist for intraorganizational criteria. 
Intraorganizational Criteria: Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was tested through the analyses implemented 
using intraorganizational criteria measures as dependent variables. 
In general, Community is not a strong predictor of organizational 
orientation to the intraorganizational criteria. 
The analyses of variance with Community as the independent 
variable and the intraorganizational criterion measures as the 
dependent variables failed to reflect any associations remotely 
approaching statistical significance. This is not supportive of the 
first hypothesis. 
Analyses of covariance produced similar results, as reflected in 
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Appendix II. In no case did the probability levels reflecting the 
associations between community and the three measures of intra-
organizational decision making criteria better p<.IO. Apparent in 
the tables, however, is a pattern of differentials between the 
associations linking Community with the various intraorganizational 
measures which are employed as covariates. Those probability levels 
associated with Agency Enhancement are consistently smaller than 
those involving Autonomy and Internal Orientation. While this may 
be of interest to later investigations, it does not alter the basic 
fact that the results of the covariance analyses do not lend support 
to the study's initial hypothesis. 
The multiple regression analyses allowed the effects of 
community to be measured after parceling out the variance of all 
selected organizational variables. The results of these anlyses are 
consistent with those of the analyses of variance and covariance: 
they do not reflect intercommunity variation in organizational 
orientations to the intraorganizational criteria. 
Overall, the results of the analyses point to the inescapable 
conclusion that the first hypothesis of the study is not supported 
throughout the data; organizational assessments of the intra-
organizational benefits attached to entering into interagency agree-
ments do not vary by city. 
Extraorganizational Criteria: HYpothesis 2 
In a manner similar to that described above, the second 
hypothesis was tested through analyses employing extraorganizational 
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criterion measures as dependent variables. 
The results of the analyses of variance show community to be a 
more adequate predictor of extraorganizational orientations than was 
found to be the case with the intraorganizational criteria, although 
no analysis produced results consistent with commonly accepted 
measures of statistical significance. These results are reported in 
Appendix II. 
Better than similar figures obtained through the analysis of 
the intraorganizational criteria, these analyses lend marginal support 
to the study's second hypothesis. 
The analyses of covariance assessed the associations relating 
the extraorganizational decision making criteria to Community, while 
controlling for the organizational variables. These analyses are 
reported in Appendix II. 
Overall, the findings are inconclusive. Three associations were 
found to be statistically significant, while seven more reflected 
probability levels between .05 and .10. While not overwhelmingly 
supportive of the study's second hypothesis, these figures do surpass 
the results of the intraorganizational analyses. 
As with the intraorganizational criteria, a separate step-wise 
mUltiple regression analysis was implemented for each measure of 
extraorganizational orientation, as reported in Appendix II. 
The results of the multiple regression analyses are the most 
supportive of the dissertation's second hypothesis, although none of 
these analyses evidenced a statistically significant association 
between Community and the Extraorganizational Criteria (with 
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Instrumental Coordination, p<.127; with Expressive Coordination, 
p<.081; with Exclusion, p<.229; with Outside Input, p<.131; with 
External Orientation, p<.076). Having noted the non-significance of 
these associations, it is appropriate to also note that in light of 
the fact that these results are not entirely negative. This disserta-
tion constitut'es the first attempt at operationalizing the Extra-
organizational Criteria and at their analysis, and it is reasonable 
to expect that improvements could be realized in both activities. In 
this light, the fact that general support was realized in the 
associations between Community and four of the five Extraorganizational 
Criterion measures would seem to call for further work in the concepts 
entailed in this study, a point which will be discussed further in 
the following chapter. 
Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational Criteria: 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis, predicting greater intercommunity 
differences among the extraorganizational criteria than among the 
intraorganizational criteria is supported. 
Three general approaches are employed to demonstrate the 
differences in the magnitude of Community contributions to variance 
for each of the eight dependent variables. First, the plotting of 
beta values for each of the towns with respect to each of the 
variables gives a visual indication of differences in intercommunity 
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orientations to each dependent measure. Second, differences in the 
community contribution to each dependent measure may be alternatively 
stated in terms of the variance associated with beta values, as 
derived from organizational responses in each city and calculated 
through the eight regression analyses. Finally, differences in the 
community contributions may be assessed in terms of the probability 
levels associated with the community contribution to each analysis. 
Figure 4 provides a graphic trace of each city's beta value, 
reflecting how agencies in each city differ from those of San 
Bernardino in their orientation to each dependent measure. In 
general, the greater the difference between the highest and lowest 
cities' values, and the greater the dispersion between values, the 
greater will be the contribution of the Community variable to the 
explanation of variance in the dependent variable. It can be seen in 
Figure 4 that by both indexes--spread between polar values and 
dispersion between values--differences between cities with respect 
to each extraorganizational dependent variable are greater than 
differences reflected among the intraorganizational criteria. This 
is supportive of the dissertation's third hypothesis. 
A more precise means of assessing the inter-city differences 
addressed above lies in comparing the standard deviations associated 
42 
It will be recalled that for the purposes of multiple 
regression analysis, the community variable was dummied. As a result, 
beta values associated with each of the five cities named measures 
that city's deviation from San Bernardino's measure with respect to 
each dependent variable. Were San Bernardino to be plotted in 
Figure 4, its plots would lie on each of the eight zero points. 
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with the five cities' beta values for each dependent variable. Each 
figure reflects overall inter-city differences as they relate to each 
of the eight dependent variables. Figure 5 provides a graphic com-
parison of these standard deviations. As noted above, the standard 
deviation of beta weights associated with each of the extraorganiza-
tional criterion measures is greater than those associated with each 
of the intraorganizational criteria, a finding supportive of the 
dissertation's third hypothesis. A third method of comparing Community 
contributions to the various decision making criteria lies in comparing 
the statistical significance of the Community contribution to each. 
Figure 6 provides a graphic comparison of these measures. Here, 
the statistical significance associated with each of the relationships 
between Community and the decision making criteria are plotted: the 
smaller the numerical value of the significance level, and the shorter 
the bar in Figure 6, the stronger the association. The three measures 
of Intraorganizational Criteria are positioned to the left of the 
figure, while the five Extraorganizational Criteria are to the right. 
The differences are dramatic. 
As reflected in the multiple regression analyses, Community 
shares no association with the Intraorganizational Criterion Measure 
which is statistically significant beyond p<.lO. 
Among the Extraorganizational Criterion Measures, however, no 
association with Community is less statistically significant than 
p<.230, and two associations exceed measures of p<.lO. 
As is dramatized by the distinct differences between the lengths 
of each set of bars in the figure, Community shows much stronger 
standard 
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interrelations with the extraorganizational criteria than with the 
intraorganizational criteria. The differences are clear not only with 
respect to paired comparisons of individual measures, but also with 
rexpect to the overall comparison. This is clearly supportive of the 
third hypothesis of Phase 1: Community Variation. 
In sum, the analyses conducted in Part 1: Community Variation 
provide the following support for the phase's three hypotheses. 
1. No support is provided for the first hypothesis. In no case 
does Community account for sufficient variance to general statistical 
significance. 
2. Greater support is provided for the second hypothesis. Two 
of the five associations between Community and the extraorganizational 
criteria are statistically significant at levels between p<.OS and 
p<.lO, while the three remaining associations generate alpha levels 
above .10. While not meeting commonly accepted probability levels 
(p<.05), the pattern established by these measures is generally 
consistent with the parameters of acceptability discussed by Hays 
(1973), and certainly support further investigation of the topic. 
3. Full support is provided for the third hypothesis. The 
associations between Community and all extraorganizational measures are 
considerably stronger than between Community and all the intraorganiza-
tional measures. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary significance of this concluding chapter is the 
exploration of the dissertation's analytical results for more general 
findings, and their application to actual or potential situations 
which might be identified both in theory and in the "real world." 
This broad goal will be addressed in four sections. The first will 
briefly review the work which was reported in the dissertation's first 
five chapters. The second section will discuss the analytical findings 
reported in Chapter V: first, with respect to issues pertaining to 
organizational theory and operation and, second, with respect to issues 
which might be expected to impact on the analytical findings for 
reasons other than those which might derive from theoretical sources. 
The third section will draw this chapter's discussion into a concise 
statement of the dissertation's conclusions. Finally, the fourth 
section will address implications of the dissertation's findings: 
first, with respect to the theoretical issues which prompted the 
development of the research question and, second, with respect to the 
policies and practices employed in the delivery of human services to 
clients. 
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REVIEW 
As was noted in the fourth chapter, the dissertation research 
reported in this document was designed to address the following 
research question: Do the criteria by which organizations assess the 
benefits of entering into interagency agreements vary by city? 
The pursuit of this research question demanded first, that a 
model of organizational decision making behavior which incorporates 
extraorganizatonal criteria be identified and, second, that the model 
be tested through empirical analysis. 
The dissertation's first two chapters were devoted to developing 
a model for use in this research application. It will be recalled 
that the first chapter was devoted to the explication of four general 
theoretical bases developed for use in organizational analysis. 
Employing the microeconomic model (also termed the "Classical Theory 
of the Firm") as a basis, other models were described in terms of 
their further contributions to the understanding of organizational 
behavior. Economic contributions were described largely in terms of 
their emphasis on "utility-maximizing behavior," and for their 
generalizations of the concept of organizational goal to include those 
of parties other than owners. That body of organizational theory 
arising out of the other social sciences was described in terms of its 
implications for organizational goals. To the profit posited by 
economists was added the goal-related concepts of power, autonomy, 
integration, domain, status, and ideology. As a framework for 
examining the interactions arising out of these orientations, the 
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Organizational Interaction Model (Wetle, 1976) was advanced as a 
concise explication of a more diverse literature on exchange. Finally, 
the Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976a, 1976b) was introduced as 
a natural extension of the preceding models, capable of incorporating 
extraorganizational goals into an organizational decision making 
model. 
The Primitive Economy Model was formulated in terms of a general 
organizational utility function, as were those contributions previously 
discussed, in order to provide a general statement of the model's 
components and in order to stress the similarities and differences 
which relate it to other approaches to organizational analysis. This 
utility function, (14), constitutes a very general statement which in 
its current state offers a conceptual basis for use in testing the 
Primitive Economy Model through the Model's principal corollary, the 
Differential Mix Hypothesis. Simply stated, the Differential Mix 
Hypothesis states that similar organizations pursue similar combina-
tions of goals, and so will tend to behave similarly. In the context 
of interindustrial comparisons, for example, the Differential Mix 
Hypothesis would lead to expectations of different goal mixes between 
groups of organizations identified by their industrial context. In 
terms of this dissertation, where organizations within an industry--
the human service industry--are identified in terms of locale, the 
Differential Mix Hypothesis suggests differences born of locale. In 
terms of formula (14), which constitutes a formulation of the PEM as 
noted above, the Differential Mix Hypothesis suggests that firms of a 
given type, however defined, will tend on the whole to reflect similar 
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patterns of valuation (as represented by the VIi and VEj terms) among 
the various goals available for organizational pursuit. To the extent 
that this position is found to be valid, it constitutes a means of 
verifying systems of organizational classification. 
As noted above, organizations in this dissertation were classi-
fied according to locale. Because organizations--particularly 
organizations of the type encountered in the human service industry--
receive much of their operational direction from their environments, 
and because operational environments in the human services industry 
are largely local in scope and therefore subject to local differentia-
tion, it was hypothesized that organizations operating in different 
locales would reflect different operational orientations or goals. 
Three hypotheses were employed in the testing of the research 
question. 
The first posited different organizational orientations toward 
intraorganizational goals in different cities. (Intraorganizational 
goals are those by which organizations assess success in terms of 
conditions associated directly with the organization itself.) Analytical 
results yielded no support for the first hypothesis, reflecting rather 
that locale is not a pertinent factor in the emphasis lent by organiza-
tions to intraorganizational classes of goals. 
The second hypothesis suggested that organizational emphases on 
extraorganizational goals vary by city, extraorganizational goals 
being those by which success is identified with respect to entities 
outside the organization. Results indicated that locale is much more 
influential in accounting for variance among the extraorganizational 
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criteria than among intraorga~izational measures. While no analytical 
results produced probability levels exceeding p<.05, four of the five 
analytical results are generally consistent with other standards as 
they relate to exploratory research (Hays, 1973). 
The third hypothesis, calling for greater inter-city differences 
among the extraorganizational criteria than among the intraorganiza-
tional was deemed fully supported by the analyses. All measures of 
intercity differences among the extraorganizational criteria were 
found to exceed all intercity difference measures among the intra-
organizational criteria. 
DISCUSSION 
To this point, discussion has been limited to one of the two 
classes of organizational decision making criteria. While useful, the 
original goal of the dissertation was to additionally develop a model 
within which both classes of criteria could be incorporated, a goal 
necessitating a general discussion of the findings employing both 
series of analyses. Accordingly, the pages which follow will address 
simultaneously the intraorganizational as well as the extraorganiza-
tional decision making criteria in order to assess the worth of the 
two when considered together. 
At the most fundamental level, the dissertation employed the 
Primitive Economy Model as a general statement of how an organizational 
entity might address two distinct classes of goals. Limitation of the 
model to two classes of goals, as opposed to three or more, was a 
decision made in order to simplify the initial analysis of 
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extraorganizational goals as a newly recognized class of influences. 
While simplifying the analytical process, this approach left 
unaddressed many of the criteria addressed inthe initial chapter 
including such motivators as managerial goals, and a number of the 
organizational goals. The exclusion of these measures from the 
analyses undertaken in this research undoubtedly affected the findings 
of the research, but allowed the assessment of two broad classes of 
goals with a relatively efficient interviewing instrument. Subject 
to the limitations born of this necessary decision, the analyses 
presented in the preceding pages allowed for a relatively crude initial 
application of the Primitive Economy Model employing goals which 
roughly represent internal motivations as perceived by non-profit 
organizations, as well as those more directly identified as extra-
organizational. 
Interesting is the fact that the two classes of goals were shown 
to be responsive to different classes of influence. This is probably 
the most important finding of the study. Where intraorganizational 
criteria were found to be responsive primarily to organizational 
characteristics and not at all to community influences, the extra-
organizational criteria were found to be less subject to influence by 
organizational variables and considerably more responsive to contextual 
influences identified as being associated with the organizations' 
community contexts. This set of findings suggests a number of ideas 
concerning organizational behavior as it is encountered in the human 
services industry. 
First and foremost, it appears from the findings that 
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organizational decision making is more complex than is generally 
acknowledged. Not only were two independent general types of criteria 
found to be employed in the assessment of benefits associated with 
organizational decision making, but each was found to respond to 
different classes of influence. 
On the one hand lie the intraorganizational criteria. These 
include the general notion of profit (broadened to include beneficial 
trades of commodities other than money), growth, staff welfare, 
autonomy, and time preference as applied to returns on investment. 
These criteria were found to be resistant to local variations in their 
valuation, but were found to covary with such organizational variables 
as organizational goal (function, and position in network), and 
environmental uncertainty as identified in the local public, at the 
state and federal levels, and within the interorganizational network. 
On the other hand are the extraorganizational criteria. Existing 
independently of the intraorganizational measures addressed above, 
these measures of success were found to vary considerably by locale, 
and to additionally reflect influence born of organizational charac-
teristics. 
The simultaneous existence of the two classes of goals and the 
two classes of influence suggests that the simultaneous acknowledgement, 
if not the actual treatment, of both classes of phenomena involves a 
sophisticated and complex decision making process and a discerning eye 
for influences. 
This general pattern of findings would tend to lend support to 
the Primitive Economy Model, at least to the extent that the limited 
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application of the model in this dissertation would allow. It will be 
recalled that the PEM suggests that organizations respond simulta-
neously to goals which are unique to the organizations themselves, and 
to goals which are associated most directly with entities outside the 
organization. Moreover, the model suggests that the two classes of 
goals are independent of one another. Both general stipulations were 
vindicated in this application. First, it was found that organiza-
tional identification of valuation patterns pertaining to intraorgani-
zational goals was not linearly associated with their treatment of 
extraorganizational goals, as is explained in Appendix I. This lack 
of association was additionally supported through the distinctions 
which separate the influences impacting upon each class of goal, as 
identified in Chapter IV and above. Finally, it was found thdt the 
actual locus of influence impacting upon each type of goal is different: 
intraorganizational goals tend on the whole to be affected by forces 
outside the locale, while extraorganizational orientations tend to be 
associated with local influences. 
The Differential Mix Hypothesis, a derivative of the Primitive 
Economy Model suggesting that organizations may be typed according to 
their mixes of goals, also gained support in this dissertation. Typing 
organizations by locale, it was found that organizational orientations 
toward extraorganizational measures of success do indeed reflect 
differences by city: in this respect, organizations may be typed by 
location. With respect to intraorganizational criteria, however, 
location does not constitute an effective means of classifying 
organizations. This conclusion is derived from the fact that Community 
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shares little variance with these measures of organizational success. 
Over and above the discussion of the implications of the disser-
tation's findings, it is appropriate to address the findings themselves. 
By and large, the analytical results of this study are clouded by 
significance levels which fall short in varying degree of commonly 
accepted parameters. While due note has been made in the textual 
discussions of the analytical results, it is appropriate to discuss 
possible reasons why the associations did not meet these criteria. 
A clear explanation centers on the null hypothesis: it is 
entirely possible that the analyses do not meet commonly accepted 
parameters of statistical significance simply because the theoretical 
development of the dissertation's hypotheses is faulty, and because the 
Primitive Economy Model itself is an ineffective model of organiza-
tional behavior. 
Unfortunately, the findings themselves do not offer sufficient 
grounds to fully refute the null hypothesis in the traditional way; 
measures of statistical significance do not permit it. There are a 
number of reasons, however, to question whether the dissertation's 
premises should be dismissed, and these will be discussed in the pages 
to follow. They include observations relating to sampling, to the 
application of the model, and to the methodological approaches employed 
in analysis. 
1. Exploratory Nature of the Dissertation. Perhaps the greatest 
single impediment to this study is the fact that this constitutes the 
first empirical application of the Primitive Economy Model and of the 
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Differential Mix Hypothesls. 
This in itself constitutes a potential weakness in the anlytical 
work simply because it connotes no prior work in those areas where the 
model offers novel insights; no author has previously addressed extra-
organizational decision making criteria in this type of an empirical 
application. Because this is the model's first application it is 
reasonable to assume that mistakes may well have been made or, in the 
absence of mistakes, that various steps in the execution of the 
research design may have been less effective than could have been the 
case. At least two steps in the conduct of the research could well 
have suffered as a result. 
Instrument deveZopment. The dependent variables for the 
dissertation, it will be recalled, were developed from two instruments 
designed explicitly to yield measures of intra- and extraorganizational 
goals. These were not haphazardly developed. In each case, items 
were developed in order to plumb a range of carefully selected types 
of goals which would reflect not only organizational orientations, but 
also those of the market in which they operate and those of other 
entities with whom service agencies transact business as identified in 
prior work (O'Brien and Wetle, 1978). These efforts notwithstanding, 
the fact that many of the issues addressed through the instruments--
particularly those relating to the extraorganizational criteria--had 
not been addressed in earlier empirical work undoubtedly affected the 
veracity of the measures actually employed in the instruments, and this 
condition would ultimately reflect in the analyses employing these 
measures as dependent variables. 
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Dependent variable deveZopment. The potential for weakness 
in the various individual measures were critical in the decision to 
employ composite measures as dependent variables. It is widely recog-
nized that factor analysis allows the development of indexes which 
represent variables only indirectly reflected in data through measures 
explicitly included in data gathering instruments. Through the 
selective inclusion of these explicit measures into a composite 
representation of the indirectly represented variable, it is possible 
to operationalize that concept. There are several benefits associated 
with this approach to variable development, including the recognition 
of variables potentially more fundamental to a researchable issue than 
was initially thought to be the case, and the ability to gain more 
widely-based measures of a concept than would be possible through 
single measures. Unfortunately, there are also potential costs in 
precision which accompany the development of factor-based composite 
measures. The first point of potential loss involves the selection of 
variables for inclusion in a composite index; some arbitrary decision 
is ultimately necessary. While a number of approaches have been 
documented in the literature, one which is widely employed and which 
was used in this application involves the selection of measures with 
factor loadings exceeding .30; often accompanying this approach is a 
parallel decision to assign measures with loadings over .30 on two or 
more factors to that factor upon which it loads most highly. While 
this approach serves the ends of parsimony and univocity, it does not 
necessarily maximize precision in the operationalization of the 
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factor-derived variable. Three potential limitations bear upon this 
problem. First, the contributions of measures with loadings under .30 
are lost. While the contributions of these measures would likely be 
small, they nonetheless represent contributions and in their absence 
they detract from the composite variable's precision. Second, 
variables loading more highly than .30 on two factors are lost to the 
factor upon which the lesser loading occurred. This problem in assign-
ment occurred in the operationalization of Expressive Coordination, 
doubtless with costs for that measure's precision. 
The third point of potential loss in precision involves the 
manner in which the variance of these measures included in a factor 
are treated in the process of aggregation. As noted in Chapter III, 
a number of approaches exist for addressing this treatment, each 
offering relative advantages and disadvantages. The approach employed 
in this dissertation was found to offer mid-range performance with 
respect to four standards of performance (univocity, validity, 
reliability, correlatedness), while others offered more advantageous 
performance among certain standards of performance at the expense of 
others. Having acknowledged these issues, it is appropriate to note 
that the method selected--the simple summing of all measures--
overstates the contribution of each individual measure to total 
variance and therefore introduces error variance which will adversely 
impact the precision with which the composite measure is operation-
alized. As with the other po~nts mentioned above, analytical 
precision must ultimately reflect this condition. 
Each of these three points represents a calculated risk. While 
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each frequently accompanies the analytical application of early models, 
they nonetheless are likely reflected in tests of statistical signifi-
cance. 
2. Model Operationalization. The Primitive Economy Model, 
which forms the conceptual basis for this dissertation's development 
and execution, was developed in the first and second chapters as a 
utility function. As such, it was presented essentially as a statement 
of organizational goal mix and, through the valuation terms, as a goal 
hierarchy. In this form, problems associated with the comparable 
operationalization of largely incomparable goals were minimized, and 
the concept of cost was designed out of the problem. These were 
necessary precautions tak~n to avoid problems which have defied 
adequate solution in a wide range of applications (for example, see 
Clawson and Knetsch, 1966). In spite of this necessity, however, this 
skeletal treatment of the Primitive Economy Model almost certainly 
diminishes the degree to which differences in goal orientation can be 
assessed. 
3. Methodological Issues. While the discussion presented above 
bears a number of methodological implications, a number of other forces 
more closely associated with design-related issues also warrant 
discussion. 
SeZection of cities. As noted in Chapter III, the selection of 
cities was governed by a number of parameters designed to enhance 
certain types of variance and to diminish others. The use of six 
cities and those cities' specific selection were in part determined 
through budgetary constraints. While the ability to employ comparable 
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data gathered virtually simultaneously in six cities constitutes an 
opportunity of the highest order--particularly for the manner of 
research employed in this dissertation--it is still appropriate to note 
that six is not a large number and that the hypotheses advanced in this 
study could possibly have been better assessed through the employment 
of a greater number of cities, or through greater geographic dispersion 
among the six, with particular emphasis on the latter. As noted 
earlier, communities tend to exist in open systems of social units 
extending in steadily increasing scales to the national and world 
levels. The fact that all cities selected for this study are located 
in the western third of the nation, in this context, undoubtedly 
diminishes the differences apparent between locales by effectively 
reducing the differences arising out of regional differences. On the 
one hand, this regional concentration lends greater weight to those 
differences identified as being associated with intercity distinctions 
and therefore largely local in scale. On the other hand, national 
policy connotes implementation in locales within all regions of the 
country, and so differences manifested at the local level from 
regional influences are appropriate matters of study. They would also 
likely enhance the degree of interlocal difference identified in a 
study such as this. 
ContextuaZ anaZysis. Contextual analysis, as described earlier, 
comprises an analytical approach which allows the researcher to 
assess influences born of environmental sources affecting focal units 
of analysis. While its use in prior studies (Wright, 1977; Meyer, 
1970; Farkas, 1974; Heyck and Klecka, 1973) is well reported, a 
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consistent characteristic of these studies involves general weakness of 
findings as evidenced in relatively low measures of statistical signi-
significance. In large measure, it is reasonable to suggest that 
contextual influences, such as those identified in education (Meyer, 
1970), constitute subtle forces which are difficult to define and 
measure. This assessment would seem to be appropriate to the research 
reported in this document, where community-related influences generated 
associations among the extraorganizational decision making criteria 
which, in terms of probability levels, are relatively weak. 
The preceding discussion is oriented to a brief explication of 
the findings of the research reported in this dissertation, and to the 
provision of possible explanations for relatively weak results which 
could compete with the null hypothesis. The most powerful argument in 
this respect, however, lies in patterns reflected in the findings 
themselves. While this issue was largely addressed in preceding 
discussion, it bears brief reconsideration here as well. Two classes 
of findings are appropriate to note. 
First, the findings of the dissertation as they relate to 
relevant literatures are consistent with expectations advanced in 
those literaturesi this class of associations lend a measure of 
indirect external validation to this work. Particularly relevant in 
this respect are a number of points relating to the organizational 
exchange literature. Waldman's (1972) input and output components 
are frequently apparent in the results of these analyses, and 
associations between organizations and relevant environmental entities 
tend on the whole to mirror expectations born of that literature. 
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Second, patterns apparent in the findings themselves tend to 
reinforce inclinations away from the null hypothesis. Particularly 
apparent in this regard is the difference in strengths of associations 
linking community with the intraorganizational criteria and with the 
extraorganizational criteria. Were these associations strictly 
spurious in nature, it is doubtful that degrees of strength between 
Community and the two classes of criteria would have differed so 
markedly. It will be recalled that associations between Community and 
the intraorganizational criteria were found to reflect probability 
levels ranging from p<.684 to p<.867, while those reflecting extra-
organizational criteria varied from p<.076 to p<.229, with three 
reflecting p<.lOO. While none of the individual significance measures 
meet normal criteria, the patterns in which the findings are encountered 
makes difficult the wholesale rejection of the dissertation's findings. 
In his discussion of significance levels, William L. Hays (1973) 
warns that the unquestioning application of tests of statistical 
significance can lead to the dismissal of valuable findings. In so 
doing, he notes the following. 
Stripped of the language of decision theory and of concern 
with personal probabilities, all that a significant result 
implies is that one has observed something relatively unlikely 
given the hypothetical situation, but relatively more likely 
given some alternative situation. Everything else is a matter 
of what one does with this information. Statistical signifi-
cance is a statement about the likelihood of the observed 
result, nothing else. It does not guarantee that something 
important, or even meaningful, has been found (p. 384). 
He goes on to point out that investigators should be aware that 
meaningful findings can easily be dismissed through their failures to 
meet conventional measures of statistical significance. He says that, 
conventions about significant results should not be turned 
into canons of good scientific practice. Even more 
emphatically, a convention must not be made a superstition. 
It is interesting to speculate how many of the early 
discoveries in physical science would have been statistically 
significant in the experiments where they were first observed. 
Even in the crude and poorly controlled experiment, some 
departures from expe~:tation stand out simply because they are 
interesting and suggest things to us that we might not be able 
to explain. These are matters that warrant looking into 
further regardless of what the conventional rule says to 
decide. Statistics cannot do the scientist's basic job--
looking and wondering and looking again (po 385). 
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It is suggested that the findings and conclusions of this disser-
tation are consistent with these caveats. Alone, conventional measures 
of statistical significance preclude the acknowlegement of community 
differences in the orientations of agencies to the interests of the 
communities in which they operate. The patterns evident in the data, 
however, suggest that these differences are differentially active among 
the two classes of organizational goals studies. These consistent 
differences, combined with supportive expectations derived from the 
literature, suggest that there may indeed be substantive associations 
in the data which, for a number of reasons, fail to meet conventional 
measures of statistical significance. 
Mindful of these issues, the most general finding of the disser-
tation may be advanced as follows: general support has been found for 
the notion that organizations do orient to extraorganizational as well 
as intraorganizational issues in the conduct of their affairs. 
Moreover, the patterns evident in the goals identified as more 
important than others to organizations were found to differentially 
vary between cities. While no variation was discerned between locales 
with respect to intraorganizational decision making criteria, 
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considerable variation was identified among the extraorganizational 
decision making criteria. This pattern of results suggests the 
rejection of the study's first hypothesis--that inter-local differences 
would be found in organizations' orientations to intraorganizational 
goals. Results further suggest that the dissertation's second and 
third hypotheses--that interlocal differences would be identified 
among the extraorganizational criteria l and that these differences 
would exceed those found among the intraorganizational criteria--not 
be rejected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding pages in this chapter are generally oriented to a 
brief recounting of the theoretical development of the Primitive 
Economy Model, and to a general discussion of analytical findings. The 
section immediately preceding discussed various strengths and weak-
nesses in the initial application of the Primitive Economy Model as 
undertaken in this research endeavor. This section will attempt in 
the broadest possible terms to summarize the conclusions of the 
research reported in this dissertation. Discussion will be limited to 
broad conclusions as distilled from the analyses reported earlier, and 
will be followed by a discussion of theoretical and policy implications 
which might be derived from the conclusions presented here. 
As noted earlier, one of the most important conclusions to 
emanate from this dissertation relates to organizational decision 
making, which is indicated here to be a more complex process than is 
widely acknowledged to be the case. The literature reviewed in the 
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early phases of the dissertation was designed to trace the development 
of current organizational theory, which in large measure constitutes a 
treatment of organizational goals. Two issues were apparent throughout 
that discussion. First, the degree of specificity required in a model 
of organizational decision making is largely a product of the planned 
uses of the model. until relatively recently, the microeconomic model 
of the firm, the simplest model discussed, was more than sufficient to 
meet the demands placed upon it, and there continue to exist a range 
of uses for which it is admirably suited. Nonetheless, there also 
exist a range of uses for which its simplicity ill suits it for use. 
It is for these uses that the various models discussed later, including 
the Primitive Economy Model, are potentially better equipped. This 
point leads to a second observation: organizational decision making is 
oriented to a range of goals and, when examined closely, demands a 
complex model. Employing only those models discussed in the first 
chapter, it is reasonable to posit an organizational utility function 
embracing a dozen or more goals, most of which are not consistent with 
one another. This observation alone suggests a managerial capacity for 
decision making which is very highly developed, even in models 
embracing only intraorganizational goals. The addition of goals which 
are best associated with extraorganizational parties and conditions 
lends even greater complexity to the model, and suggests the existence 
of a valuational mechanism for relating goals of considerable dis-
similarity. 
Just as important is the fact that stimulants of organizational 
activity appear to be multi-faceted and, on the whole, relatively 
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limited in the type of response they generate. Indeed, in terms of the 
policy implications to be discussed shortly, this may be the most 
important finding to ernanage from the study. In this regard, a certain 
class of variables tends to covary with organizational orientations 
toward various measures of their own welfare. The function of the 
organization, for example, is clearly associated with its orientation 
toward funding and other, similar issues, such as instability among 
extralocal governmental bodies. Similarly, instability among the 
local population as a whole tends to heighten organizational orienta-
tions toward autonomy. While instability among local agencies 
diminishes organizational orientations toward its own welfare, inter-
local distinctions do not impact upon these orientations. However, 
phenomena active at the local level, such as local public and inter-
organizational turbulence, do. Orientations toward expressive indica-
tions of interorganizational support are inversely associated with 
turbulence in that arena. Finally, interlocal distinctions appear to 
be important in orientations to the extraorganizational benefits 
arising out of concerted organizational activity. In general, the 
impacts of those influences identified as impacting upon organizational 
goals appear to be quite specific. 
Finally, within the context identified by the previous discussion, 
it appears that organizations in different communities do in fact 
differ in their orientations to certain classes of goals, and so very 
likely differ in their behaviors. This issue, addressed explicitly in 
the study's research question, constitutes the analytical focus of the 
dissertation and, more generally, bears important implications for the 
administration and delivery of human services. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretical Implications 
As was noted earlier, the findings of the dissertation bear 
directly on two relevant literature: community theory and organiza-
tional theory. 
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While not accorded a prominent role in the theoretical develop-
ment of this dissertation's analytical approach, an important element 
of the project's design involved expectations of orientational 
differences between organizations in different cities. That these 
differences were identified only among one of two classes of organiza-
tional goals is noteworthy and generally consistent with expectations 
born of this literature. The identification of such differences among 
extraorganizational goals connotes differences in the goals and values 
of organizations' environments as identified by location. This finding 
implies the existence of social cohesion and of uniqueness within 
communities, both of which are characteristics of communities identified 
in the literature. In this sense, the findings of this study provide a 
new source of empirical verification for those theoretical explications. 
That community was not identified as a determinant of intraorganiza-
tional orientations is probably not so much a denial of community-
related influences as it is an indication of how far community-related 
influences can be expected to extend. Stated alternatively, this 
pattern of findings would lend credence to a general tendency among 
organizations to engage in endeavors which at least up to a point serve 
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their own interests. 
Closely related to these points is the role of environments as 
determinants of organizational behavior. Five environmental components 
were addressed in the analyses reported earlier, including four 
measures of turbulence, and Community. That each was found to exhibit 
unique patterns of association with various organizational orientations 
is supportive both of contentions that environments share operative 
associations with organizations, and that environments may best be 
conceptualized not as integral, but rather as collections of hetero-
geneous sub-components. Again, this finding is consistent with the 
literature. 
This dissertation employed as its integrating model a relatively 
recent contribution to organizational theory, the Primitive Economy 
Model (O'Brien, 197Gb), and its corollary, the Differential Mix 
Hypothesis. Each warrants discussion. 
The Primitive Economy Model in itself constitutes a theoretical 
development of considerable magnitude in that it provides a basis for 
incorporating the two classes of goal into a common statement. As 
such, it suggests new approaches to the concepts of exchange and 
reciprocity which have not gained common favor among those who analyze 
organizations. These fundamental considerations aside, however, the 
Primitive Economy Model is a logical extension of the work advanced by 
others and described in the first chapter. First, it incorporates the 
work of economists and others who suggest a range of goals relating to 
the economic well-being of the organization and of parties associated 
with the organization. Second, the Primitive Economy Model 
217 
incorporates into the context established by economists the work of 
organizational theorists addressing environmental issues. Together, 
these characteristics of the model promise the analysis of organiza-
tional issues at a level of considerably greater specificity and 
precision than would otherwise be possible. Above all, the model is 
adaptable to a wide range of research contexts. While those environ-
mental components of greatest interest in this particular application 
of the Primitive Economy Model were local in nature, a myriad of others 
are amenable to the model as well: environments could be identified 
in terms of funding sources, markets, regulatory bodies, industries, 
regional locations, and a host of others as dictated by the nature of 
potential research. Similarly, the nature of extraorganizational 
benefits and beneficiaries can be adapted to suit the needs of the 
researcher. While acknowledging that the Primitive Economy Model 
could only be applied in partial form in this dissertation, it is 
nonetheless appropriate to claim support for the model within those 
limitations. 
The Differential Mix Hypothesis constitutes the means by which 
the Primitive Economy Model was adapted to this research application. 
Like the model from which it was developed, this analytical tool is 
amenable to a broad range of uses and research settings. Moreover, the 
model is consistent with existing approaches to organizational analysis. 
Probably the most readily identifiable value of the Differential Mix 
Hypothesis lies in its potential for verifying taxonomies developed 
from theoretical grounds. To the extent that classificatory schemes 
are posited to reflect potential differences in behavior or goal, this 
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tool provides a device by which such differences may be specified and 
tested. 
Policy Implications 
It will be recalled that the research undertaken in this disser-
tation is based on a rather specific class of organizations and, 
further, that the cities within which sampling occurred exhibit a 
restricted range of populations. Because these findings of necessity 
reflect decisions made in the sampling process, it is necessary to 
explicitly limit the implications drawn from the research to the popu-
lation of organizations from which the sample was derived. Two such 
restrictions apply. 
1. Organizations. The organizational sample upon which analyses 
are based and findings derived is almost solely comprised of human 
service agencies. While these agencies display a broad range of 
characteristics pertaining to function, location, relation to federal 
funding sources, and others, they nonetheless are distinguishable from 
most other organizational types through the relatively complete 
separation of their input components from those benefitting from their 
operation. Where commercial firms typically derive their income from 
precisely those parties--their customers--employing their products, 
service agencies generally orient to transfer programs whereby 
resources from one element of a constituency are passed to members of 
another constituent population. This is an important distinction. 
2. Cities. It will be recalled from Chapter IV that for a 
number of reasons the sites addressed in this survey were limited to 
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mid-sized cities. Smaller cities were deleted in order to avoid 
simplicity in interorganizational networks, while larger cities were 
avoided in order to obviate unwanted complexity in organizations' 
operational environments. Implicit in this sampling stipulation is an 
awareness that realities in both operational settings--large and small 
cities--likely differ from those of mid-sized locales, and these 
differences necessarily limit the direct application of the disserta-
tion's findings. 
Within these parameters, the dissertation's findings suggest 
three policy implications of merit. 
First and foremost, the tendency for local organizations to 
orient to different extraorganizational goals in different locales 
suggests that coordinating programs designed to be implemented through-
out states, regions, and the nation must embrace a degree of flexibility 
in order to "fit" with operational realities in various locales. 
Accordingly, goals identified by extralocal entities undertaking such 
strategies should be kept general, allowing for a range of diversity in 
the development of specific implementation strategies at the local 
level. In a real sense, this point is largely a vindication of the 
approach employed by the Administration on Aging in its organization of 
aging services networks in locales around the country. By mandating a 
general condition--the creation of agency networks so as to provide a 
range of services to elderly clients-~the AoA left room for the local 
tailoring of programs as demanded by local conditions and needs. 
Second, it appears from this dissertation's findings that 
extralocal funding is not a major factor in the orientation of firms 
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toward their communities. Virtually all firms contacted in the survey 
were dependent in some measure upon federal or state sources for their 
funding, yet the findings suggest differences in extraorganizational 
goal hierarchies between locales. This finding is sUbstantiated in 
the lack of associations evidenced between agencies' reliance on 
federal funding and their orientations toward the eight decision making 
criteria. In short, federal monies do not appear to be influential in 
establishing the nature of organizational-environmental linkages at the 
local level; rather, it would appear that organizations do in fact 
develop in response to local conditions and that external support 
follows as agencies mature, as their early funding sources are lost, 
or as support is sought for new, locally-initiated organizations. This 
observation is not intended to suggest that federal funding is not 
instrumental in developing new services for clients. It was not 
unusual during interviews with agency directors, for example, to 
encounter agencies which would extend their services to new classes of 
clients were resources available. In these cases, funding availability 
would benefit new classes of clients with services which would be new 
to them. In virtually all cases, however, the services themselves and 
the motivation for their initial introduction were locally derived. 
Indeed, the identity of target populations was found to vary consider-
ably from locale to locale. In sum, the role of locale in the 
development of human services is both important and pervasive. 
Third, to the extent that monetary and other classes of intra-
organizational inducements are effective in promoting desired ends 
among service agencies, this effectiveness is likely to be universally 
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realized in spite of intercity differences. Agencies in all cities 
studied were equally attuned to intraorganizational measures of success. 
This is not an inconsequential finding, for a great deal of policy can 
be implemented within the parameters of locally-defined organizational 
responsibilities and goals. Agencies, for example, can provide needed, 
existing services to new classes of clients, and interorganizational 
systems can be established or combined for a broad range of ends. In 
each case and in many others, a clearly defined desired end and 
requisite resources can lead to very clear and desired responses at the 
local level. 
In the final analysis, the findings of this dissertation research 
suggest that local service provision is best seen as a cooperative 
endeavor undertaken by local and extralocal organizations acting in 
concert, each providing a set of mutually compatible resources in 
responding to a problem. Local entities can identify problems, act 
appropriately, and provide staffing and direction. Extralocal agencies--
th~ federal government, the United Jewish Appeal, the Salvation Army, 
the Red Cross, and countless others--provide funds and, perhaps, 
technologies and operational procedures. In large measure, each is 
reliant upon the other, and each is a determinant of the other's 
ability and success. 
In the final analysis, the research presented in this doCument 
offers support to the theoretical foundations upon which it is based. 
Findings suggest that economic considerations tend to be universal 
among agencies, as is posited in the economic literature. Other 
findings suggest, however, that organizations respond to influences 
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other than the purely intraorganizational, and that in so doing they 
address issues relating to their operational environments. In many 
cases, characteristics of environmental influence were found to yield 
relatively constant reactions regardless of community setting, though 
it was also shown that the simple fact of geographic location also 
influences certain aspects of organizational operation. In all, this 
research suggests that the operational reality of human services 
organizations is a complex of goals, environmental forces, and 
linkages which, if fully understood, would allow considerable fine-
tuning of existing and potential service networks. It is hoped that 
the dissertation, in exploring this array of forces, added a degree 
of insight to that end. 
In all, the research reported in this document shares with most 
other investigations the disquieting quality of producing more 
questions than it answered. This ubiquitous quality would seem to 
suggest that perhaps the real value of academic inquiry lies not in 
providing answers to questions, but rather in compounding our perceived 
ignorance by adding to the scales again~t which it is measured. 
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APPENDIX I 
TESTS OF MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2 
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A critical assumption in this application of the Primitive 
Economy Model lies in the independence of intraorganizational decision 
criteria from the extraorganizational decision criteria. 
As represented in formula (14), the two are envisioned as 
separate considerations in the decision making process, independent of 
one another except through their functional relations to the decision 
making process and outcome. They are derived from different sources, 
and compel organizations to assess their operational options both with 
respect to the direct net rewards accruing to the organization itself 
and to entities outside the organization. Accordingly, the independence 
of the two types of criteria constitute a cornerstone of the Primitive 
Economy Model. 
A quite different conceptualization, not supportive of the 
Primitive Economy Model, could also be intuitively derived. Here, 
extraorganizational considerations are important only to the extent 
that they enhance the likelihood of attaining intraorganizational 
goals. An example could be cited in the sponsorship for public 
relations purposes of public broadcasting programming by numerous 
firms. 
The instruments and variables developed both in the original 
study and in this dissertation were developed to assess the former 
model, implicitly citing the mutual independence of the two sets of 
criteria. It is, therefore, appropriate to test the various operation-
alizations of the two sets of criteria in order to assess their 
demonstrated independence. 
Two such tests were undertaken. The first compares 
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intercorrelations between the 24 items comprising Instruments 1 and 2 
(see Chapter IV), the second involves the factor analysis of all 24 
items, and the third assesses intercorrelations between the eight 
composite variables employed in the dissertation's analyses as opera-
tionalizations of the two types of criteria. 
The results of these tests are reported below. 
1. Correlational Analysis. The first analytical test of the two 
instruments' mutual independence involved the inspection of the cor-
relation matrix relating the 24 items from both instruments. Three 
sets of comparisons were performed. First, the number of correlations 
exceeding an absolute value of .30 were counted; if the two instruments 
are in fact unrelated, there should be a higher incidence of correla-
tions greater than .30 between paired items from the same instruments 
than between pairs representing both. Second, the median correlation 
was determined for pairs within each of the instruments, and for pairs 
representing bothi here the median values representing pairs within 
instruments should exceed that found for pairs between the two. 
Finally, the highest correlations for pairs within and between 
instruments were determined; again, this value should be higher for 
pairs derived from the same instrument than for pairs derived from both. 
Table XLIV summarizes these comparisons. 
Of the 144 pairs of items representing both instruments, none 
reflected a correlation equalling or exceeding .30. This compares with 
10 of 66 pairs from Instrument 1, and with 14 of 66 pairs from 
Instrument 2 which exceed .30. This comparison is interpreted as 
supportive of the two instruments' independence. 
236 
Median correlation values support the same interpretation. 
Correlations relating items within Instrument 1 reflect a median of 
.16968, while those reflecting pairs derived from Instrument 2 present 
a median of .16683. Paired items from both instruments, however, have 
a median value of .07749. 
TABLE XLIV 
SELECTED DESCRIPTORS OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PAIRED ITEMS 
FROM INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2 
Pairs of Items 
From 
Instrument 1 
Pairs of Items 
From Both 
Instruments 
Pairs of Items 
From 
Instrument 2 
Number of 
Correlations 
<.30 
10 of 66 
o of 144 
14 of 66 
Median 
Correlation 
.16968 
.077 49 
.16683 
Overall, however, these analyses do lend credence to the assump-
tion being tested. Both of the comparisons, involving the number of 
correlations exceeding .30 and median correlations, provide clear 
support for the assumption. 
2. Factor Analysis. As a different test of independence between 
the two instruments, a factor analysis was undertaken employing all 24 
items from the two instruments. In this analysis, it was hypothesized 
that factors developed would all fall within one of the two checklists. 
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To the extent that no factor was comprised of items from both instru-
ments, their mutual independence would be supported. 
Table XLV presents the results of the analysis. Eight factors 
were generated before the program's default option terminated the 
analysis. As can be seen in the table, only on the eighth factor did 
items from both instruments load above .30 load on the same factor. 
In each of the first seven factors, all items loading higher than .30 
on a factor represent the same instrument. 
Like that of the correlation analysis, this result is deemed 
supportive of the mutual independence of the two instruments. 
3. Correlational Analysis of Composite Variables. While the two 
analyses described above are deemed supportive of the assumption in 
question, it was deemed wise to assess the degree to which the composite 
variables derived from the items which display mutual freedom of 
variance. 
Accordingly, Pearson's Product-Moment Correlations measuring the 
strength of relation between paired variables representing Intra-
organizational and Extraorganizational criteria were developed. These 
correlations are reported in Table XLVI. As can be seen, the highest 
correlation relating External Orientation to Autonomy is .263. The 
median correlation is .137. As with the others, this analysis was 
deemed supportive of the mutual independence of the two instruments. 
In sum, the three results described above were all deemed 
supportive of the mutual independence of the Intraorganizational and 
Extraorganizational Decision Making criteria. Accordingly, the analyses 
comprising the testing of the dissertation's thesis, and the 
TABLE XLV 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2 
Instrument Factor Factor Factor Factor 
Item 1 2 3 4 
Instrument 1( Interagenc~ Agreements 
1- (Increase Services) .252 .181 .169 -.143 
2. (Avoid Entanglements) .075 .056 .030 .630* 
3. (Here and Now Basis) .230 .251 .126 .361* 
4. (Avoid publicity) .039 .157 .183 .029 
5. (Staff Interests) -.014 .178 -.019 .163 
6. (Maintain Goals) .063 -.044 .089 .443* 
7. (Bread and Butter) .053 .181 -.021 .109 
8. (Increase Departments) -.273 .221 .116 -.088 
9. (Stress Clear Agreements) .161 .348* .070 .442* 
10. (Hard Bargain) -.069 .569* .021 .161 
11. (Wishes of Board) .014 .497* .037 .040 
12. (Maximize Return) .068 .675* -.046 -.010 
Instrument 2( Interagenc~ Agreements and the Communit~ 
1- (Link Agencies) .259 .030 -.079 .027 
2. (Avoid Struggle) .162 .160 .225 .298 
3. (Exclude Uncooperative) -.039 -.089 .645* .001 
4. (Promote Cooperation) .597* -.006 .014 .129 
5. (Avoid Agency Building) .193 .116 .209 .083 
6. (Avoid Self-Serving Orgs) .130 .054 .470* .119 
7. (Example of Fair Play) .651* .102 .159 .081 
8. (community Leaders) .193 .056 .057 -.055 
9. (Increase Regard) .571* -.072 .106 .016 
10. (Avoid Undependable Orgs) .157 .054 .560* .134 
11. (Strengthen Capacity) .524* .160 .046 -.016 
12. (Client Input) .546* -.124 .0]8 .062 
---- *factor loadin~ greater than .300._ -~ - ---- --
Factor Factor 
5 6 
.132 -.017 
-.016 .007 
.170 .067 
.449* .005 
.440* .026 
.048 .011 
.701* -.154 
.405* .149 
.134 .072 
.267 -.071 
.035 .123 
.238 -.069 
-.047 .729* 
-.167 .293 
.220 .120 
.013 .470* 
-.236 .145 
.048 -.039 
-.205 .135 
-.003 .083 
.083 .209 
-.034 -.125 
.001 -.029 
.055 .086 
---- -----
Factor 
7 
-.187 
.043 
-.033 
.026 
.233 
-.089 
-.136 
.065 
.159 
.131 
.072 
-.125 
.053 
.259 
-.128 
.185 
.128 
.157 
.046 
.699* 
.303* 
.048 
.020 
.031 
Factor 
8 
.395* 
-.070 
.007 
-.021 
.417* 
.128 
-.059 
.101 
-.298 
.105 
.112 
-.025 
.030 
.036 
-.099 
.043 
.401* 
.078 
.071 
.006 
.137 
.206 
-.034 
.076 
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TABLE XLVI 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
I I I Intraorqani zational Extraorganizational I Criteria Criteria r A (j e II E F 
Agency r= 
Enhancement (AI p= 
n= 
Autonomy (B) r= .2734 
p= .001 
n= 145 
Internal r= .8569 .6347 
Or ientation (e) p= .001 .001 
n= 145 145 
Expressive r= -.0304 .2231 .1089 
Coordination (D) p= .358 .003 .096 
n= 145 145 145 
Instrumental r= .0135 .1793 .1178 .4815 
Coordination (E) p= .436 .015 .079 .001 
n= 145 145 145 147 
Exel us ion (F) r= .1365 .1441 .2109 .1901 .1909 
p= .051 .042 .005 .011 .010 
n= 145 145 145 147 147 
Outside r= .0200 .1050 .0413 .6212 .5776 .1382 
Input (G) p= .406 .104 .311 .001 .001 .048 
n= 145 145 145 147 147 147 
External r= .0579 .2633 .2111 .7673 .7711 .6353 
Orientation (II) p= .245 .001 .005 .001 .001 .001 
n= 145 145 145 147 147 147 
A B c D E F 
G 
.6149 
.001 
147 
G 
II 
H 
N 
W 
\0 
interpretations of the analyses' results, will reflect the tested 
assumption of this independence. 
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TABLE XLVII 
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE, INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA BY COMMUNITY 
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
CRITERIA 
Source of Variance SS df 1-1S F P 
Agency Enhancement 
Between Communities 98.678 5 19.736 1.096 .365 
Within Communities 2502.542 139 18.004 
Time Preference 
Between Communities 22.160 5 4.432 .666 .650 
Within Communities 924.756 139 6.653 
Internal Orientation 
Between Communities 107.639 5 21.528 .485 .787 
Within Communities 6169.565 139 44.365 
TABLE XLVIII 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, AGENCY ENHANCEMENT 
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of variance ss 
.... Orsanizational Resources 
Organizational Resources 9.635 1 9.635 
Colllllunity 102.341 5 20.468 
Residual 2450.442 133 18.424 
2. Orsanizational Goal 
Organizational Goal 187.413 2 93.707 
Broker Agencies 139.886 1 139.886 
Direct Service Agencies 5.526 1 5.526 
Community 139.500 5 27.900 
Residual 2274.307 137 16.601 
3. Local Public uncertaintz: 
Local Public Uncertainty 34.958 1 34.958 
Community 70.618 5 14.124 
Residual 2063.966 119 17.344 
4. State and Federal Uncertaintz: 
State and Federal uncertainty 107.892 1 107.892 
Cormnunity 85.760 :; 17.152 
Residual 1889.441 124 15.238 
5. Client uncertaintz: 
Client Uncertainty 1.931 1 1.931 
Community 97.416 5 19.483 
Residual 2443.365 134 18.234 
6. Interorsanizational uncertaintz: 
Interorganizational Uncertainty 56.597 1 56.597 
Community 82.333 5 16.467 
Residual 2036.012 122 16.689 
245 
F 
.523 .471 
1.111 .358 
5.645 .004 
8.426 .004 
.333 .565 
1.681 .143 
2.016 .158 
.814 .542 
7.081 .009 
1.126 .350 
.106 .745 
1.069 .381 
3.391 .068 
.987 .429 
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TABLE XLIX 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df MS F P 
1. Orsanizationa1 Resources 
Organizational Resources 13.939 1 13.939 2.136 .146 
Community 17.749 5 3.550 .544 .743 
Residual 867.954 133 6.526 
2. Orsanizatiooal Goal 
Organizational Goal 55.046 2 27.523 4.322 .015 
Broker Agencies 24.381 1 24.381 3.829 .052 
Direct Service Agencies 1.107 1 1.107 .174 .677 
ColIII\unity 19.503 5 3.901 .613 .690 
Residual 872.367 137 10.650 
3. Local Public Uncertaint:z: 
Local Public Uncertainty 14.315 1 14.315 2.096 .150 
Community 21.876 5 4.375 .641 .669 
Residual 812.669 119 6.032 
4. State and Federal uncertaint:z: 
State and Federal Uncertainty 8.255 1 8.255 1.287 .259 
Community 14.379 5 2.876 .448 .814 
Resiciual 795.442 124 6.415 
5. Client Uncertaint:z: 
Client Uncertainty 8.832 1 8.832 1. 318 .253 
Community 15.912 5 3.182 .475 .795 
Residual 898.142 134 6.703 
6. Interorganizatiooa1 uncertaint:z: 
Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 10.005 1 10.005 1.551 .215 
CollDllunity 19.514 5 3.903 .605 .696 
Residual 787.114 122 6.452 
TABLE L 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, INTERNAL ORIENTATION 
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df MS 
1. Orgnizational Resources 
Organizational Resources 54.661 1 54.661 
Canmunity 126.075 5 25.215 
Residual 5920.308 133 44.514 
2. Organizational Goal 
Organizational Goal 357.686 2 178.843 
Broker Agencies 219.205 1 219.205 
Direct Service Agencies .295 1 .295 
Conununity 185.393 5 37.079 
Residual 5734.124 137 41.855 
3. Local Public Uncertaint:z: 
Local Public Uncertainty 157.521 1 157.521 
Community 75.353 5 15.071 
Residual 3087.662 119 25.947 
4. State and Federal Uncertaint:i 
State and Federal Uncertainty 149.404 1 149.404 
Conununity 56.001 5 11.200 
Residual 5137.590 124 41. 432 
5. Client Uncertaint:z: 
Client Uncertainty 24.799 1 24.799 
Community 91.931 5 18.386 
Residual 5993.828 134 44.730 
6. Interor~anizationa1 Uncertaint:t: 
Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 191.317 1 191.317 
Community 102.486 5 20.497 
Residual 4814.202 122 39.461 
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F P 
1. 228 .270 
.566 .726 
4.273 .016 I 
5.237 .024 
.007 .933 
.886 .492 
3.626 .059 
.347 .883 
3.606 .060 
.270 .929 
.554 .458 
.411 .840 
4.848 .030 
.519 .761 
TABLE LI 
NULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AGENCY ENHANCEMENT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi- Overall 
Beta At F At cance F At 
Step Variable Last Step Last step Of F Each Step df 
1 Broker Agencies .312 6.527 .012 8.495 1,113 
2 State dnd Federal -.278 7.349 .008 9.309 2,112 
Uncertainty 
3 Interorganizationa1 .127 1.927 .168 7.067 3,111 
Uncertainty 
4 Organizational .104 1.078 .302 5.592 4,110 
Resources 
5 Direct Service .083 .451 .503 4.537 5,109 
Agencies 
6 Clients .021 .051 .822 3.768 6,108 
Uncertainty 
7 Local Public .032 .089 .766 3.207 7,107 
Uncertainty 
8 community .621 .684 2.097 12,102 
Signifi-
cance of 
stepwise 
F 
.004 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.002 
.004 
.023 
N 
"'" ex> 
TABLE LII 
t>1ULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi- Overall 
Beta At F At cance F At 
Step Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each Step df 
1 Broker Agencies .168 1.615 .207 6.826 1,113 
2 Local Publ ic -.179 2.924 .090 4.327 2,112 
Uncertainty 
3 State and Federal .111 1.079 .301 3.398 3,111 
Uncertainty 
4 Clients .079 .658 .419 2.843 4,110 
Uncertainty 
5 Interorganizational .094 .970 .327 2.400 5,109 
Uncertainty 
6 Direct Service -.043 .107 .744 2.000 6,108 
Agencies 
7 Organizational -.005 .002 .961 1. 708 7,107 
Resources 
8 Conununity .482 .789 1.173 2,112 
Signifi-
cance of 
stepwise 
F 
.010 
.015 
.020 
.028 
.042 
.072 
.115 
.312 
N 
"'" \0 
Step 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
TABLE LIII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: INTERNAL ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi-
Signifi- Overall cance of 
Beta At F At cance F At stepwise 
Variable Last Step Last step Of F Each Step df F 
Broker Agencies .227 3.117 .080 6.822 1,113 .010 
State and Federal -.195 3.498 .064 6.139 2,112 .003 
Uncertainty 
Interorganizational .174 3.504 .064 5.375 3,111 .002 
Uncertainty 
Organizational .099 .941 .334 4.467 4,110 .002 
Uncertainty 
Local Public -.127 1. 552 .216 3.779 5,109 .003 
Uncertainty 
Clients .059 .385 .537 3.220 6,108 .006 
Uncertainty 
Direct Service .015 .014 .978 2.737 7,107 .012 
Agencies 
Community .372 .867 1. 704 2,112 .076 
N 
lJ1 
o 
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TABLE LIV 
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE, EXTRAORGfu~IZATIONAL CRITERIA BY COMMUNITY 
INTRAORGANI ZATIONAL 
CRITERIA 
Source of Variance SS df MS F P 
Instrumental Coordination 
Between Communities 49.403 5 9.881 1. 620 .159 
Within Communities 847.663 139 6.098 
Expres3ive Coordination 
Between Communities 44.320 5 8.864 1. 664 .147 
Within Communities 740.439 139 5.327 
Exclusion 
Between Communities 34.391 5 6.878 1.134 .345 
Within Communities 843.181 139 6.066 
Outside Input 
Between Communities 16.193 5 3.239 1. 912 .096 
Within Communities 235.414 139 1.694 
External Orientation 
Between Communities 142.409 5 28.482 1.119 .353 
Within Communities 3539.289 139 25.463 
TABLE LV 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION 
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df loIS F 
1- Organizational Resources 
Organizational Resources 3.848 1 3.848 .626 
Community 60.625 5 12.125 1. 973 
Residual 817.306 133 6.145 
2. Organizational Goal 
Organizational Goal 1.212 2 .606 .096 
Broker Agencies .381 1 .381 .060 
Direct Service Agencies .089 1 .089 .014 
Community 65.614 5 13.033 2.053 
Residual 882.297 139 9.482 
3. Local Public uncertaint:: . 
Local Public Uncertainty 1.242 1 1.242 .193 
Community 44.955 5 8.991 1. 400 
Residual 764.323 119 6.423 
4. State and Federal Uncertaint:: 
State and Federal Uncertainty 1.165 1 1.165 .180 
Community 49.071 5 9.814 1.515 
Residual 803.168 124 6.477 
5. Client Uncertaint:: 
Client Uncertainty .089 1 .089 .014 
Community 50.525 5 10 .105 1.627 
Residual 832.385 134 6.212 
6. Interorganizational uncertaint:: 
Interorganizational Uncertainty 4.210 1 4.210 .657 
Community 58.050 5 11.610 1.811 
Residual 795.114 124 6.412 
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p 
.430 
.087 
.909 
.807 
.906 
.075 
.661 
.229 
.672 
.190 
.905 
.157 
.419 
.116 
TABLE LVI 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION 
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df MS F 
1. Or~anizationa1 Resources 
Organizational Resources 2.778 1 2.778 .510 
Community 44.060 5 8.812 1.618 
Residual 724.383 133 5.446 
2. or~anizationa1 Goal 
Organizational Goal 6.882 2 3.441 .540 
Broker Agencies 6.095 1 6.095 .956 
Direct Service Agencies 5.157 1 5.157 .809 
Community 83.447 5 16.689 2.618 
Residual 886.134 139 6.375 
3. Local Public uncertaint;L 
Local Public Uncertainty 10.661 1 10.661 1.906 
Community 27.696 5 5.539 .995 
Residual 662.519 119 5.567 
4. State and Federal Uncertaint;L 
State and Federal Uncertainty .712 1 .712 .133 
Community 38.248 5 7.650 1.430 
Residual 663.208 124 5.348 
5. Client Uncertaint;L 
Client Uncertainty 3.805 1 3.805 .721 
Community 46.644 5 9.329 1. 768 
Residual 707.097 134 5.277 
6. Interorsanizationa1 uncertaint;L 
Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 38.116 1 38.116 6.206 
Community 83.521 5 16.704 2.716 
Residual 762.618 124 6.510 
253 
p 
.476 
.160 
.584 
.330 
.370 
.027 
.170 
.424 
.716 
.218 
.397 
.124 
.014 
.023 
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TABLE LVII 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df ~1S F --»-
1. Orsanizational Resources 
Organizational Resources 1. 725 1 1. 725 .287 .593 
Community 34.330 5 6.866 1.144 .340 
Residual 798.278 133 6.002 
2. Orsanizational Goal 
Organizational Goal 10.939 2 5.470 .831 .438 
Broker Agencies 6.389 1 6.389 .970 .326 
Direct Service Agencies 10.633 1 10.633 1.615 .206 
Community 36.416 5 7.283 1.106 .360 
Residual 915.245 139 6.584 
3. Local public uncertaint:L 
Local Public Uncertainty 10.029 1 10.029 1.601 .208 
Community 16.376 5 3.275 .523 .759 
Residual 745.325 119 6.263 
4. State and Federal Uncertalnt~ 
State and Federal Uncertainty 6.085 1 6.085 .978 .325 
Community 23.626 5 4.725 .760 .581 
Residual 771.370 124 6.221 
5. Client Uncertaint:L 
Client Uncertainty 16.504 1 16.504 2.731 .101 
Community 44.172 5 8.834 1.462 .207 
Residual 809.910 134 6.044 
6. Interorsanizationa1 Uncertaint~ 
Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 8.496 1 8.496 1.305 .255 
Community 23.549 5 4.710 .723 .607 
Residual 807.218 124 6.510 
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TABLE LVIII 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss df MS F P 
1. Or5!anizational Resources 
Organizational Resources .056 1 .056 .033 .857 
Community 16.899 5 3.380 1.970 .087 
Residual 228.197 133 1. 716 
2. Or5!anizationa1 Goal 
Organizational Goal .655 2 .328 .17<; .839 
Broker Agencies .000 1 .000 .000 .999 
Direct Service Agencies .382 1 .382 .206 .651 
Community 22.407 5 4.481 2.411 .039 
Residual 258.361 139 1.895 
3. Local Public Uncertaint:L 
Local Public Uncertainty .109 1 .109 .062 .804 
Community 14.397 5 2.879 1.621 .160 
Residual 211. 344 119 1.776 
4. State and Federal uncertaint:L 
State and Federal Uncertainty .153 1 .153 .090 .765 
COlllllunity 16.930 5 3.386 1.987 .085 
Residual 211.302 124 1. 704 
5. Client Uncertaint:L 
Client Uncertainty .058 1 .058 .033 .855 
Community 44.172 5 8.834 1.462 .105 
Residual 809.910 134 6.044 
6. In~eror5!ani~ationa1 uncertaint:L 
Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty .780 1 .780 .409 .524 
Community 19.872 5 3.974 2.085 .072 
Residual 236.418 124 1.907 
TABLE LIX 
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXTERNAL ORIENTATION 
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Covariate 
Source of Variance ss sf MS 
1. Organizational Resources 
Organizational Resources 2.587 1 2.587 
Community 147.683 5 29.537 
Residual 3439.090 133 25.858 
2. Orsanizational Goal 
Organizational Goal 34.637 2 17.319 
Broker Agencies 19.178 1 19.178 
Direct Service Agencies 33.986 1 33.986 
Community 314.118 5 62.824 
Residual 4199.251 139 30.210 
3. Local Public Uncertaint:t 
Local Public Uncertainty 28.197 1 28.197 
Community 127.478 5 25.496 
Residual 3087.662 119 25.947 
4. State and Federal Uncertaint:t 
State and Federal Uncertainty 4.978 1 4.978 
Community 152.803 5 30.561 
Residual 3372.176 124 27.195 
5. Client Uncertainty 
Client Uncertainty 3.288 1 3.288 
Community 170.281 5 34.056 
Residual 3414.242 134 25.479 
6. Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 
Interorganizational Uncertainty 124.199 1 124.119 
Community 304.529 5 60.906 
Residual 3710.239 124 29.921 
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F p 
.100 .752 
1.142 .341 
.573 .565 
.635 .427 
1.125 .291 
2.080 .072 
1.087 .299 
.983 .431 
.183 .670 
1.124 .351 
.129 .720 
1.337 .253 
4.151 .044 
2.036 .078 
Step 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
TABLE LX 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi-
Signifi- Overall cance of 
Beta At F At cance F At stepwise 
Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each Step df F 
Organizational .143 1.814 .181 .681 1,113 .411 
Resources 
Interorganizational -.075 .594 .443 .650 2,112 .524 
Uncertainty 
State and Federal -.036 .111 .740 .519 3,111 .670 
Uncertainty 
Broker Agencies -.063 .220 .640 .419 4,110 .795 
Local Public -.004 .001 .972 .340 5,109 .888 
Uncertainty 
Community 1. 761 .127 1. 056 10,104 .403 
Clients -.016 .025 .876 .953 11,103 .493 
Uncertainty 
Direct Service -.018 .018 .893 .867 12,102 .582 
Agencies 
N 
lJ1 ...... 
Step 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
TABLE LXI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi-
Signifi- Overall cance of 
Beta At F AT cance F At stepwise 
Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each Step df F 
Interorganizational -.244 6.920 .010 5.097 1,113 .026 
Uncertainty 
Local Public .132 1.932 .168 3.465 2,112 .035 
Uncertainty 
Broker Agencies .160 1.572 .213 2.559 3,111 .059 
Direct Service .116 .836 .363 2.146 4,110 .080 
Agencies 
Organizational .014 .021 .884 1.810 5,109 .117 
Resources 
Clients .047 .245 .622 1.554 6,108 .168 
Uncertainty 
Community 2.023 .081 1.807 11,103 .062 
N 
VI 
CD 
TABLE LXII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi- Overall 
Beta At F At cance F At 
Step Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each Step df 
1 Clients -.188 3.753 .055 2.478 1,113 
uncertainty 
2 Local Public .190 3.317 .072 2.283 2,112 
Uncertainty 
3 Interorganizational -.120 1.580 .212 1.856 3,111 
Uncertainty 
4 Organizational .051 .242 .624 1.577 4,110 
Resources 
5 Direct Service .154 1.419 .236 1.328 5,109 
Agencies 
6 Broker Agencies .139 1.127 .291 1.303 6,108 
7 State and Federal .061 .327 .569 1.135 7,106 
Uncertainty 
8 Community 1. 403 .229 1.259 12,102 
Signifi-
cance of 
Stepwise 
F 
.118 
.107 
.141 
.185 
.258 
.262 
.347 
.255 
N 
U1 
\D 
TABLE LXIII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABL£ 
Signifi- Overall 
Beta At F At cance F At 
Step Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each Step df 
1 Interorganizational -.064 .446 .506 .344 1,113 
Uncertainty 
2 Direct Service -.063 .424 .516 .348 2,112 
Agencies 
3 Clients -.043 .189 .665 .264 3,111 
Uncertainty 
4 Local Public .019 .031 .861 .211 4,110 
Uncertainty 
5 State and Federal -.018 .028 .867 .185 5,109 
Uncertainty 
6 Community 1. 746 .131 .969 10,104 
7 Organizational .047 .199 .656 .892 11,103 
Resources 
Signifi-
cance of 
Stepwise 
F 
.559 
.707 
.851 
.932 
.968 
.475 
.551 
N 
0'1 
o 
TABLE LXIV 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EXTERNAL ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Signifi-
Signifi- Overall cance of 
Beta At F At cance F At Stepwise 
Step Variable Last Step Last Step Of F Each step df F 
1 Interorganizationa1 -.201 4.511 .036 3.496 1,113 .064 
Uncertainty 
2 Local Public .147 1. 998 .161 2.222 2,112 .113 
Uncertainty 
3 Clients -.072 .564 .454 1.558 3,111 .204 
Uncertainty 
4 Organizational .082 .627 .430 1. 220 4,110 .306 
Resources 
5 Direct Service .116 .817 .368 1.008 5,109 .417 
Agencies 
6 Broker Agencies .109 .703 .404 .999 6,108 .430 
7 Community 2.057 .076 1. 507 11,103 .140 
8 State and Federal .012 .013 .911 1.369 12,102 .193 
Uncertainty 
N 
0\ 
...... 
APPENDIX III 
INSTRUMENTS 
For purposes of the next series of questions, we would like to 
give you a hypothetical problem to consider. 
263 
Assume that legislation is passed enacting Human Services Revenue 
Sharing. The program will be implemented by the designation of a local 
government agency to broker and monitor the pass through and use of 
the services funds. The actual service monies will be awarded through 
contracts with various local service agencies such as the one you work 
for. 
Assume that your agency is approached to participate in the 
program. To do so will result in certain modifications in your 
program and in your funding picture. In order to participate, your 
agency must negotiate a contract setting down the terms of this inter-
agency agreement. 
We are specifically interested in what factors you would 
consider in attempting both to decide whether or not to seek to 
participate in the program and, later, assuming you were interested, 
in how you would set your priorities relative to the specifics 
involved in the contract. 
INSTRUMENT 1: INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS 
A. Relative to your agency, please check the extent to which each of the following 
would constitute an important criterion in your assessment of the merits of this 
type of agreement. 
IN CONSIDERING SUCH AGREEMENTS, 
IT IS IMPORTANT • • 
1. to use such opportunities to increase the range 
of services your organization offers 
2. to avoid entanglements that diminish your 
agency's independence and self direction 
3. to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since 
future obligations may be hard to count on 
4. to avoid maing the terms of such arrangements 
a public matter 
5. to advance the professional interests of your 
staff in any new programs 
6. to avoid new activities that do not match 
your agency goals 
7. to concentrate on the bread and butter issues lik 
maximizing your share of the contract money 
B. to use such opportunities to increase the size 
of your agency staff and departments 
9. to stress clear agreements which avoid longrun 
entanglements with other organizations 
10. to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain 
11. to further the wishes of your board 
12. to maximize the return from the agreement 
to your agency 
13. to avoid the opportunity altogether because it 
is likely to be more trouble than it is worth 
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INSTRUMENT 2: INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS AND THE COMMUNITY 
STILL KEEPING IN MIND THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION ON THE PREVIOUS PAGE ••• 
B. Relative to the community, please check the extent to which each of the following 
would constitute an important criterion in your assessment of the merits of this 
type of agreement. 
IN CONSIDERING SUCH AGREEMENTS, 
IT IS IMPORTANT • • • 
1. to use the opportunity to link many 
community agencies for close coordination 
2. to avoid allowing the program to become a 
competitive struggle among many organizations 
3. to exclude agencies which have been 
uncooperative with past community efforts 
4. to promote a sense of cooperation 
among agencies in the community 
5. to minimize the share of the resources whi~h 
go for agency building and administration 
6. to avoid participation if the distribution process 
likely to be dominated by a few self serving agenc 
7. to set an example of fair play in 
conducting the negotiations 
8. to stimulate competition among 
agencies for better distribution of funds 
9. to seek consultation with community 
leaders before settling on specific terms 
10. to increase the positive regard 
of agencies for one another 
11. to discourage the award of funds to agencies with 
reputation of not following through with their agr 
12. to use the funds for strengthening the capacity 
for human services delivery in the community 
13. to assure open input from client representatives 
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